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Abstract 
 
Drive All Blames into One: 
Rhetorics of ‘Self-Blame’ and Refuge in Tibetan Buddhist Lojong, 
Nietzsche, and the Desert Fathers 
 
 
Glenn Robert Willis 
 
Professor John Makransky, Dissertation Director 
 
The purpose of this work is to differentiate the autonomous ‘self-compassion’ of 
therapeutic modernist Buddhism from pre-therapeutic Mahāyāna Buddhist practices of 
refuge, so that refuge itself is not obscured as a fundamental Buddhist orientation that 
empowers the possibility of compassion for self and other in the first place. 
The work begins by situating issues of shame and self-aversion sociologically, in 
order to understand how and why self-aversion became a significant topic of concern 
during the final quarter of the twentieth century.  This discussion allows for a further 
investigation of shame as it has been addressed first by psychologists, for whom shame 
is often understood as a form of isolating self-aversion, and then by philosophers such 
as Bernard Williams and Emmanuel Levinas, for whom shame attunes the person to the 
moral expectations of a community, and therefore to ethical commands that arise from 
beyond the individual self.  Both psychologists and philosophers are ultimately 
concerned with problems and possibilities of relationship.  These discussions prepare 
the reader to understand the importance of Buddhist refuge as a form of relationship 
that structures an integrative rather than destructive self-evaluation. 
 
 
The second chapter of the dissertation closely examines Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
work on shame.  In a late note, Nietzsche wrote that “man has lost the faith in his own 
value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him”1; the second chapter 
argues that Nietzsche’s vision of a relatively autonomous will to power cannot fully 
incorporate this important Nietzschean insight, and helps to drive the kind of self-
evaluation typical of modernist ‘personality culture,’ which is likely to become harsh. 
 The third chapter first discusses contemporary therapeutic Buddhist responses 
to self-aversion, particularly practices of ‘self-compassion’ that claim to be rooted in 
early Pali canonical and commentarial sources, before developing a commentary on the 
medieval Tibetan lojong teaching Drive all blames into one.  Drive all blames into one, 
though often discussed in contemporary commentaries as a form of self-blame, should 
be understood more thoroughly as a simultaneous process of refuge and critique—a 
process that drives further access to compassion not only for self, but for others as well. 
 Chapter Four discusses mourning and self-reproach in the apophthegmata of the 
Desert Fathers, showing how ‘self-hatred’ in this context is in a form of irony: the self 
that is denigrated is not an ultimate reality, and the process of mourning depends upon 
both an access to love and a clear recognition of our many turns away from that love. 
 In conclusion, I draw attention to the irony of modernist rejections of religious 
self-critique as supposedly harmful forms of mere shaming, even as the modernist 
emphasis on autonomy is what enables self-critique to become harsh and damaging.
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 12. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This is an extended essay about self-aversion, on the one hand, and about 
Buddhist and Christian rhetorics of ‘self-blame,’ on the other.  These are very different 
ways of understanding oneself, and they imply different understandings of the world. 
 Self-aversion expresses isolation; Buddhist and Christian practices of self-blame 
have to do with integration into broader patterns of compassion and care.  
Contemporary psychological discussions of destructive shame have too readily assumed 
that religious ‘self-blame’ is a masochism, and that therapeutic ‘self-acceptance’ is the 
primary end of any justifiable religious commitment. 
 In the history of its usage, the English word shame has held a number of 
competing but related meanings: dishonor, exposure, modesty, moral self-
consciousness.  During the past half-century, however, shame has come to refer more 
singularly to a sense of unworthiness, as part of a spectrum that includes harsh forms of 
self-contempt, laceration, castigation, and denigration. 
I find such internalized violence as occasionally melodramatic and tiresomely 
demanding as the reader may find it.  I also wish to suggest, though, that such quiet 
hatreds are a genuine problem in what the social historian Walter Susman called a 
‘personality culture’—the kind of self-amplifying, self-performative culture we live 
within, economically and otherwise. 
As personality culture intensifies, the discourses of shame proliferate.  For 
psychologists in particular, shame has recently displaced the earlier psychoanalytic 
concept of ‘guilt’ as a primary therapeutic focus.  Most importantly, shame as self-1 
 
aversion or unworthiness has become increasingly understood as a pattern of thought 
and feeling that is conditioned or imposed only from without: by early-life experience, 
by families or cultures that deny care.  This makes the psychology of shame at once a 
diagnostic approach and a form of social criticism. 
This psychological portrait of shame lends itself to what appears, at first, like 
clear moral conclusions: shame is a violent imposition.  James Gilligan has offered one of 
the most beautiful and representative indictments of shame as a foundation for 
destructive force in Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (1991), his study of 
American prisoners with histories of extraordinary early-life abuse. 
This narrative—that self-contempt is a tragic result of cultural and familial 
violence—has become powerful and prominent.  It is powerful in part because it names 
the truth of human vulnerability and the very real damages of violence, but also because 
it offers attractive possibilities of secular redemption.  Through insight into the cultural 
etiologies of one’s own shame it is possible to find and assert a more pristine identity. 
This is a basic narrative strategy of both private psychotherapy and the 
confessional of Oprah Winfrey. 2  We are showered by narratives of therapeutic 
redemption—narratives that emphasize an initial victimization and its subsequent 
transcendence.  The story of personal damage, displayed or performed for others, is 
itself a fundamental component of the therapeutic process. 
2 See Eva Illouz, Oprah Winfrey and the Glamour of Misery (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 
especially Chapter 2, “The Success of a Self-Failed Woman,” for Illouz’s analysis of public confession 
narratives (‘therapeutic biography’) as a foundation for psychological liberation narratives. 2 
                                                        
 
This is primarily an essay about religious ways of understanding the self.  I speak 
from a particular Mahāyāna Buddhist perspective, although, as the reader will see, I am 
intensely sympathetic to certain Christian understandings of mourning and self-critique.  
Of course Christianity in particular has been viewed during the past two centuries as a 
powerful source of unnecessary guilt and shaming.  One incisive contemporary 
psychologist of shame, June Price Tangney, has written that the message taken from her 
own early experience of “Sunday sermons, stories of saints, and Monday afternoon 
religious classes was that: To be a good person, you have to feel really bad.  If you’re not 
a saint, if you occasionally, inevitably sin, then your worthiness and closeness to God 
hinges on how bad you feel about those sins.  Good people feel intense remorse and 
regret, and a painful, grinding self-scrutiny and denouncement of the self.”3 
The modern distortion of Christian repentance as a strange perfectionism to be 
performed is a significant theme in European literature.  The priest with Camus’s 
Meursault, the Jesuits lecturing Stephen Daedalus, are ridiculous figures, serving only 
the power of the institutions they represent.  Repentance is presented in those works as 
a form of bad faith; resisting such distorted self-judgment is definitive of heroic, 
autonomous self-affirmation.  To be truly redeemed is to refuse repentance. 
This essay will argue that an imposed self-contempt has nothing to do with more 
mature forms of religious self-evaluation.  In Tibetan lojong, or awareness-training, the 
most central focus of this work, ‘self-blame’ is simultaneously a refuge in the basic 
ground (Tib.: shi) of compassionate awareness that enables an increasingly clear 
3 June Price Tangney and Ronda Dearing, Shame and Guilt (New York: The Guilford Press, 2002), p. 1. 3                                                         
 
recognition of the ways in which we consistently turn away from integration into that 
compassion.  Where no such integration seems believable, religious self-critique can 
only sound like a secret enjoyment of hatred. 
The following pages are implicitly and sometimes explicitly about what Buddhists 
call refuge.  But refuge is not separable from the simultaneous recognition of our most 
damaging and insidiously negative patterns of selfhood.  Christian traditions, too, seek 
to turn our attention repeatedly toward a basic choice to either participate in, or refuse, 
the agapic love within which we are always held.  And if that love is the primary reality, 
the most reasonable response to our continued refusal of that reality is a form of 
mourning. 
My most basic claim is that Christian and Buddhist forms of ‘self-blame’ are, 
contrary to therapeutic expectation, important methods of deliverance from the sorts of 
self-contempt that we now talk about as ‘shame.’ Self-aversion, in fact, is a primary 
human mistake, for both Buddhists and Christians. 
I address a primary modernist irony: we reject the very possibilities of 
connection offered by apparently destructive religious forms of self-evaluation, even 
though these practices effectively confront precisely the kinds of damaging self-
judgment that a culture of intensive self-performance demands and induces.  Devotion 
and trust, rather than expressing a sacrificial abjection, actually integrate our lives in 
important ways, and ‘self-blame’ has far more to do with trust than with aversion. 
These claims resist the kind of autonomous self-affirmation that some 
psychologists of shame and religious thinkers have recently proposed as the 4 
 
paradigmatic form of therapeutic redemption.  However, to question the narrative of 
autonomous redemption is not to favor pain.  I am concerned instead that the 
therapeutic-moralist critique of ‘shame’ during the past decades has rendered us less 
and less able to perceive older, more creative forms of self-evaluation and transcendent 
integration.  For both the Buddhist practitioner of lojong and for the Christian, 
recognizing the patterns by which we assiduously avoid love in our lives is necessarily a 
practice of participation in love itself. 
The distorted picture of forced repentance in Christian traditions has also 
influenced a very partial reception of Buddhism in the West.  Is the Buddhist emphasis 
on self-compassion not part of a wider cultural rejection of the self-evident harms of 
exhausted theistic forms of self-critique? 
In fact, for Buddhist and Christian traditions alike, practices of connection to 
compassion and love have been indispensable to the total process of unraveling false 
human autonomy and self-centeredness.  This process is particularly definitive of the 
Mahāyāna figure of the bodhisattva, one who seeks awakening with and on behalf of all 
others.  The path of the bodhisattva depends far less on ‘self-affirmation,’ however, 
than it does on a recognition of the harms we do to ourselves and to others when we 
remain unconnected to the heart of awakening itself: bodhicitta. 
The Tibetan lojong or awareness-training instruction Drive all blames into one is 
the primary commentarial focus in the central section of this work.  In order to show 
how Buddhist practices of ‘self-blame’ are in fact a participation in compassion, it will be 
helpful to show how theistic practices of integrative mourning have worked similarly, so 5 
 
that the modernist therapeutic rejection of religious self-critique can be more 
thoroughly called into question. 
I wish to make room for an understanding of ‘blame’ that is nothing like the sort 
of ‘self-blame’ that we usually practice in our interior, familial, and economic lives.  
Unlike the destructive self-denigrations of contemporary shame, Mahāyāna Buddhist 
self-evaluation takes place relentlessly within and toward a field of compassion. 
In the first chapter, I begin by reviewing the different meanings that have been 
given to the word shame by philosophers and psychologists over the past half-century.  
Whereas Emmanuel Levinas, Bernard Williams, and other philosophical ethicists have 
emphasized shame as a human capacity necessary for moral learning and humane 
conduct in community, there has also been a concurrent consensus among 
psychologists that shame is in fact a morally destructive form of self-denigration, rooted 
in violent familial and social patterning. 
It seems clear, however, that both philosophers of ethicizing shame, and 
psychologists of destructive shame, are concerned with problems and possibilities of 
relationship.  Shame is a felt threat to, or absence of, connection.  However, 
philosophers and psychologists tend to value autonomy very differently, and this has 
consequences for how they evaluate the moral implications of shame. 
In the first chapter, I also discuss in detail several possible sociological reasons 
for the extraordinary proliferation of shame experience and literature in the late 
twentieth-century West.  I draw in particular on the work of the late social historian 
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Walter Sussman and the sociologist Eva Illouz to show how economic changes have 
quietly demanded new standards of public performance and self-evaluation. 
 The second chapter reflects at length on Friedrich Nietzsche’s central 
preoccupation, increasingly evident beginning with The Gay Science, with shame.  And 
although Nietzsche seeks to alleviate shame and ‘bad conscience’ through a critique of 
the socializing moralities of the slave and herd, this strategy of relief ultimately rests 
upon an untenable anthropological vision: Nietzschean autonomy cannot support the 
affirmation of life and fate that Nietzsche himself seeks to construct. 
 The third, most important chapter is a commentary on the Tibetan directive 
Drive all blames into one—an enigmatic but central teaching that will allow us to 
uncover some dynamics of self-critique and compassion in Tibetan Buddhist lojong. 
This chapter also includes a critique of prominent contemporary teachings of 
Buddhist self-affirmation, which threaten to obscure central pre-therapeutic Buddhist 
strategies of transformation that necessarily include clear and critical self-recognition. 
  The fourth chapter examines some instances of the pre-modern Christian 
rhetoric of ‘self-blame’ and ‘mourning,’ or penthos, arguing that we have lost the ability 
to understand the implicit ironies, and the explicit turn toward love, embedded within 
those teachings.  I focus in particular on the sayings of the Desert Fathers, for whom 
‘self-reproach’ was not at all a total contempt for the whole self, but a stark recognition 
of the way in which we consistently refuse to love.  If we have failed to hear both the 
directness and the humor in the Desert Fathers’ language, that of course says more 
about us than it does about them.  One purpose of the fourth chapter is to sharply 7 
 
differentiate Christian modes of self-evaluation from the sorts of sharp self-denigration 
practiced in a personality culture, where there is no true context of connection. 
 The final concluding section reflects on the importance of understanding 
Buddhist practices of self-critique as practices of compassionate connection and 
integration, and then asks briefly what Buddhists might learn from Christian 
understandings of evil. 
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CHAPTER 1 
VARIETIES OF SHAME 
 
1.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
To imagine ourselves otherwise is definitively human.  But this basic capacity for 
self-evaluation is also ambiguous, and can lead in directions both creative and 
destructive. 
In this chapter, I review some ways that philosophical ethicists and 
contemporary psychologists have written differently about shame over recent decades.  
While philosophers such as Bernard Williams and Emmanuel Levinas have discussed 
shame as a foundational capacity of connection to values and ethical commitments that 
transcend any particular human being, psychologists have argued that shame, as a form 
of self-denigrating despair, is in fact a morally damaging form of isolation. 
These appear at first as significant definitional divergences.  However, the 
convergence of philosophical and psychological concern with issues of connection and 
isolation is ultimately more important than competing disciplinary definitions. 
Over the past half-century, psychological thinkers have come to speak more and 
more frequently of shame, and far less often of guilt—which had been a central 
category of earlier psychoanalytic theory. 4   Shame is now understood among 
psychologists as the most intensely damaging of the moral emotions—emotions that 
4 June Price Tangney, “Constructive and Destructive Aspects of Shame and Guilt,” in Constructive and 
Destructive Behavior: Implications for Family, School and Society, ed. Arthur C. Bohart and Deborah J. 
Stipek (American Psychological Association Press, 2001), 128. 9 
                                                        
 
influence the attitudes and ethical postures with which we engage the world around us.  
In particular, the gravitational pull of shame’s self-involvement disrupts empathic 
responsiveness to others.  But shame has also come to be seen as a foundation for some 
of the most intractable problems of human violence: the long-term conditioning of self-
contempt slowly undermines any strong sense of dignified belonging in the world, 
leading to instinctive moments of violent self-protection against those who elicit the 
intolerable depth of that pain. 
These patterns make us dangerous in a way that is different than other animals; 
we defend a far more expansive psychological territory than they do. 
Simultaneously, however, several of our most gifted philosophers 5  have 
responded to the increasingly influential therapeutic critique of shame by arguing that 
‘shame’ is a necessary foundation for any robust ethical excellence.  Without a basic 
openness to the force of extra-personal demands, without an affirmation of values and 
standards that are greater than any individual personality, both culture and the 
individual human come to lack moral depth and commitment. 
From this perspective, the human transcendence of self-concern becomes less 
likely when we are unmoored from shame.  Dismissing shame as a pillar of our life 
together risks a basic failure of our responsiveness to others—and this seems, at first, 
like an argument that must be opposed sharply to the insights of contemporary 
psychology.  
5 I focus here on philosophical ethicists who understand shame as a foundation for human moral learning 
in community, but other thinkers—Sartre, for instance, informed by a mid-century psychological culture—
offer phenomenological accounts that are closer to psychological portraits of shame 10 
                                                        
 
Psychologists rightly suggest that self-denigration is not in fact a form of creative 
moral learning.  Philosophers rightly argue that moral self-evaluation is a creative and 
communal necessity, even if it is sometimes painful.  These insights are not exclusive.   
But because, over the past half-century, shame’s negative definition as a form of 
isolating unworthiness has become the more widespread cultural understanding, it is 
necessary now to habilitate the philosophical insistence on the importance of moral 
self-evaluation in community. 
It seems clear that if, when we speak of ‘shame,’ we sometimes mean self-
contempt or a sense of unworthiness, and at other times we mean something like 
conscience or openness, disagreements may quickly and understandably multiply.  It is 
unfortunate that both psychologists and philosophers have used the word ‘shame’ to 
designate their objects of inquiry, because these two disciplines employ the word to 
name such different—but, as I will argue, still closely related—meanings. 
 It must also be said that the emotion now referred to as shame is often difficult 
to distinguish from other ‘negative’ emotions.  Among the tides of negative affect, 
wrote William James, “internal shadings merge endlessly into each other.”6  It comes to 
seem presumptuous to select something called ‘shame’ out of the myriad worlds of co-
emergent emotion that compose an uncomfortable selfhood.  Is compulsive shame 
simply an indicator of major depression?  What is the difference between contemporary 
shame and the ‘despair’ outlined in Kierkegaard’s writing?  To what extent can shame, 
6 William James, Psychology: Briefer Course collected in Writings, 1878-1899 (New York: Library of 
America, 1992), 351. 11 
                                                        
 
an affect that often contains an implicit cognitive judgment against one’s self, be 
separated from guilt, which supposedly evaluates action alone?  (Emotions include both 
affect and cognition, which is why empathy, for example, can go so badly awry when we 
misperceive the emotions occurring for others.) 
This important contemporary distinction between shame as self-directed, on the 
one hand, and guilt as action-directed, on the other, is a useful one.  However, intensely 
regretted actions can only be performed by an irretrievably imperfect self.  The 
theoretical boundaries between shame and guilt are less vivid in lived experience.  The 
definitional distinctions drawn by psychologists and philosophers may not map neatly 
onto any particular internal topography.  And this leads us to a basic methodological 
point: I will not propose a final or correct definition of the English word, shame, but 
inquire instead into the important interrelated aspects of ‘shame’ as it is differently 
understood by psychologists and philosophers. 
This approach will, hopefully, allow us to begin naming those interrelated 
conditions that allow shame to produce moral creativity under some circumstances, and 
extraordinary violence in others.  And in order to marshal the fullest possible range of 
relevant conditions and circumstances, I also suggest several historical and sociological 
reasons for the new intensity of shame literatures in the final decades of the twentieth 
century, and in the first decades of this one.  What is it about industrial and post-
industrial capitalist, technological, and secular developments that have made problems 
of shame and self-evaluation so prominent a focus of attention across the humanities 
and social sciences? 12 
 
My purpose in these pages is to articulate the possibility of self-evaluation as a 
practice of connection and joy, rather than isolation and despair.  That self-evaluation is 
much more like repentance than we currently imagine. 
1.2 SOCIOLOGICAL SOURCES OF SELF-AVERSION 
The varieties of self-aversion are among the most intransigent of all human self-
limitations.  Before Helen Block Lewis’s 1971 work Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, most of 
the first century of psychoanalytic theory had been dominated by an overwhelming 
focus on the problems of self-prosecutorial guilt, rather than on pathologies of shame.7  
In 1963, Erik Erikson noted, in a revised edition of Childhood and Society, that shame “is 
an emotion insufficiently studied, because in our civilization it is so early and easily 
absorbed by guilt.”8 
It was Block Lewis who initiated a shift in disciplinary perspective.  Most 
significantly, she suggested in a very clear way that guilt and shame could no longer be 
viewed as alternate shadings of the same basic human affect.  For Block Lewis, shame 
and guilt diverge in the ultimate objects of their evaluation: “The experience of shame is 
directly about the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the 
central object of negative evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus. 
In guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself the 
7 See especially Helen Block Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (Madison, CT: International Universities 
Press, 1971).  In 1958, Helen Merrell Lynd had published On Shame and the Search for Identity (New York: 
Science Editions), but it was Block Lewis whose work initiated the enormous late-century outpouring of 
literature on shame, in both the clinical and popular works. 
8 Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), 252.  It is suggestive 
that Erikson did not mention shame at all in the 1950 edition of Childhood and Society.  The latter half of 
the century saw significant cultural and psychological changes. 13 
                                                        
 
focus of the experience.”9  Following Block Lewis, therapeutic and clinical studies of 
shame would be published with astonishing frequency through the final quarter of the 
twentieth century. 
Donald Capps noted, in 1993, that the late-century focus on shame had 
coincided with an equally flourishing investigation of narcissism.  For Capps, the relation 
between shame and patterns of narcissism was an important because, “while narcissists 
are popularly viewed as being in love with themselves, they are in fact engulfed in self-
hatred.” 10  Self-aversion remains a fundamental expression of what other epochs 
understood as a distorted curvature toward self.11 
 What has been happening, this past half-century, such that psychoanalytic 
theorists, philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists12 have come so consistently to 
concern themselves with issues of narcissism and shame? 
9 Block Lewis, 30. 
10 Donald Capps, The Depleted Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 22.  More 
recent psychological studies have questioned the truism that narcissists don’t like themselves much.  My 
own sense is that it is entirely possible for a person to believe in their own superiority in comparison to 
others, while simultaneously having an implicitly negative portrait of themselves.  While a habitual focus 
on oneself is not necessarily rooted in extreme self-aversion, self-aversion is certainly an extreme focus 
on the self.  See: Campbell, W. K., Bosson, J. K., Goheen, T. W., Lakey, C. E., & Kernis, M. H. (2007). Do 
narcissists dislike themselves 'deep down inside?'. Psychological Science, 18, 227-229. 
11 Incurvatus in se: a significant metaphor for sin in Christian theological traditions.  See Matt Jenson, The 
Gravity of Sin: Incurvatus in Se in Augustine, Luther and Barth (New York: Continuum Books, 2006). 
12 In 1946, Ruth Benedict, in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, wrote explicitly of American culture as a 
‘culture of guilt’ and of Japanese culture as a ‘culture of shame.’  Benedict’s attempt to understand 
Japanese aggression in the Second World War led her to conclude, in part, that shame, defined as a 
“reaction to other people’s criticism,” led to a greater risk of general ethical wrongdoing, because mere 
social expectations may or may not be moral expectations.  Guilt, on the other hand, relies on conscience, 
an internal conviction that is largely immune (in Benedict’s view) to moral relativism.  “A society that 
inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men’s developing a conscience is a guilt culture by 
definition…” (Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and The Sword [Mariner Books, 2005 (1946)], 222).  It is 
important, however, to see that even on Benedict’s understanding of ‘guilt culture,’ the internalized 
conscience is related to ultimate concerns shared by a whole host of others—guilt cultures must be 
cultures, even on her analysis. 14 
                                                        
 
For Christopher Lasch, the new prominence of bureaucratic institutions “put a 
premium on the manipulation of interpersonal relations, discourage the formation of 
deep personal attachments, and at the same time provide the narcissist with the 
approval he needs in order to validate his self-esteem.” 13   And, crucially, the 
manipulation of interpersonal relations in a reliable way requires an increasing emphasis 
on self-management.  The skillful projection of emotion comes to represent a necessary 
problem to be solved in economic life. 
This mid-century bureaucrat was, however, only the forerunner of the 
hypercompetitive economic actor of the present, who increasingly represents himself or 
herself as an evolving commodity, as much as any product or service.    The ability to 
compete economically depends on a much extended education, in which the human 
being contributes less to his or her own community, for longer.  And the mobility of the 
hyper-competitive actor increases the variety of relationships, but almost certainly 
disrupts their long-term depth. 
Cultures have always, of course, required their members to master practices of 
implicit and explicit self-representation.  But recent shifts toward ferociously demanding 
forms of self-projection and self-control have legislated an endless self-development, 
usually framed as an ethics of personal growth.  The worker’s own intensified practices 
of self-evaluation, self-comparison, self-judgment, and self-representation, are 
requisites of sustained economic belonging. 
13 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 43-4. 15 
                                                        
 
In 1979, the same year that saw the release of Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism, 
the cultural historian Walter Susman published “‘Personality’ and the Making of 
Twentieth-Century Culture,” a study of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
cultural forms—self-help texts, films, and business advice literature—documenting a 
significant turn-of-the-century shift from a broad culture of ‘character’ to one that 
privileged a projection of ‘personality.’ 
Susman argued that a culture celebrating character had been defined, prior to 
the twentieth century, by adherence to moral codes—interdictory rules that offered 
“fulfillment through sacrifice in the name of a higher law, ideals of duty, honor, 
integrity.”14 The movement from a production-oriented economic culture to one of 
consumption required, importantly, a shift from rule-bound structures of character to 
expressive and energetic projections of personality:  
From the beginning the adjectives most frequently associated with 
personality suggest a very different concept from that of character: 
fascinating, stunning, attractive, magnetic, glowing, masterful, creative, 
dominant, forceful… ‘Personality is the quality of being Somebody.’ This 
definition—repeated in various ways in almost all of the manuals I have 
analyzed—is also a major theme of this literature… ‘To create a 
personality is power,’ one manual writer insists.  One does this by being 
‘conscious of yourself and of others,’ by being discerning and sincere, by 
14 Walter Susman, “‘Personality’ and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture,” in Culture as History (New 
York: Pantheon, 1984), 280.  Originally published in New Trends in Intellectual History, eds. John Higham 
and Paul K. Conklin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).  Susman is not interested in 
nostalgia; he is interested in the loss of a ‘culture of character’ as a fact of early twentieth-century 
American history, and offers no moralistic evaluation of the contemporary emphasis on personality.  He 
does persuasively document a shift.  It might also be argued, however, that the culture of personality 
already finds representation in the popular culture of Britain, much earlier in the nineteenth century—in 
certain characters of Austen or Dickens, for instance.  But those personalities are drawn as ultimately 
ridiculous, subjects for the reader’s implicit critique or amusement.  The characters with the most 
‘character’ succeed, in the end, over the morally shallow personality. 16 
                                                        
 
showing energy, by paying attention to others so that they will pay 
attention to you.15 
 
“The social role demanded of all in the new culture of personality was that of a 
performer.” 16  The cultural shift outlined by Susman demands self-righteousness, 
understood not moralistically but literally: the attempt to establish and control one’s 
own status, both for oneself and for others.  “The man of ambition is still with us, as in 
all times,” wrote Philip Rieff at mid-century, “but now he needs a more subtle initiative, 
a deeper capacity to manipulate the democracy of emotions, if he is to maintain his 
separate identity and significantly augment it with success…”17 
In Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (2007), Eva Illouz outlines 
what she calls “a new emotional style—the therapeutic emotional style—which has 
dominated the American cultural landscape throughout the twentieth century.”18  Like 
Lasch, Illouz believes that this style has emerged simultaneously with an increasing 
emphasis on emotion management within the workplace: “The economic sphere, far 
from being devoid of emotions, has been on the contrary saturated with affect, a kind of 
affect committed to and commanded by the imperative of cooperation and a mode of 
settling conflicts based on ‘recognition.’”19 This is an imperative to recognize one 
another’s emotional claims, “For the bearer of an emotion is recognized as the ultimate 
15 Ibid., 277. 
16 Ibid., 280. 
17 Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 372.  While Illouz speaks of a 
therapeutic emotional style, Philip Rieff referred to the rise of an ‘analytic attitude’: a safe self-
involvement; an intelligent, reflective distance from oneself; and a belief that further self-analysis is 
always a foundation for personal ‘growth,’ vaguely defined. 
18 Eva Illouz, Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 
2007), 6. 
19 Ibid, 23. 17 
                                                        
 
arbiter of their own feelings. ‘I feel that…’ implies not only that one has the right to feel 
that way, but also that such right entitles one to be accepted and recognized simply by 
virtue of feeling a certain way.”20 
One of Illouz’s most persuasive claims is that “the ethos of communication blurs 
gender divisions [ital. original] by inviting men and women to control their negative 
emotions, be friendly, view themselves through others’ eyes, and empathize with 
others.”  Men, in Illouz’s work, take on qualities that had been considered feminine, 
while women, as they enter the workplace, increasingly value autonomy, self-reliance, 
and rights, so that “throughout the twentieth century, there has been an increased 
emotional androgynization of men and women.”21 
Shame is a felt threat of isolation.  Such an implicit and serious threat is 
constantly at issue in an economic and social environment in which a person’s ongoing 
acceptability is managed through emotional performance.  And such acceptability can 
never be final or complete—each exchange of emotion is as important for the ongoing 
production of authenticity, and acceptance, as the last.  We must learn unceasingly to 
manage ourselves.  Prominent late-century management consultant Peter F. Drucker 
writes: 
We live in an age of unprecedented opportunity: If you’ve got ambition, 
drive, and smarts, you can rise to the top of your chosen profession—
regardless of where you started out.  But with opportunity comes 
responsibility.  Companies today aren’t managing their knowledge 
workers’ careers.  Rather, we must each be our own chief executive 
officer.  Simply put, it’s up to you to carve out your place in the work 
20 Ibid, 39. 
21 Ibid, 37. 18 
                                                        
 
world and know when to change course.  …To do all of these things well, 
you’ll need to cultivate a deep understanding of yourself.22 
 
Here is a Weberian rationalization of the inner life; this is the door to a self-surveillance 
and a pseudo-interiority in the service of economic self-realization.  It is easy to see how 
management theory and therapeutic psychology became natural allies. 
For Illouz, self-realization and the therapeutic narrative that claims to support 
such realization are inextricably intertwined, and the result is that the self is repeatedly 
redirected toward its own imperfection: “The very therapeutic narrative of self-
realization can function only by identifying the complication in the story—what prevents 
me from being happy, intimate, successful—and make sense of it in reference to an 
event in one’s past.  [Such a narrative] structurally makes one understand one’s life as a 
generalized dysfunction, in order precisely to overcome it.  This narrative foregrounds 
negative emotions as shame, guilt, fear, inadequacy…”23 
Of course this contradicts the self-image of the therapeutic project itself, which 
understands its prominence as a form of moral progress, uncovering and alleviating 
objective layers of disorder in the person and in the culture.  But self-aversion is one of 
the most acceptable affects in a therapeutic market culture: it resolves itself in 
consumption; it is carefully aligned with ambition.  The ambition self is the 
problematized self (‘If you’ve got ambition, drive, and smarts…’).  This has an iatrogenic 
force: “The therapeutic narrative posits normality and self-realization as the goal of the 
narrative of self, yet, because that goal is never given a clear positive content, it in fact 
22 Peter F. Drucker, “Managing Oneself,” Harvard Business Review 77 (1999), 64-74. 
23 Illouz, 52. 19 
                                                        
 
produces a wide variety of un-self-realized and therefore sick people… simultaneously 
defined as potential patients and consumers. …This is also why therapeutic culture 
paradoxically privileges suffering and trauma.”24 
Only autobiographies of authentic suffering can promise redemption through 
recognition. The narrative of self-realization becomes a narrative of pain.  And this 
narrative is, for Michel Foucault, simultaneously a delightful exposure as well as a 
pleasurable demonstration of special insight and power: 
Perhaps this production of truth… multiplied, intensified, and even 
created its own intrinsic pleasures.  It is often said that we have been 
incapable of imagining any new pleasures.  We have at least invented a 
different kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure 
of knowing that truth, of discovering and exposing it, the fascination of 
seeing it and telling it, of captivating and capturing others by it, of 
confiding it in secret, of luring it out in the open…25 
 
The therapeutic emotional style of modernity produces a pleasure of insight, which is 
also a sense of expanding power.  Nietzsche is amusingly ironic: 
What urges you on and arouses your ardour, you wisest of men—do you 
call it ‘will to truth’? 
 
Will to the conceivability of all being: that is what I call your will!  You first 
want to make all being conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust, you 
doubt whether it is in fact conceivable.  But it must bend and 
accommodate itself to you!  Thus will your will have it.  …That is your 
entire will, you wisest men; it is a will to power…26 
 
These interweavings of power and pleasure of insight itself are directly related to 
the relief of diagnosis: to find out one’s problem, whether it be bipolar disorder or post-
24 Illouz, 50, 52. 
25 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Vintage; New York, 1990 [1978]), 71.  See 
also Illouz, pp. 61-2, where Foucault is discussed in further detail. 
26 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of Self-Overcoming,” trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Penguin: 
New York, 1961). 20 
                                                        
 
traumatic stress, is in some sense to fulfill the first step in a longed-for redemption.  The 
diagnosis makes sense of the unease that the therapeutic emotional style necessarily 
creates and demands.  As Illouz notes, health, in therapeutic culture, is only vaguely 
defined, so that it can never be fully achieved.  The pleasure of the diagnosis is 
potentially intense, so much so that diagnoses can easily multiply, offering new 
narratives of self, and then new potential recognition.  Note here, too, the thematic 
prominence of exposure—a basic structure of shame. 
Of course, what Susman, Rieff, and Lasch could not have fully foreseen, but 
which Illouz writes about in depth, is the way in which the internet and contemporary 
communicative technologies have greatly amplified the opportunities, and the 
demands, for emotional performativity.  The therapeutic emotional style is enhanced by 
technological consumption. 
Two further points are in order.  First, in a therapeutic culture where recognition 
is earned through the communication of affect and insight, there is no love outside the 
love that we ourselves are able to earn.  Love and acceptance are produced rather than 
relied upon.  Religious repentance, in such a culture, will have to appear either as an 
alternative but deluded model of ‘earning’ acceptance, or else as a truly ridiculous trust 
in one’s own inalienable status within love itself—which destroys the motivational 
structure of the therapeutic emotional style, depending as it does on its own capacity to 
unceasingly create the foundations of its own acceptability. 
Second, and importantly for the philosophical discussion below, the therapeutic 
production of recognition is not connected to any clear communal moral values beyond 21 
 
the individual self.  It is far more important to produce recognition in a ‘personality’ 
culture than to fulfill moral commitments that transcend the value of any particular 
individual: loyalty, kindness, sacrifice.  It is not hard to see how the emptiness of living 
so functional a life leads toward the ongoing necessity of the therapeutic.  Motivated by 
extraneous ends, related to no higher form of authority or other-oriented action, we 
create the conditions for the full spectrum of narcissisms. 
 Therapeutic ideology has had a far more serious social effect than is generally 
admitted.  The twentieth-century psychoanalytic project of dissolving burdensome, 
unnecessary guilt—by relativizing cultural codes of behavioral expectation, weakening 
the internalization of those codes, and reducing the intensity of the psychic pressure 
these intergenerational codes understandably exert as the price of belonging—has 
meant the inexorable erosion of the very codes by which we might once have evaluated 
our own worthiness in a culture of character. 
Where all interdictory ethical demands are criticized as coercive of our 
supposedly more fundamental autonomy, the permissive culture of the consumer is 
empowered.  This leaves only the most tenuous, unstable possibilities of belonging, 
unmoored from particular moral expectations. 
Certainly we need no further moralistic and ultimately impotent complaints 
about ‘consumerism,’ but it must also be said that the therapeutic emotional style is a 
style of desire that drives, and is also further amplified by, a consumer economy.  
Consumer culture must uncover ever new forms of suffering to sustain itself; it is a 
culture of the plaintiff, rather than the celebrant.  And it is easy to see how an emphasis 22 
 
on the place of the human within a field of affirmation disrupts the dialectic of need and 
fulfillment that characterize the therapeutic emotional and economic style. 
For the therapeutic there is little beyond the self that can adequately measure 
the worth of a self.  Self-evaluation becomes a relatively closed and increasingly 
dangerous feedback loop.  And the therapeutic proposes to heal, at the level of the 
individual, the very problems of self-evaluation that it helps to induce at the level of 
culture. 
1.3 SHAME IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 
 Now a half-century later, shame is no longer analytically ‘absorbed by guilt,’ to 
return to Erikson’s note from 1963.  The therapeutic disciplines have come to see a 
significant chasm between the two modes of affect.  Guilt and shame lead toward 
different moral outcomes; guilt correlates positively to empathic concern for others, 
while the egocentrism of shame leads away from such concern; guilt and shame 
represent divergent character ‘dispositions’; shame, but not guilt, is related closely to 
anger, PTSD, anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation.27  Shame is not only not 
absorbed by guilt, but is now seen as contrary to guilt in the most significant ways. 
For experimental psychologist June Price Tangney, guilt, which perceives and 
seeks to repair the damages we cause to others, enables a range of personal and moral 
creativity.  Shame, on the other hand, is a sentence of moral and relational self-
confinement: “[P]roneness to guilt (about specific behaviors) is a fairly adaptive 
27 June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig and Debra J. Mashek, “Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior,” Annual 
Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 345-72. 23 
                                                        
 
affective style or disposition, especially in the interpersonal realm. In contrast, 
proneness to shame appears to be a substantial liability, in terms of both individual and 
interpersonal adjustment.”28 The dysphoric, self-focused feelings of shame “disrupt 
individuals’ ability to form empathic connections with others. …Shame’s inherently 
egocentric focus on the ‘bad self’ (as opposed to the bad behavior) derails the empathic 
process. Individuals in the throes of shame turn tightly inward, and are thus less able to 
focus cognitive and emotional resources on the harmed other.”29 
James Gilligan, a psychiatrist and former director of mental health for 
Massachusetts prisons, has written eloquently about the long-term psychic damages of 
early-life brutality.  For Gilligan, it is not so much that empathic disruptions result from 
shame; such disruptions within formative relationships in fact produce shame: 
The violent criminals I have known have been objects of violence from 
early childhood.  They have seen their closest relatives—their fathers and 
mothers and sisters and brothers—murdered in front of their eyes, often 
by other family members.  As children, these men were shot, axed, 
scalded, beaten, strangled, tortured, drugged, starved, suffocated, set on 
fire, thrown out of windows, raped, or prostituted by mothers who were 
their ‘pimps’; their bones have been broken; they have been locked in 
closets or attics for extended periods, and one man I know was 
deliberately locked by his parents in an empty icebox until he suffered 
brain damage from oxygen deprivation before he was let out.… How can 
violence to the body kill the soul, even if it does not kill the body?  Having 
heard hundreds of men describe the experience of being beaten nearly to 
death, I believe the answer to that question is that violence—whatever 
else it may mean—is the ultimate means of communicating the absence 
of love by the person inflicting the violence.30 
 
28 Tangney (2001), 132. 
29 Tangney, et al. (2007), 350, 351. 
30 James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 45, 47. 24 
                                                        
 
There is nothing new, of course, in the claim that repetitive exposure to violence 
profoundly influences a human being.  But this fundamental connection between self-
hatred and the loss of love, though simple enough, is important to articulate: “Children 
who fail to receive sufficient love from others fail to build those reserves of self-love, 
and the capacity for self-love, which enable them to survive the inevitable rejections 
and humiliations which even the most fortunate of people cannot avoid.  Without 
feelings of love, the self feels numb, empty, and dead.  The word I use,” writes Gilligan, 
“to refer to the absence or deficiency of self-love is shame.”31 
When the absence of love becomes too intense, for too long, a complete death 
of selfhood emerges as a fundamental possibility: “The death of the self—which is what 
we are talking about here—brings with it a sense of the intolerability of existence—
one’s own and everyone else’s.”  In a situation where such complete death appears as 
an imminent threat, violence can be an attempt to revive selfhood, an attempt “to bring 
one’s dead self back to life,”32 through the imposition of one’s own dignity in the mode 
of destructive dominance over another.  Violence is an attempt at transcendence, 
seeking to solve, through force, a problem of dignity that has far more to do with one’s 
fundamental relation, or lack of relationship, to love. 
Gilligan, focusing on situations of psychic extremity, emphasizes the near-
absolute power of conditioning; Tangney, working with a relatively normal range of 
human experience, emphasizes a relatively unconditioned typology of affective 
31 Ibid., 47. 
32 Ibid., 41. 25 
                                                        
 
orientation or ‘disposition.’  These differences between Gilligan and Tangney don’t 
present any serious conceptual problem—one may be faced with intense negative 
conditioning, and yet be graced with a disposition of hopeful resilience; one may be 
conditioned by a set of positive relations, and yet fail to overcome a disposition toward 
self-involvement. 
But the language of ‘proneness’ and ‘disposition,’ while helping to name 
potentially inelastic habits of affect, enforce a questionably rigid emotional distinctions, 
and then a division between kinds of persons.  What of the guilt that stumbles into the 
repetitive self-reprisals of shame?  What of the shame that is easily translated into 
other-engaging guilt through a challenging conversation?  There is little sense here of 
possible alteration, of potential dynamism in the person so thoroughly conceived as 
prone: “Shame-prone people are not empathic people.”33 The shame-disposed person is 
damned to a permanent sameness. 
The distinction between shame and guilt that had been initially introduced by 
Helen Block Lewis, was offered as a practical therapeutic heuristic to distinguish 
emotions.  But this interpretive distinction may be distorted by a more abstract 
experimental method that begins from a much sharper distinction between affects than 
is likely to actually exist for most persons.  Shame and guilt, writes Stanford psychiatrist 
33 Ibid., 133. 26                                                         
 
Herant Katchadourian, “are neither good nor bad in themselves, but just part of our 
nature.  They become a blessing or a curse depending on how they are used.”34 
Tangney notes that relatively little attention “has been directed toward how 
people cope with aversive feelings of shame and guilt.”35 But she expresses little 
confidence that coping can be effective at all: “[P]ainful feelings of shame are difficult to 
resolve.  Shame—and, shame-fused guilt36—offers little opportunity for redemption.  It 
is a daunting challenge to transform a self that is defective at its core.”37 
There is a latent perfectionism in the therapeutic style, and Tangney arrives at a 
perfectionist distinction between moral persons: good and bad, morally functional and 
non-functional.  But what self is not defective in some way?  The differences between 
shame and guilt should be upheld, not as static forms or types, but as affective modes 
capable of transformation from one end of a spectrum of self-evaluation to the other: 
from self-involvement to a focus on actions that involve and affect valued others.   
Human connectedness is, of course, always exposed to damage: we can’t fully 
prevent loss, misunderstandings, harm intensified by intention, pain inflicted without 
awareness.  But a vision of ontological interconnection, deepened by a repeated 
34 Herant Katchadourian, Guilt: The Bite of Conscience (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 136-37. 
35 Tangney, et al. (2007), 355. 
36 This phrase, ‘shame-infused guilt,’ is not fully explained in Tangney’s work.  It functions simply as 
shame. 
37 Ibid., 353.  James Gilligan, too, expresses a certain hopelessness about the negative determinism of 
shame as it relates to interpersonal aggression.  In the final pages of his extended reflection on 
pathogenic shame and the epidemiology of violence, Gilligan writes that “It is presumptuous to think that 
anyone can ‘save’ another person… [W]here violence is concerned, attempting to repair the damage, 
whether by means of punishment or of therapy, after irrevocable violence has already occurred, is too 
little too late…” (Gilligan, 266-67)  The problem, of course, is that violence has always already occurred; 
there is no return to a prelapsarian time for any of us.  The question, then, is whether we can recover 
practices that allow us to move from isolation toward more interconnected and empathic patterns. 27 
                                                        
 
commitment to that vision, places these damages in a context of care that makes 
reparation (and forgiveness, from another perspective) not just possible, but desirable.  
It is not that guilt leads to empathic connection; instead, the connected imagination 
produces reparative guilt when precarious but valued human relations are harmed.  The 
connected imagination produces guilt, while the isolated imagination produces shame. 
To recognize harm is to have already perceived fundamental connections 
between ourselves and others.  Differences in the moral responses of shame and guilt 
have much to do with this prior, habitual understanding of the self as it is constituted, or 
not, by relationship.38 Self-evaluative guilt, but not self-aversive shame, is grounded in a 
moral identity that is intrinsically embedded within a field of valued others.  The moral 
identity is first of all a related identity. 
Here again is Helen Block Lewis’s initial distinction between guilt and shame: “In 
guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself the 
focus of the experience.”39 So much—perhaps everything—depends on this ‘connection 
with something.’ 
‘Self-blame,’ as we will see, is precisely a practice of reconnection with a love 
that cannot be earned.  And if shame is in large part an expression of moral isolation, 
such isolation can be re-imagined.  Human beings can make choices and commitments 
toward repeated connection.  And even if it is the case in some sense that “shame-
38 Tangney writes that feelings of shame “disrupt individuals’ ability to form empathic connections” 
(Tangney, et al. [2007], 350).  I am arguing that disrupted connections are, instead, one aspect of the prior 
framework for self-aversive shame. 
39 Block Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, 30. 28 
                                                        
 
prone people are not empathic people,” the formula should have been given in the 
opposite order: without empathic connection, people tend toward self-isolating shame. 
If our first instinct, when faced with deep imperfection in ourselves or others, is 
to sense our own remoteness from the lives around us, we are not therefore 
condemned as an affective type to an eternal remoteness.  It is not so clear that, given a 
certain early conditioning (Gilligan), or a certain disposition of ‘proneness’ (Tangney), we 
can thereby express any final certainty about the future of a moral character.  In much 
of the psychology of self-evaluation, we are entirely confined within the conditioned—
there is little if any clear trust in an unconditioned love or compassion. 
The difference between shame and guilt is not a divergence between kinds of 
persons, but rather a variation in how, and whether, we choose relatedness.  Guilt, 
convinced of connection, can choose to affirm relationship in response to a particular 
situation of harm.   
Katchadourian has already noted that shame and guilt “become a blessing or a 
curse depending on how they are used.”  The emotions, even the deepest affective 
negativities, offer choices about whether to use them (or not) to imagine our own 
connection with the full range of others who experience those same negativities—a 
fundamental strategy of Tibetan lojong. 
The therapeutic assumption that self-hatred is fundamentally a response to the 
conditioning of early-life no doubt contains certain important truths.  But many of us are 
in fact more responsible for our self-aversions than the therapeutic suggests.  Self-
denigration, as Buddhists from a variety of traditions will argue, is actually an aggressive 29 
 
self-construction.  It is an ongoing form of intentionality, of more or less conscious 
choice.  Self-hatred, self-contempt, and the more vicious varieties of critical self-
judgment are forms of controlling power.  This has not been argued insistently enough 
in the burgeoning contemporary literature of shame. Self-contempt is not an innocence. 
The self-concern of the therapeutic emotional style does not fully disengage us 
from the incurvatus in se at the heart of shame itself.  Instead, that disentangling occurs 
more consistently through the cultivation of a practical imagination that connects us to 
others through commitment and act.  The long cultivation of such a practical 
imagination is a religious life.40  
This is a very different process from projects of autonomous self-alteration 
rooted in an initial sense of deficiency.  The religious process of alteration has far more 
to do with increasing receptivity to qualities of care that transcend the autonomous self, 
than it has to do with an imposition of individual will.  From the sort of Buddhist 
perspective that will be outlined in more detail in Chapter 3, attention itself already 
contains basic capacities of compassion and love.  We do not change from one kind of 
human being to another kind of human being.  We discover, instead, more and more of 
what we are most fundamentally.  This will be true for many Christians as well. 
Just as there is a therapeutic emotional style, there is also a therapeutic 
intellectual style, oriented toward analytic certitude about oneself and one’s own prior 
40 The imaginary of isolation is primarily a secular imagination.  The etymology of ‘religion’ is likely rooted 
in the Latin word religare, to bind fast, to connect, as reflected in the English word ‘ligament.’  Thomas 
Aquinas writes: “But whether religion be so called from frequent reading [relegere, to re-read], or from 
fresh election of Him Whom we have negligently lost [re-eligere, choosing again], or from rebinding, it 
properly implies a certain relation to God.”  See Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, 
Question 81, “Of the Virtue of Religion.” 30 
                                                        
 
conditioning—the new form of therapeutic pleasure-in-truth highlighted by Michel 
Foucault.  But the penitential discovery of what we are is not a development of 
certainty.  The human person is constantly formed by relations that he or she cannot 
ever finally comprehend.  Self-aversion, on the other hand, is an insistence on certitude. 
If love and compassion actually lie at the heart of the way things are, then 
cultivating a set of psychological narratives about oneself becomes less important than 
trusting repeatedly in relations of love to form us more thoroughly over time.  We 
become a mystery to ourselves, rather than a problem to solve or a process to control.41  
It is virtually impossible to cultivate hatreds of any kind, toward self or other, 
when one senses that one’s own life and all other lives unfold within such a field of 
compassionate affirmation.  To entrust ourselves to a compassion that is not entirely 
our own is that same compassion’s way of transforming human negativities, over a 
lifetime, into ongoing opportunities for empathic connection with other imperfect and 
suffering persons. 
41 See Augustine, Confessions, 4.4.9; 10.3.3.  On December 22, 1817, in a letter to his brothers George and 
Thomas, John Keats reflected briefly but famously on the foundations of human creativity.  While Keats’s 
primary interest was in literary creativity, he was explicit in addressing himself to other spheres of activity 
as well: “I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, 
doubts, without any irritable searching after fact and reason” (John Keats, Selected Letters, ed. Robert 
Gittings [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 41). 
This capability is, of course, not a dark, aversive negativity; and the ‘doubt’ embedded in the 
definition is no simple skepticism.  Doubt is, at times, a suspicion that normal patterns of imagination 
have become inadequate, combined with an intuition that another way of being or seeing may yet 
emerge.  Doubt can sometimes align itself closely with the deepest sense of possibility (Descartes used 
doubt not to negate, but to discover). 
Jackson Bate, a prominent scholar of Keats, has suggested that negative capability is “the ability 
to negate or lose one’s identity in something larger than oneself—a sympathetic openness to the 
concrete reality without, an imaginative identification, a relishing and understanding of it” (Walter 
Jackson Bate, Negative Capability: On the Intuitive Approach in Keats [Contra Mundum Press, 2012 
(1939)]).  What Keats calls negative capability can only be sustained within a broader trust: inquiry can 
only forego ‘irritable searching’ because it is engaged in an openness to sources of insight beyond the 
self—to something like revelation. 31 
                                                        
 
Such religious forms of self-evaluation must always be embedded within an 
ongoing liturgy, some sustained repetition, wherever they retain vitality.  We are 
enabled, by a participation in such repetition, to relate to others through something 
other than our own power.  The capacity to affirm comes from our consistent exposure 
to the field of affirmation itself, through sacrament, liturgy, and devotion.42 And such 
repeated liturgical, contemplative, and imaginative commitments to an ontology of love 
is also a way for that field of compassionate affirmation to connect to itself.   
One influential cultural narrative holds that religious practices of confession and 
penance are the real historical sources of contemporary self-aversion, from which we 
are now finally extricating ourselves.  But such practices in fact contextualize the self 
within relationships that secular epistemologies tend not to recognize in the first place.  
Confessional practices are only possible because of a prior trust in one’s own 
connectedness to compassion or mercy; without such trust, the normal human habit of 
self-evaluation risks turning sharply in on itself. 
The failure to sense that, prior to any pragmatic outcome or production, we are 
well-made to participate in love, is a fundamental human loss wherever it occurs.  
Mistakes of self-evaluation, then, are among the most serious kinds of mistakes that 
human beings commit.43 So, while I admire therapeutic scholars’ deep concern with self-
42 To maintain that this exposure is ‘merely imaginative,’ misses the point entirely. 
43 Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of evil, not as a separate creation, but rather as that aspect of 
creation that turns away by choice from an agapic God, has much in common with Gilligan’s 
understanding of the dynamics of shame and violence, where violence, like Aquinas’s ‘evil,’ is the 
expression of a separation from love. 32 
                                                        
 
aversive shame, I work at a distance from the therapeutic,44 and wish to gesture toward 
a paradox: the most fundamental human healing of the incurvatus in se occurs where a 
movement toward mere human health is renounced, in favor of a desire to offer oneself 
more and more to a reality whose basic character is love or compassion. 
The soteriological and the therapeutic, of course, each seek human healing.  But 
soteriologies rest upon relational commitment, rather than therapies of self-analysis.45 
In the next section, we will look briefly at several recent philosophers of shame in order 
to see how they, too, highlight themes of connection and commitment. 
1.4 SHAME AMONG THE PHILOSOPHERS I: 
BERNARD WILLIAMS AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE 
For several prominent contemporary philosophers, it is not only possible that 
some version of shame should contribute to social ethics, it is necessary that shame 
should do so.  To live together, we need an affect capable of evaluating the self in light 
of standards of excellence that connect us to others.  Shame is not primarily self-
aversion, but rather an awareness of some temporary, resolvable distance between 
ourselves and an ideal.  Shame is quintessentially and constructively human.46 
44 I write about ‘the’ therapeutic, following Philip Rieff, in part to draw attention to the current hegemony 
of psychologized ways of perceiving and interpreting the world.  I do not deny the internal diversity of 
therapeutic and psychological disciplines, but like Rieff, I seek to challenge therapeutics to more fully 
articulate their own common assumptions. 
45 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Chapter 3. 
46 The Polish poet Wisława Szymborska writes: 
 
…Though hearts of killer whales may weigh a ton, 
in every other way they’re light. 
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  It is possible to perceive two distinct but related modern philosophical 
approaches to shame.  The first represents shame as a kind of sentimental education—a 
social training in preferred values and virtues.  This approach is prominent among 
thinkers who attempt to articulate the affective mechanisms of social cohesion (this is 
philosophy as a project of social restoration).  The second approach seeks to articulate a 
more intricately phenomenological and existential structure of shame as an affect. 
 A variety of understandings of ‘shame’ in multiple languages has led 
philosophical thinkers to consider shame very differently than psychologists have done.  
In English, to be called ‘shameless’ is to be exiled beyond a particular community of 
moral expectation.  The shameless is for himself alone, 47 and shame itself is a 
commitment to value what is valued by others.  Shame is the affect of moral solidarity. 
The words translated into English from other languages as ‘shame’ contain a 
similar range of potentially positive meanings.  The German scham, though it can at 
times connote something of the serious self-negativity of shame’s late-century English 
meaning, has at times suggested something much closer to ‘modesty.’48 Max Scheler, 
writing a century ago, argued that scham, as a dignified modesty that guards a deep 
sense of personal value, should be understood most fundamentally as a “protective 
a clear conscience is Number One. 
 
From ‘In Praise of Feeling Bad About Yourself’ in View With a Grain of Sand, trans. Stanisław Barańczak 
and Clare Cavanagh (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 124. 
47 The rhetorical phrase ‘Have you no shame?’ appears to have made its way into contemporary English 
usage as a revision to Army Counsel Joseph N. Welch’s response to Senator Joe McCarthy on June 9, 1954: 
“Have you no sense of decency, sir?”  Shame as a ‘sense of decency’ is no doubt culturally demarcated, 
but some form of defined decency is universally necessary for any significant cultural cohesion.  This 
concern for cohesion is a primary philosophical motivation for the analysis of shame. 
48 See Max Scheler, Person and Self-Value: Three Essays, trans. M.S. Frings (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987 [1913]): translator’s introduction, VII. 34 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
feeling of the individual.”  “In general,” he argued, “genuine shame is always built upon 
a feeling of a positive value of the self” [ital. original].49 
In this kind of discussion, we are suddenly quite distant from any sense of shame 
as a significant self-aversion.  Instead, shame is here aligned with a heightened capacity 
for very real reverence. 
Scheler was in fact explicit in complaining that shame as a modest, self-
respecting form of nobility had been degraded by class and racial developments in his 
own time.50 Scheler’s formulation of the philosophy of shame in the early years of the 
twentieth century is very much opposed to the self-destructive vision of shame 
advanced by James Gilligan and others at the close of the century.51 
 In the classical Greek aidōs, ‘shame’ gestures toward an internalized sense of 
honor to be defended against nemesis—a word often paired with aidōs in Greek 
literature.52  For Bernard Williams, it is particularly revealing that, in Homer, aidōs 
serves as a battle cry.  Here again we are quite far from shame as a form of self-
49 Ibid., 17, 37. 
50 Scheler, 69: “The decline of the feeling of shame in modern times is undoubtedly a sign of racial 
degeneration.  It is not, as is sometimes superficially held, a consequence of higher and increased cultural 
development.  The low valuation of shame is one sign among many expressions of the rising domination 
of those values which the common man produced by his endlessly quantifying production and by the 
gradual abolition of higher social strata which became subject to such values.  He who understands the 
Germans well will find that it is the tall, blond, blue-eyed and long-faced people of lower Saxony that have 
the most refined feeling of a shame easily aroused.  And if one ignores prudishness and cant among the 
English, one will find that it is the English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh peoples that have a most refined 
feeling of shame and traces of a master-type.” 
51 We should also expect that German cultural understandings of scham have themselves been altered, 
well beyond Scheler’s own complaints about already changed meanings, given the extraordinary history 
of Germany in the decades following Scheler’s writing. 
52 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 80. 35 
                                                        
 
contempt.  If anything, ‘shame’ is here a positive self-evaluation, albeit in need of 
assertion or defense. 
“People have at once a sense of their own honour,” writes Williams, “and a 
respect for other people’s honour; they can feel indignation or other forms of anger 
when honour is violated, in their own case or someone else’s.  These are shared 
sentiments with similar objects, and they serve to bind people together in a community 
of feeling.”53  Shame performs and expresses this binding. 
In recent legal philosophy, social shaming has been influentially theorized by 
John Braithwaite as a moral and restorative education.  Such shaming—including 
encounters between offenders and victims, fines, public admissions of wrongdoing, and 
other sanctions—is presented by Braithwaite as “a means of making citizens actively 
responsible, of informing them of how justifiably resentful their fellow citizens are 
toward criminal behavior which harms them.  In practice, shaming surely limits 
autonomy, more surely than repression, but it does so by communicating moral claims 
over which other citizens can reasonably be expected to express disgust should we 
choose to ignore them.  In other words, shaming is a route to coerced compliance.”54 
This coercion is the necessary foundation for any coherent culture of shared values, and 
so, although shame may be painful, its enforcement is crucial. 
Such restorative strategies of justice promise to prevent the permanent 
severance of perpetrators (and victims) from a given moral community.  The broadly 
53 Ibid. 
54 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 10. 36 
                                                        
 
positive philosophical view of shame as an affective foundation for cultural cohesion 
and moral creativity rests upon a view of the shamed person as ultimately connected to 
a vital, consistent community of common value.  However, if serious violence is in part 
the basic expression of separation from loving connectedness to self and other, it may 
be very naïve to expect that any educative ‘communication of moral claims’—through 
expressions of disgust or ‘justifiable resentment’—can actually heal the basic prior lack 
of relation that violence expresses.55 
It simply isn’t clear that communities of common value currently exist in the way 
that Braithwaite, for instance, needs for them to exist, in order for his vision of 
reintegrative shaming to work.56 There is no possibility of reintegration where moral 
integration has itself been so incomplete or tenuous.  Braithwaite projects a cohesive 
communal sensibility that does not describe our actual sociological situation.  And when 
Bernard Williams speaks of communities of feeling,57 he uses as his social model the 
ancient Greek polis—a pre-secular community in which a genuine cohesion of moral 
55 For a sociologically sensitive alternative to Braithwaite’s criminological views, and particularly for 
examples of ‘shaming legislation’ that all too easily turn toward strategies of mere humiliation, see 
Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
56  Reintegration is likely to occur only within what Rowan Williams has called ‘supplementary 
jurisdictions,’ or situational legal alternatives, such as forums for restorative justice, or the limited 
application of religious jurisprudence.  These might be considered very momentary but functional 
‘communities of feeling.’  Such episodic moral ‘communities’ may even help to create the possibility of 
more sustained sensibilities of integrative justice within diverse modern democracies like Britain, America 
and India.  But within our own diversity of ethical sensibility and judgment, it is difficult to expect that 
restorative justice can be anything but an occasional punctuating alternative to more dominant, and far 
less trusting, legal frameworks.  Williams himself has famously advocated for the very selective use of 
sharia law among British Muslims.  See Rowan Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England: A religious 
perspective,” a lecture to the Temple Foundation at the Royal Courts of Justice, Feb. 7, 2008.  Text 
accessed Jan. 9, 2013:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/07/religion.world2. 
57 The broadly conservative desire for communal cohesion is understandable: where there is no 
community of feeling, the individual is less directed toward others for whom he might sacrifice, or to 
whom he might give, and a form of human greatness is genuinely attenuated. 37 
                                                        
 
expectation among one section of the relatively small population rested in part on the 
enslavement of another.  If shame functions creatively only within a certain kind of 
community, we must ask whether ours is of the proper kind. 
We have already seen the historian Warren Susman write about the early-
twentieth-century shift from an American ‘culture of character’ to one of ‘personality.’58 
Philip Rieff argued that a culture of character is primarily one in which interdictory 
moral codes retain their authority.  In such cultures, character is not a psychological 
category, and not about what one feels or even what one experiences; character has to 
do with behaviors of commitment.59 
The arguments of Bernard Williams, John Braithwaite, and others implicitly 
challenge the emphasis on autonomy in much modernist moral thought (including the 
moralist psychologies of shame).60 Philosophical historian J.B. Schneewind notes that for 
Kant, “morality centers on a law that human beings impose on themselves, necessarily 
58 Some may wish to suggest that Susman’s representation of the culture of personality as one of 
‘performance’ should be equally applied to the culture of character, which is no less performative.  This 
critique is superficial in my view.  The performance of the personality is one intended to attract; it 
ultimately directs the desire of others toward ourselves; the performance of character is intended 
primarily to act on behalf of a broader communal moral sensibility, and is always qualified by a robust 
account of sin, an insistence that no will toward the good is completely self-created. 
59 Michael Himes notes that, in the only judgment narrative given by the New Testament, that of Matthew 
25, the criterion of judgment is not faith, but actions: feeding the hungry, visiting prisoners, welcoming 
strangers.  The ones welcomed into the ‘kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world’ are 
those who construct it through active practical commitments.  However, as Himes himself argues in Doing 
the Truth in Love (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1995), such practical commitments are enabled by 
faith and by participation in an agapic love that is not fully our own.  Neither the ‘conservative’ nor the 
‘liberal’ Christian can fully claim these passages in Matthew. 
60 We have already seen that, for Braithwaite, social shame, in communicating its moral claims, “surely 
limits autonomy.”  This would be a strange and peripheral statement, if autonomy were not already 
presumed to hold some serious moral significance. 38 
                                                        
 
providing themselves, in doing so, with a motive to obey.  Kant speaks of agents who are 
morally self-governed in this way as autonomous.”61 
It is important to note, however, that the Kantian practice of autonomy is a 
method of self-governance that is intended to align us with the identical intentions of 
others (whether it actually functions this way is another matter; the imperative seems 
to be easily coopted as a form of self-confirmation).  The categorical imperative actively 
disrupts the merely personal desires that cannot be reasonably imagined to be good for 
others, and rests upon a deep faith in the self’s power over its own affects and 
commitments.  The categorical imperative is always a practice of imagined participation 
in a broader community of moral purpose: “Act only according to that maxim whereby 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. …[E]very rational 
being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the 
universal kingdom of ends.”62 
Autonomous reason is a shared, potentially universal foundation of morality, 
ennabling a common, repeatable method for arriving at common ethical commitments.  
Autonomy is therefore the surest foundation for the ethics of the democratic age. 
61 Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 483.  “The idea that we are rational beings who 
spontaneously impose lawfulness on the world in which we live and thereby create its basic order is, of 
course, central to the whole of Kant’s philosophy.  In its practical aspects it has engaged attention and 
attracted adherents since its first publication” (484). 
62 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1993 [1785]), 30, 43.  This famous practice of universal imagination has been criticized on 
perspectival, feminist, and anti-totalitarian grounds.  It is, ironically, an implicit ancestor of all of these 
positions.  We will briefly revisit the categorical imperative in Chapter 4, when it is compared to the 
universal imagination of lojong. 39 
                                                        
 
Nietzsche, as we will see in the next chapter, was, like Kant, intensely concerned 
to restore a true autonomy to the human person—or to one sort of person. (Nietzsche’s 
peculiarly invitational rhetoric invites the reader to recognize themselves as this sort of 
higher person.  One also senses that Nietzsche is addressing himself in some way.)  
Nietzsche writes: “We… want to become those we are—human beings who are new, 
unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves” (GS 335).63 
This is the autonomy that is at stake in the pages below. 
One irony is that such autonomous self-creation can easily become, or has 
always been, a form of performance of the self for others, a way of gaining attracting 
the perceptions, interest, and confirmations of others.  Nietzsche writes of Kant as a fox 
who, through the categorical imperative, came close to releasing its own self-interested 
reason—the kind of reason that wishes to command others.  But by subsuming the 
categorical imperative under a social purpose, the fox “goes astray back into his cage” 
(GS 335).  Nietzsche, himself the fox that seeks a higher ethical independence from 
socializing slave moralities, relentlessly encourages his readers to ‘create themselves,’ 
precisely at the moment when self-performativity is a necessary foundation for 
capitalist economies.  If Nietzsche had not existed, personality culture would have found 
it necessary, of course, to invent him.64  
 What has this to do with shame of any kind? 
63 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974 [1882]) 64 One irony is that, for both Kant and Nietzsche, autonomy is intended to transcend social conditioning, 
but ends up failing to do so. 40 
                                                        
 
For Kant, and in a way for Nietzsche as well, all moral judgments that do not 
come to us by self-legislation—all socialization and educability—must be suspect.  
Shame imposes precisely such heteronomous, socializing, culturally dependent, and 
therefore ethically suspect judgments.  Shame, on this view, must be mere “adjustment 
to the prejudices of the community,”65 and therefore a form of moral relativism66 that is 
alienated from the imperatives of autonomous conscience.67 
In his defense of shame as an indispensable aspect of a deep education in virtue, 
therefore, Bernard Williams suggests that he argues primarily with Kant, though it is 
probably Nietzsche he has most in mind. 68  For Williams, the judgment of the 
internalized other shows me the possibility of my own full humanity in relation to 
others: “He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in 
one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my relations to 
the world about me.”69  
65 Williams, 81.  As we will see, it is not Williams’s own position that shame is actually the mere accession 
to conventional opinion.  That position is, however, reflected in the work of Ruth Benedict.  See footnote 
11.   
66 Kant’s anthropological expertise was relatively advanced, and the categorical imperative seems 
designed in part to short-circuit socially determined moral relativism.  The imperative, ingeniously, also 
manages to appeal to Christian ethics while undermining the importance of confessional differences.  It 
seems doubtful that the categorical imperative has ever been practiced formally in any sustained way, but 
it functions far more importantly as a narrative about the shared human capacity to agree, in principle, on 
real moral ends.  A better ethical formulation could hardly have been created to meet the needs of the 
early democratic period.  Politically, Kantians and anti-Kantians generally seek different political 
communities: those who wish to found our common political life on practices of reason and logic most 
often seek an ideal, imagined consensus; those who wish to engage democracy as a community of 
necessary dispute between irreconcilably diverse positions commit themselves, instead, to institutional 
practices of argumentation. 
67 The philosophical anthropology of the therapeutic forcefully advances autonomy, aiming to restore the 
functional integrity of the psyche.  The therapeutic repairs autonomies.   
68 Williams, 75-77. 
69 Ibid., 84. 41 
                                                        
 
Shame reveals to us the standards of excellence to which we might aspire—one 
reason why ‘shame’ cultures are often simultaneously ‘honor’ or public achievement 
cultures.  For Williams, it is shame, and not guilt, that “embodies conceptions of what 
one is and of how one is related to others [emphasis mine].  If guilt seems to many 
people morally self-sufficient, it is probably because they have a distinctive and false 
picture of the moral life, according to which the truly moral self is characterless.”70, 71 In 
other words, we can only recognize specific actions as damaging to others—we can only 
experience ‘guilt’—when our character has already been educated toward a 
commitment to shared virtues such as courage and justice.  Shame, as Williams says, 
involves a set of ‘conceptions of what one is and of how one is related to others’—a 
formulation neatly opposed to that of James Gilligan, for whom shame is a conception 
of one’s ultimate isolation.  The moral-life-in-relation, for Williams and for Braithwaite, 
depends upon the work of shame.72 
70 Williams, 94. 
71 John Rawls fundamentally disagrees that the categorical imperative is incommensurate with the 
cultivation of moral character: “Our humanity [for Kant] is our pure practical reason together with our 
moral sensibility (our capacity for moral feeling).  These two powers constitute moral personality, and 
include the power to set ends; they make a good will and moral character possible.  We have a duty to 
cultivate our natural capacities in order to make ourselves worthy of our humanity.”  See John Rawls, 
“Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the 
Opus postumum, ed. Eckart Forster (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989), 89.  Rawls has 
also written, I think correctly, that “[B]eing excellences of our person which we bring to the affairs of 
social life, all of the virtues may be sought and their absence may render us liable to shame.  But some 
virtues are joined to shame in a special way, since they are peculiarly indicative of the failure to achieve 
self-command and its attendant excellences of strength, courage, and self-control.  Wrongs manifesting 
the absence of these qualities are especially likely to subject us to painful feelings of shame.”  See A 
Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 391. 
72 The ‘necessity’ of Bernard Williams’s Shame and Necessity is both moving and disturbing, insofar as it 
refers to an overwhelming sense that, in the face of certain failures of virtue, the only honorable option is 
suicide (or total exile).  Writing about Sophocles’s Ajax, Williams says: “He has no way of living that 
anyone he respects would respect—which means that he cannot live with any self-respect” (Williams, 85).  
This is the text’s only hint that shame is as capable of self-destruction as it is of moral creativity and 42 
                                                        
 
The tacit premise of such a position is that, without shame’s intrinsic desire to 
belong more fully to a desired field of relations, no moral education is possible.  
However, this is the point at which we will begin to speak in a more theological key.  We 
can desire to belong to some definitive human family or community, but we can also 
desire to belong to a more ultimate or transcendent set of relations.  Socializing shame 
educates us into the moral expectations and commitments of a given community; 
repentance, however, places the person within compassion itself, so that he or she can 
not only uphold compassionate commitments within community, but can also challenge 
communities when they fail to uphold those commitments themselves.  In the next 
section of this chapter, we begin to examine the changing nature of self-evaluation 
when the field of relations shifts from the social to the transcendent. 
1.5  SHAME AMONG THE PHILOSOPHERS II: 
EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 
 I turn here to a brief discussion of shame in the work of Emmanuel Levinas in 
order to more clearly see the relation between shame and transcendence.  These pages 
include a number of technical and specialized terms, and although I will spend time 
exploring those terms, I do so with the sole purpose of drawing out the significance of 
shame in Levinas’s work. 
As background to any discussion of Levinas, I want to first mention the detailed 
reflections on shame in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: An Essay in 
relation—though one might say that suicide, in such a case, is as much an affirmation of the true authority 
of communal value, as it is a judgment of self. 43 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Phenomenological Ontology (1943).  Levinas himself spoke not so much of Sartre, but of 
Martin Heidegger and the broader Western tradition of philosophical ontology, as his 
primary targets of philosophical critique.  But it seems clear that many of Levinas’s most 
influential philosophical formulations—the face, infinity, the limitation of freedom—find 
several direct, inverted counterparts at the center of Sartre’s work.  Levinas transforms 
the phenomenological categories used by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, so that they 
become, in Levinas’s own thought, a critique of ‘phenomenological ontology.’ 
Shame, in Being and Nothingness, is a recognition of one’s own status as an 
object before another’s gaze—shame is our experience before what Sartre called ‘the 
look’ of the other.  This experience of ourselves as an object invokes shame because, in 
being addressed by ‘the look,’73 we become aware of the diminution of our own 
freedom. 
Our naïve sense of that freedom, our sense of the world as ours, is suddenly 
threatened by the awareness that we have become perceived as an object, in a way that 
we are not mere objects for ourselves.  Shame is an awareness of the disruption or 
limitation of our freedom.  In Being and Nothingness, the discussion of shame helps 
Sartre begin to say what it is that prevents the human person from consistently 
affirming his own freedom: others. 
73 Levinas’s resistance to visual metaphors is rooted, one suspects, in his original resistance to Sartre’s 
phenomenological formulations. 44 
                                                        
 
For Sartre, the other is “the presence of a strange freedom,” one before whom “I 
experience a subtle alienation of all my possibilities.”74 “I can be ashamed only as my 
freedom escapes me.”  Sartre’s ‘freedom’ is zero-sum; it escapes to the other when we 
do not retain it.  In shame, writes Sartre, “To use an every-day expression which better 
expresses our thought, I am no longer master of the situation [ital. original].”75 
Existential ontology is, first and foremost, an affirmation of freedom, one 
intended to allow individuals embedded in mass culture to reclaim their own 
autonomous self-mastery.  The faint existentialist posture of rebellion is in part a 
defiance against the perception of others—others who hold a quiet but immense power 
over us.  Existentialism was an effort to teach us to desire our own freedom, the most 
basic human quality. 
Perhaps the most famous existentialist words ever written are Camus’s: “There is 
but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.  Judging whether life is 
or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.”76 
The question of The Myth of Sisyphus is whether Sisyphus can be happy.  Can Sisyphus, 
emblem of repetitious and alienated labor, figure of punishment, affirm his own life?  In 
74 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazell E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 
1956 [1943]), 367, 354. 
75 Ibid., 350, 355. In a particularly suggestive passage, Sartre says that “It would perhaps not be impossible 
to conceive a For-itself which would be wholly free from all For-others and which would exist without 
even suspecting the possibility of being an object.  But this For-itself simply would not be ‘man’” (376). It 
is an odd speculation.  This vision of total isolation, of a being ‘for-itself’ who is unseen by others, or who 
is inescapably sociopathic, is faintly disturbing, but also expresses a significant undertone of Sartre’s 
actual celebration of autonomy.  “[W]hile I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. 
…Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others.  If we start with the first revelation of the Other as a 
look, we must recognize that we experience our inapprehensible being-for-others in the form of a 
possession” (475).  If freedom is, in fact, zero-sum, it becomes easier to say something as patently 
immature as “hell is other people.”  
76 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Knopf, 1955 [1942]), 3. 45 
                                                        
 
Camus’s modernized mythos, there is no one else around.77 The answer to the suddenly 
fundamental question of self-affirmation is up to Sisyphus himself. 
For Sartre, the human situation at the middle of the century required an 
articulation of the ‘ontological’ foundations of resistance—resistance to violence, to the 
state, to mass culture, to man’s fate as a consumer of his own manipulation.  Sartre 
responds to mass conditioning by articulating a self-conditioning, self-affirming 
freedom: his existentialism is a humanism of defiance; he, not Kant, is the true 
philosopher of autonomy.78  
Sartre’s ontology of existential freedom, as well as Levinas’s own ethics, are both 
attempts to articulate an elemental human dignity in the middle of a century of 
sometimes amplified inhumanity.  The problem of human dignity may be found at the 
heart of Bernard Williams’s Shame and Necessity as well.  The text unfolds from the 
situation of Sophocles’s Ajax:  “He has no way of living that anyone he respects would 
respect—which means that he cannot live with any self-respect” (Williams, 85).   
 For Levinas, however, human dignity is recognized, or activated, in an ethical 
demand—a demand that is encountered most directly in the face, or vulnerability, of 
77 Sartre responds to shame largely by rejecting the social ‘level’ of connection—not in an attempt to turn 
to a transcendent Other, but rather by radically reinforcing the self-relation, at the individual ‘level’ of 
self-connection. 
78 Kant and Levinas have more in common than either thinker does with Sartre.  The infinity of ethical 
demand to be found in the face of the other functions, in several ways, very much as the categorical 
imperative functions.  Both the infinity of demand and the categorical imperative are universal in their 
affirmation of others as ultimate ends in themselves; and both infinity and the imperative admit, but 
undermine, our own accidental preferences and desires, in favor of a greater ethical desire and duty.  My 
own sense is that both infinity and the imperative function as important moral narratives, rather than real 
moral practices.  As narratives, they induce new habits of ethical experience, rather than accurately 
describing such habits.  Sartre, on the other hand, is in a sense categorically anti-imperative: he focuses 
not on others as ends, but on freedom as its own end. 46 
                                                        
 
the other.  This is a fateful difference between Levinas’s thought and that of Sartre.  
Dignity cannot be accomplished through a self-affirmative freedom; no dignity can ever 
be our own. 79  Instead, dignity is what occurs when the nakedness, the basic 
vulnerability of the face is disclosed through an infinite communication of the demand 
that we should not kill.80  (Infinite, because we can never fully grasp or comprehend the 
demand; it exceeds understanding, goes beyond ‘what thought itself can think’ in such a 
way that we can never get behind the demand, to any system of which it is only a part.81  
Infinity addresses us as a command that cannot be undermined by our habit of mere 
comprehension.  The point is not comprehension but response.)  We are now clearly 
within the interdictory confines of the Tanakh, overhearing the early human worlds of 
Genesis, in which human vulnerability is a sentence of expulsion for our grasping after 
mere understanding, and Cain is unwilling to be put to question: where is your brother? 
 ‘The look’ that had objectified us, for Sartre, now becomes, in the work of 
Levinas, the ‘face’ that reveals the human, not as an object, but as an ethical demand to 
which we can only respond or fail to respond. 
79 Among contemporary thinkers, Levinas is the most profound critic of the literal self-righteousness 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  This is, I think, one reason why his work has been so influential in recent 
decades, precisely as self-righteousness is increasingly required by our economic context.   
80 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay in Exteriority, trans. Alphoso Lingis (Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969 [1961]), 74-75, 199.  The language of naked vulnerability 
invokes the most devastating images of the Shoah.  (Mary Oliver’s ‘soft animal of the body’ depends on a 
context of a benevolent nature; Levinas does not assume the same.) 
81 Similarities between Levinas and Kant have already been noted, but here is a serious difference: Kant 
adheres to the power of a calculative reason, and Levinas critiques an ethics of calculation and 
comprehension in favor of a fundamental human receptivity to interpersonal ethical demand, or what 
Charles Hallisey has called ‘the moral self degree zero,’ prior to calculation (personal communication).  
Moral calculation is particularly suspect in the Japanese Buddhist traditions of Jodo Shinshu and Zen. 47 
                                                        
 
Levinas’s creative inversion of ‘the look’ extends also into a counter-existential 
account of freedom.  For Sartre, freedom was something that we lose, something that 
flees from us, when we are objectified in ‘the look.’  Freedom, for Levinas, is instead 
something that is rightly ‘called into question’ in our encounter with the infinity of 
ethical demand.  In responding to the demand in the face of the other, we do not reclaim 
our freedom but renounce it. 
One suspects that Levinas has Sartre in mind when he says, with a hint of 
sarcasm, that in the Western philosophical tradition, the limitation of freedom “alone is 
held to be tragic and to constitute a scandal.” 
The freedom that can be ashamed of itself founds truth…. The Other is 
not initially a fact, is not an obstacle, does not threaten me with death [a 
refutation of Sartre]; he is desired in my shame.  To discover the 
unjustified facticity of power and freedom one must not consider it as an 
object, nor consider the Other as an object; one must measure oneself 
against infinity, that is, desire him.  It is necessary to have the idea of 
infinity, the idea of the perfect, as Descartes would say, in order to know 
one’s own imperfection.  The idea of the perfect is not an idea but desire; 
it is the welcoming of the Other, the commencement of moral 
consciousness, which calls in question my freedom.  Thus this way of 
measuring oneself against the perfection of infinity is not a theoretical 
consideration; it is accomplished as shame, where freedom discovers 
itself murderous in its very exercise.82 
 
 This is a typically intricate Levinasian passage.  The language here will strike 
some readers as hyperbolic.  But it is a finely ordered conceptual poetry.  Levinas 
suggests that a relationship to the other—a relation made possible by a recognition of 
infinity as the transcendent Other—is not only possible, but is in fact always the true 
82 Totality and Infinity, 83-84. 48                                                         
 
direction of human consciousness.  We are human, for Levinas, as far as we recognize 
ourselves as subjected to an infinity of ethical demand. 
 It may be that the work of Levinas would be unnecessary, if this encounter with 
infinitude of ethical demand were in fact fundamental to human consciousness.  Levinas 
does not develop a full account of the human propensity to escape or avoid this 
fundamental precariousness of the other. 
Levinas persuasively suggests that the Western tradition of moral philosophy has 
been tempted to, and co-opted by, mere comprehension.83 The failure of moral life is a 
failure of the Western intellectual tradition, more than it is a failure inherent in human 
consciousness itself.  Western thought is a refusal to be called into question, and this is 
its basic fault. 84 Elsewhere, Levinas suggests that our consistent failure to allow 
ourselves to be addressed by an infinite moral demand is fundamentally a natural 
human ‘forgetfulness’ of primary responsibility.85 “The aggressiveness of the offender is 
83 In “The Temptation of Temptation,” a Talmudic reading of part of the Sabbath Tractate given in late 
1964, Levinas reflects quite beautifully on the rabbinic teaching that when the Torah was presented to the 
Israelites, they “committed to doing before hearing” (Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz 
[Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990], 30).  The ‘temptation to temptation’ is the 
temptation of comprehension as an end in itself, and “temptation defines the philosophical reason of the 
West” (38).  The commitment to accept (to do) the law, before understanding the law, is, in Levinas’s 
reading, the foundation of Israelite Temimut, uprightness (a term that appears in Levinas’s philosophical 
work as well).  Elsewhere, Levinas writes that “The idea of totality and the idea of infinity differ precisely 
in that the first is purely theoretical, while the second is moral” (Totality and Infinity, 83). 
84 As far as Levinas places the tradition itself in question, however, he is a participant in the process of 
critique that defines tradition itself, and so his thought may be simply incorporated by the very habits of 
comprehension that he criticizes. 
85 “The Temptation of Temptation,” Nine Readings, 50. 49 
                                                        
 
perhaps his very unconsciousness.  Aggression is the lack of attention par excellence.”86 
Shame is the human capacity of return from this forgetfulness of attention. 
The arguments that violence is the result of a failed intellectual tradition, and 
that this failure of tradition now continues to condition our natural human forgetfulness 
of the primary demand, do not fully explain how we ever return to the vulnerability of 
the face, once it is forgotten.  If Levinas had developed a more adequate account of our 
actual shamelessness when encountering the vulnerability of the other, he might also 
have had to commit himself to some liturgy to educate our attention.  Instead, for 
Levinas, the consciousness of infinity is simply a given, toward which we can always 
turn.  It is shame that implicitly allows for that turn. 
In the extended passage selected above, shame is the revelation of infinity; it is 
the ‘commencement of moral consciousness.’  Shame allows two simultaneous events 
of consciousness to occur: it reveals our self-affirmative ‘freedom’ as a mode of harmful 
ignorance87; and it measures that ignorance against the perfection of the infinite ethical 
demand.  Shame reverses the latent violence of innocence.88 
In Levinas, shame as a movement of desire receives its most insistent and skillful 
articulation.  Infinity is not conceptualized, but desired; only desire makes possible our 
86 “Toward the Other,” Nine Readings, 25. This might have been just as easily said by a student of the 
Mahayana. 
87 “Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and 
violent” (Totality and Infinity, 84).  The language of justification, as well as the basic attitude expressed in 
Levinas’s position, is remarkably consonant with Luther.  Strange bedfellows indeed. 
88 Levinas does not completely explain the tension between the fundamental directions of consciousness 
in his work: the direction of enjoyment, or naïve freedom; and the exterior encounter with the infinity of 
demand.  If consciousness is, most fundamentally, the latter, the real power of violently self-affirmative 
freedom is left largely unexplained.  Shame would be unnecessary if our consciousness were as oriented 
toward the ethical demand as Levinas’s phenomenological claims suggest it is.  In my view, shame 
becomes central to Levinas because of the immense power of naïve freedom in his work. 50 
                                                        
 
basic receptivity to ethical demand.  We are always addressed by infinity, but shame 
opens up in us the very human desire to hear that address.89 
Self-contempt is not at all the same thing as the ‘shame’ that occurs when our 
naïve freedom is called into question through the encounter with the other. The 
compulsivity of self-hatred is felt as a sensation of assertive power, while Levinasian 
‘shame’ involves a basic openness.90  And unlike the strange certitude of self-contempt, 
Levinasian shame is a way of unknowing; infinity is the relation we cannot fully fathom, 
even as it renders us more responsive to vulnerability.   
In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas develops further this account of the 
structure of the commandment not to kill.  Here, instead of representing infinity as an 
interdict against violence to which we either do or do not respond, Levinas speaks of our 
responsiveness as a primary, even passive, substitution of our own self-interest for 
others.  Such substitutionary responsiveness is the status, writes Levinas, of one who is 
a ‘hostage,’ ‘persecuted’ by the ethical demand of the other in an ‘expiation’ of the 
contamination of being’s self-interested inertia. 91  We do not choose this; the 
substitution of self-interestedness is already what is performed in us, but also what our 
freedom may ultimately refuse.  Freedom, contra Sartre, is not in any sense the highest 
human good.  Shame, the moment in which we come to perceive the infinitude of 
89 This teaching of desire, like Augustine’s teaching on prevenient grace (the desire for grace is a already a 
grace), directs us to search for what is already closest to, but hidden from, our own awareness. 
90 “Or else this knowledge invites the knower to an interminable psychoanalysis, the desperate search for 
a true origin at least in oneself…” (Totality and Infinity, 65). 
91 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1981 [1974]).  See Chapter IV, esp. 113-27.  Substitution may 
actually presume a greater primacy of self-interestedness than Levinas allows.  Without a primary egoism, 
there would be little to substitute. 51 
                                                        
 
ethical demand in Totality and Infinity,92 becomes a turn toward an always prior 
substitution in Otherwise than Being. 
 Paul Ricoeur objects that this account actually risks “the substitution of self-
hatred for self-esteem.”93 Substitution may appear, from one perspective, as insane 
ethical perfectionism, or as an acceptance of a domineering and even wrathful 
judgment.   Levinas does anticipate the objection offered by Ricoeur: “I exist through 
the other and for the other, but without this being alienation: I am inspired.”94 Levinas 
does not claim that substitution is a procedure of secular reason; his thought is a 
refutation of autonomy. 
 “The responsibility for another,” writes Levinas, “an unlimited responsibility 
which the strict book-keeping of the free and non-free does not measure, requires 
subjectivity as an irreplaceable hostage.”95  We cannot be our own, without violence.  
Levinas renounces calculative reciprocities, which seek to define who deserves and does 
not deserve responsive compassion (as if compassion were a limited, measurable 
92 See also “Transcendence and Height,” a talk presented in early 1962, in which Levinas notes that 
“[S]hame is a movement in a direction opposed to that of consciousness, which returns triumphantly to 
itself and rests upon itself.  To feel shame is to expel oneself from this rest and not simply to be conscious 
of this already glorious exile.  The just person who knows himself to be just is no longer just.  The first 
condition of the first as of the last of the just is that their justice remains clandestine to them.”  Shame, 
here, has close resonances with the fear of the Lord.  (Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings 
[Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996], 17.) 
93 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 
[1990]), 168. 
94 Otherwise than Being, 114.  See also 124. 
95 Otherwise than Being, 124.  See also Levinas’s 1986 “Interview with François Poirié,” in Is it Righteous to 
Be?  Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2001).  “For [Martin] Buber the relation between the I and the Thou is straightaway experienced as 
reciprocity.  My point of departure is Dostoevsky: ‘Each of us is guilty before everyone and for everything, 
and I more than the others.’ …[W]hat is central is the theme of asymmetry [in Levinas’s own work], which 
determines our different manners of speaking.  Consequently, I have read Buber with much respect and 
attention, but I am not always in agreement with him” (72-73). 52 
                                                        
 
resource), or, who deserves and does not deserve retribution and vengeance.  When we 
are grasped by substitution, there is nothing we need to receive from others ‘in return’; 
substitution is the basic self-offering in the face of the other—a self-offering that is at 
the heart of the human person. 
Self-contempt is in large part the refusal of that offering; it wills certitude and 
separation. 
53 
 
CHAPTER 2  
 
THE PROBLEM OF SHAME IN NIETZSCHE 
 
Oh my friends!  Thus speaks the enlightened man: 
‘Shame, shame, shame—that is the history of humankind!’ 
—Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ‘Of the Compassionate’ 
_______________ 
 
2.1 AUTONOMY AND SHAME 
 
The problem of shame is among the most intense concerns of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s writing in The Gay Science and after.  Self-affirmative autonomy is 
Nietzsche’s primary response to that shame. 
Nietzsche, however, is a flawed visionary of affirmation.  The Eternal Return and 
the will to power are peculiar, magnetic expressions of an aspiration to self-
affirmation.96 But Nietzsche’s central constructive projects have long failed to invite any 
true commitment; they remain artifacts of philosophy.  These pages ask why that is the 
case.  I will suggest that the capacity for strong affirmation and the defense of strong 
autonomy cannot finally coincide. 
 
Nietzsche’s interwoven projects of genealogical moral critique and constructive 
philosophical vision—his attempt to envision the positive shameless man—project a 
forceful sense of possible freedom.  But Nietzsche also refuses an anthropology that 
depends upon connection; human sociality is the opening for precisely those herd 
instincts and slave moralities that induce in us a ‘bad conscience’ about ourselves. 
96 “You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and 
intoxication” (Z, ‘On Self-Overcoming’). 54 
                                                        
 
For Michel Foucault, Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of Christian shame 
initiates the true task of the discipline of historical inquiry: “Its task is to become a 
curative science.”97  Nietzschean history, writes Foucault, “opposes itself to the search 
for ‘origins’”98; “The true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost 
events, without a landmark or a point of reference.”99 
 But Nietzsche does not in fact disclaim origins—he celebrates the origin that is 
unexpected or repressed.  He locates the origin of moral judgment, for instance, in our 
fear of those ‘dangerous’ ones who have injured us; the origin of notions about 
responsibility is the need to justify punishment.  And it is the origin of shame, the 
shameful origin, which draws Nietzsche’s most acute interest: 
 O pudenda origo!100 
 ‘The origin,’ writes Foucault, ‘always precedes the Fall,’101 and in fact Nietzsche is 
very much interested in shame itself as the lapse that stands in need of healing.102   Both 
97 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,’ in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 91.  First Published in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1971). 
98 Ibid, 77. 
99 Ibid., 89.  Foucault rejects teleologies.  But the Eternal Return is characteristically teleological, insofar as 
it imagines time in a way that induces our assent to suffering, which would otherwise produce too much 
memory, and too much fear of the future.  
100 Ibid.  See Friedrich Nietzsche, Dawn, § 102.  See also On the Genealogy of Morals, II.4: “But how did 
that other ‘somber thing,’ the consciousness of guilt, the ‘bad conscience,’ come into the world?”  Note: 
In this essay I have included abbreviated initials for Nietzsche’s primary works, and the number of the 
aphorism quoted, when citing Nietzsche himself.  Except where noted, I have used Walter Kaufmann’s 
translations of The Birth of Tragedy (BT), The Gay Science (GS), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), On the 
Genealogy of Morals (GM), and Ecce Homo (EH).  See The Gay Science (New York: Random House, 1974) 
and The Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York, Random House, 1966).  When discussing Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, I found R.J. Hollingdale’s 1961 translation more useful (London: Penguin Books, 1961). 
101 Ibid., 79. 
102 Bruce Ellis Benson argues that Nietzsche cannot be considered a soteriological thinker, because 
“redemption for Nietzsche means not thinking there is something wrong in the first place.” Nietzsche is 
engaged in “a soteriology from soteriology, a soteriology that insists on abandoning soteriology” (Benson, 55 
                                                        
 
Nietzsche and Genesis, writes Thomas Altizer, agree that “morality is a consequence of 
an original and catastrophic fall.”103 Nietzsche seeks to cure the catastrophes of shame.  
Nietzsche’s focus on origins is characteristically religious and soteriological.104 
 Nietzsche, more than any other modern figure, is author of the suspicion that 
Christian commitments are, among other things, disciplines of damaging shame.  If we 
are to argue, later, that Buddhist or Christian practices of ‘self-blame’ are in fact 
movements of an encompassing affirmation, we will first have to answer a pervasive 
wariness—one that Nietzsche helps to initiate.105 
James Joyce, June Price Tangney, and thousands of others now repeat a basic 
Nietzschean refrain: Christian teachings are inhumane in their impositions of destructive 
self-despising.  The Nietzschean view that religious lives are anti-human has been 
thoroughly normalized. “Always,” writes Nietzsche, “love your neighbor as yourselves—
but first be such as love themselves—”106 Nietzsche does not trust modern Christians to 
trust in their own lovedness: this is a basic meaning, and opportunity, implied in God’s 
death.  Merely to admit that God is dead, for those who have heard the madman’s 
Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009], pp. 51, 
200).  However, it is actually a very common feature of soteriologies that they seek to show that nothing 
was fundamentally wrong in the first place.  Nietzsche’s work is quite consonant with the patterns of 
religious thought. 
103 Thomas J.J. Altizer, “Eternal Recurrence and Kingdom of God,” in The New Nietzsche, ed. David Allison 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985 [1977]), p. 236. 
104 Valadier: “The Greek affirmation of life, which Nietzsche synthesized in the term Dionysus, is a religious 
attitude that escapes the critic’s verdict of decadence” (See: Paul Valadier, “Dionysius Versus the 
Crucified,” in Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche, p. 247). 
105 Nietzsche: “The two great nihilistic movements: (a) Buddhism, (b) Christianity” (Will to Power [WP] 
220).  Nietzsche recognizes immediately that the European inculturation of Buddhism would depend 
profoundly upon European understandings of Christianity—a basic assumption of this essay as well, in a 
North American context. 
106 Zarathustra, “Of the Virtue that Makes Small.” 56 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
announcement, is inadequate—they ignore the true opportunity disclosed by that 
death, which is the possibility of a new self-love. 
Sociality has required a basic distortion of the true nature of the human: the will 
to power.  The will to power is not only the most fundamental psychological principle 
for interpreting human behavior, it is also, as Walter Kaufmann has noted, “the basic 
force of the entire universe.”107  In Nietzsche’s early work The Birth of Tragedy, he 
describes Dionysian joy in the ontologically expansive terms with which he will later 
articulate power itself: 
We are really… primordial being itself, feeling its raging desire for 
existence and joy in existence; the struggle, the pain, the destruction of 
phenomena, now appear necessary to us…. We are pierced by the 
maddening sting of these pains just when we have become, as it were, 
one with the infinite primordial joy in existence, and when we anticipate, 
in Dionysian ecstasy, the indestructibility and eternity of this joy.  In spite 
of fear and pity, we are the happy living beings, not as individuals, but as 
the one living being, with whose creative joy we are united. (BT 17) 
 
At the end of his working life, in one of the aphorisms collected by his sister in 
The Will to Power, Nietzsche would write that, “At bottom, man has lost the faith in his 
own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e., he conceived such 
a whole in order to be able to believe in his own value” (WP 12). 
The infinite whole that Nietzsche conceives is the will to power.  It is, however, a 
power that requires, for its affirmation, the separation of the human person from the 
social and religious spheres of value that seek to inhibit self-affirming power itself. 
Here there is a crucial and unresolved ambiguity in Nietzsche’s oeuvre. 
107 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Fourth Edition (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1974 [1950]), 207. 57 
                                                        
 
On the one hand, Nietzsche conceives of an ontology of creative and affirmative 
joy, in which all persons may potentially participate and share.  On the other hand, 
Nietzsche suggests repeatedly that only a select set of persons are in fact capable of 
such participation, and that these persons must be capable of separation, so that they 
are not drawn unnecessarily toward constrictive and shame-inducing moralities. 
The Übermensch is one whose vital autonomy allows him to withstand the 
threat of communal disconnection108—the threat upon which shared moral discourse 
depends is the threat of shame, and it is best to move beyond both.109 For Nietzsche, it 
is not connection, but power, which is the true path to self-affirmative joy. 
Nietzsche’s profound anthropological division into the powerful and the weak 
moves him to privilege an inviolable autonomy for the vital few—an autonomy that 
ensures they will not be exposed to the constraining shame of social moralities.  We 
have already seen, in the previous chapter, Nietzsche’s invitational tone to the readers 
of The Gay Science: “We… want to become those we are—human beings who are new, 
unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves” (GS 335).  In 
On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes of “the sovereign individual, like only to 
108 Already in 1904, Arthur Drews wrote that Nietzsche was chiefly opposed to “heteronymous morality, 
which imposes its commandments from without and results in the diminishment and subjugation of the 
individual self.  He would like to confront this old, life-denying morality with a new, autonomous morality, 
which stems directly from the individual will…” Arthur Drews, Nietzsches Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1904), 
quoted in Gianni Vattimo, Nietzsche: An Introduction, trans. Nicholas Martin (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 170-71.   
109 Remember that philosophers like John Braithwaite and Bernard Williams seek to uphold ‘shame’ as the 
affect that supports shared moral learning and social integration.  From Nietzsche’s perspective, such 
relationships only impinge upon the self-overcoming Übermensch.   58 
                                                        
 
himself, liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral (for 
‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive)” (GM, II.2).   
Nietzsche proposes an extraordinary amplification of individual autonomy as the 
necessary preparation for the will to power itself: 
Thus what is really praised when virtues are praised is, first, their 
instrumental nature [for the community] and, secondly, the [altruistic] 
instinct in every virtue that refuses to be held in check by the over-all 
advantage for the individual himself—in sum, the unreason in virtue that 
leads the individual to allow himself to be transformed into a mere 
function of the whole.  The praise of virtue is the praise of something that 
is privately harmful—the praise of instincts that deprive a human being of 
his noblest selfishness and the strength for the highest autonomy. [GS 
21] 
 
For Kant, shame violated precisely the human capacity for autonomy that underwrites 
the practical and moral application of our reason.110  Here, even though Nietzsche, 
unlike Kant, ultimately divides autonomy from morality, he remains in many ways a 
Kantian heir—shame is the most profound threat to autonomy: “Even the strongest 
person fears a cold look or a sneer on the face of those among whom he has been 
brought up. What is he really afraid of? Growing solitary! …Thus, the herd instinct 
speaks up in us” (GS 50).  “What Nietzsche’s position does share with Kant’s moral 
philosophy,” writes David Owen, “is a view of autonomy as the ground of self-
respect.”111 
Shame is the fear of isolation—a fear that must be overcome: 
110 Williams, 77: “In the scheme of Kantian oppositions, shame is on the bad side of all the lines.”  For 
Kant, the purpose of autonomy was political cohesion.  Autonomy in Kant is the guarantor that we will 
arrive at a common valuation of the good through reason.  To impose shared values through culturally 
variable shame, therefore, is to create a weak foundation for personal and political decision. 
111 David Owen, “Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency,” in Nietzsche on 
Autonomy and Freedom, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 211. 59 
                                                        
 
…[D]uring the longest period of the human past nothing was more 
terrible than to feel that one stood by oneself.  To be alone, to 
experience things by oneself, neither to obey nor to rule, to be an 
individual—that was not a pleasure but a punishment; one was 
sentenced ‘to individuality.’  Freedom of thought was considered 
discomfort itself.  While we experience law and submission as 
compulsion and loss, it was egoism that was formerly experienced as 
something painful and as real misery.  To be a self and to esteem oneself 
according to one’s own weight and measure—that offended taste in 
those days.  An inclination to do this would have been considered 
madness; for being alone was associated with every misery and fear.  
…Whatever harmed the herd, whether the individual had wanted it or 
not wanted it, prompted the sting of conscience in the individual—and in 
his neighbor, too, and even in the whole herd.—There is no point on 
which we have learned to think and feel more differently. [GS 117] 
 
The range of human instinct is seldom congruent with communal demands, and 
so, for the person who would intensify their own instinct for freedom, power, and joy, 
communal demand must be rejected.  A moral community requires, and enforces, 
damaging shame; the fear of shameful exposure is the basic price of belonging.112   
Moralities make a threatening appeal to the ‘herd instinct’ precisely in those 
who are the strongest and most potentially independent persons—moralities are 
implicit threats of fatal expulsion.  Nobility, then, is really the adoption of a proud 
contempt toward one’s own desire for the affirmation of others: “The noble type of 
man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval…” (BGE 260).  
The necessary self-contempt of the noble person will lie in his confrontation with any 
such need, if should arise. 
112 Again, on origins, Nietzsche writes: “I regard the bad conscience [cruelty toward the self] as the serious 
illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever 
experienced—that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of 
society and of peace” (GM, Second Essay, 16).  This seems very dubious; the escape from cruelties of 
wilderness may have created some discontents of ‘civilization,’ but certainly there was at least as much 
relief as there was new pain. 60 
                                                        
 
We are of course much freer to develop diversities of moral commitment than 
pre-modern persons.  We depend far less directly and completely upon our neighbors 
and hierarchs for protection and shared sustenance.  Nietzsche seeks a radical 
fortification of these freedoms, arguing that moral communities actually damage our 
capacities for independent self-affirmation:  “Morality trains the individual to be a 
function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function.  …Morality is 
herd instinct in the individual” (GS 116). 
In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Nietzsche introduces the closely related 
category of ‘slave morality.’ “According to slave morality, those who are ‘evil’ 
[instinctual] thus inspire fear… [and] the good human being has to be undangerous in 
the slaves’ way of thinking: he is good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid 
perhaps…” (BGE 260).  Like the ‘herd instinct’ of The Gay Science, “Slave morality is 
essentially a morality of utility,” emphasizing qualities “which serve to ease existence for 
those who suffer: here pity [Mitleid; compassion], the complaisant and obliging hand, 
the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness are honored—for here 
these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure 
of existence” (BGE 260).113 
What is most striking, in all such passages, is that Nietzsche presumes that there 
can be persons, either now or in the future, for whom self-affirmation apart from 
relationship can be lasting or complete.  This is where Nietzsche’s failures of affirmation 
begin: the assumption that strong self-affirmation can ever be a lasting expression of 
113 There are strong resonances here, of course, with Eva Illouz’s work on emotional capitalism. 61                                                         
 
autonomy, or that the human need for connection can be transcended.  Neither 
assumption seems anthropologically workable.   
So, even though Nietzsche conceives a broadly ontological will to power, in 
which we may or may not come to participate, that ontology does not function to 
connect the human to others—a basic requirement of any creative ontology. 
In his discussion of Nietzsche’s will to power as an extra-personal phenomenon, 
Walter Kaufmann has this to say: 
The most obvious objection at this point is, no doubt, that it seems 
empirically untrue that our minds are so constituted that, when we 
consider phenomena and think as carefully and cogently as we can, we 
are driven to assume that the will to power is the basic principle of the 
universe.  This criticism seems not only relevant but, in the end, 
unanswerable.114 
 
 The criticism itself, I think, is correct.  Other thinkers, including Levinas, will 
suggest that responsiveness to the vulnerability of the other is an even more basic 
principle of the human encounter, and that this true responsiveness is obscured by 
ontologies of power that posit ‘basic principles of the universe’ whose function is really 
the justification of self-interest.  Levinas, like Bernard Williams, privileges shame as a 
primary foundation for any recognition of our deeply human responsiveness.  This is the 
anthropology that Nietzsche attempts to leave behind. 
We cannot altogether escape shame, except through total isolation, or death.   
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2.2 SHAME AND THE GAY SCIENCE 
Nietzsche offers suggestions for how to read his work, anticipating that certain 
formulations will strike us at first as deeply strange: 
One must learn to love.—This is what happens to us in music: First one 
has to learn to hear a figure and melody at all, to detect and distinguish 
it, to isolate it and delimit it as a separate life.  Then it requires some 
exertion and good will to tolerate it in spite of its strangeness, to be 
patient with its appearance and expression, and kindhearted about its 
oddity.  Finally there comes a moment when we are used to it, when we 
wait for it, when we sense that we should miss it if it were missing; and 
now it continues to compel and enchant us relentlessly until we have 
become its humble and enraptured lovers who desire nothing better 
from the world than it and only it.  But that is what happens to us not 
only in music.  That is how we have learned to love all things that we now 
love.  In the end we are always rewarded for our good will, our patience, 
fair-mindedness, and gentleness with what is strange; gradually, it sheds 
its veil and turns out to be a new and indescribable beauty.  That is its 
thanks for our hospitality.  Even those who love themselves will have 
learned it in this way; for there is no other way.  Love, too, has to be 
learned. [GS 334] 
 
Like the medieval Provençal poet-singers who helped to inspire Die Fröhliche 
Wissenschaft, Nietzsche seeks (perhaps more earnestly than they might have done) to 
‘compel and enchant’ his listeners, so that we might follow in the current of his 
imagination.  But he recognized that readers could only approach his most central 
constructive visions through attitudes of receptivity, patience, kindheartedness.  How 
would readers come to consent to new visions of affirmation?  How would they assent 
to themselves?  Even those who love themselves will have learned it this way. 
It is significant that Nietzsche proposes, for his ideal reader, capacities involved 
in encounters with both music and revelation.  And he is preparing us in particular to 
encounter the vision of the Eternal Return and the Dionysian prophet Zarathustra—both 63 
 
of which are presented just a few aphorisms later, at the conclusion of the original 1882 
version of The Gay Science. 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche composes symphonically: arguments achieve a 
cumulative force through repetitions of emphasis and tone; leitmotifs recur; works 
develop across a series of movements that are interwoven with provocative 
symmetries.  Seeing the centrality of shame in Nietzsche’s mature thought depends in 
part on understanding the compositional structure of Nietzsche’s writing in The Gay 
Science. 
The work covers wide topographies, but Nietzsche’s most prominent internal 
transitions and patterns suggest quite clear thematic emphases.  Book One closes with a 
discussion of different kinds of suffering, and at the end of Book Two, Nietzsche writes 
that, “as long as you are in any way ashamed before yourselves, you do not yet belong 
with us” (GS 107).  These words directly prefigure the final words of Book Three: 
What is the seal of liberation?—No longer being ashamed in front of 
oneself. [GS 275]115 
 
This concise formulation marks a centerpiece of The Gay Science—the 
announcement of a soteriology against shame, which will be resolved in Nietzsche’s 
presentation of the Eternal Return at the end of Book Four (the work’s original 
conclusion).  The closing passages of the four original Books are mutually referential, 
115 I have found no discussion of this emphatic aphorism in any scholarly literature.  The question, What is 
the seal of liberation?—is one of a series of questions in Nietzsche’s dialogue with himself at the end of 
Book Three of The Gay Science.  These are, one senses, some of Nietzsche’s most personal lines. 64 
                                                        
 
and Nietzsche’s increasingly insistent explorations of shame116 in the closing aphorisms 
of the first three books are answered structurally by the cosmological vision of the 
Eternal Return that concludes the original version of the work.  The amor fati, love of 
fate, induced by the Eternal Return offers a direct answer to the problem of shame: 
If this thought [the Eternal Return] gained power over you it would, as 
you are now, transform and perhaps crush you; the question in all and 
everything: ‘do you want this again and again, times without number?’ 
would lie as the heaviest burden upon all your actions.  Or how well 
disposed towards yourself and towards life would you have to become to 
have no greater desire than for this ultimate eternal sanction and seal? 
[GS 341]117 
 
Self-affirmation is chiefly a consent to the entirety of that process which has produced 
one’s own self, including all of the necessary suffering that such a process entails.   
The structural symmetries of Nietzsche’s writing makes their own claim; the 
‘ultimate confirmation and seal’ invoked at the close of Book Three of The Gay Science, 
in the context of a discussion about shame, is now directly answered by the ‘eternal 
sanction and seal’ of the Eternal Return—a vision that attempts to ground the work of 
affirmation: can one consent to the given moment as it is, repeated infinitely, as part of 
the gathering of ever greater strength?118 
116 Nietzsche uses Scham, or selber schämen [GS 275], most consistently to invoke a damaging failure of 
self-affirmation, particularly driven by enforced shaming within the ancient ‘herd’ and within ascetic 
cultures. But Nietzsche comes in his later work to theorize new purposes of sharper, more powerful forms 
of self-despising, self-cruelty, and self-hatred.  There are some marginal exceptions to his normal usage of 
scham—see Beyond Good and Evil aphorism 40, for example, in which the dramaturgic mask is discussed 
as ‘the proper disguise for the Scham [modesty] of a god’ [an allusion to Dionysus].  More often, however, 
shame is presented as the most damaging of all affects.  It is an obsession in Nietzsche’s writing. 
117 In this instance, I have used R.J. Hollingdale’s translation of this passage, offered in the introduction to 
his translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Penguin Books, 1961). 
118 Without belaboring the point: the first aphorism of Book Four—that is, the aphorism immediately 
following the formula of the liberation from shame—raises the question of the love of fate: “Amor fati: let 
that be my love henceforth!” (GS 376).  In Nietzsche’s writing, amor fati answers shame. 65 
                                                        
 
To become ‘well-disposed toward oneself’ is the primary antidote to modern 
‘weightlessness’ 119 —a weightlessness that is primarily a contemporary failure of 
commitment.  The most important commitment, for Nietzsche, is self-affirmation, and 
the Eternal Return is an aide to precisely that affirmation. 
In the very last aphorism of the original version of The Gay Science, we find, for 
the first time, the figure of Zarathustra—advocate of power and joy, strident critic of 
shame.120 Nietzsche’s voice is now no longer merely diagnostic, but full-prophetic—
perhaps even somewhat too loud to be entirely believable. 
The early interpretive concern with the question of Nietzsche’s ‘immoralism’121 
was understandably drawn to the most basic of his announcements: ‘God is dead.’  The 
first iteration of the statement itself opens Book Three of The Gay Science: 
After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a 
cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow.  God is dead; but given the way 
of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his 
shadow will be shown. —And we—we still have to vanquish his shadow, 
too. [108]122 
119 Aphorism 341, in which the Eternal Return is introduced, is titled Das grösste Schwergewicht: The 
Greatest Weight. Jackson Lears comments: “During the late nineteenth century, for educated Americans, 
secularization meant primarily a particular dis-ease: a sense that American Christianity had begun to lose 
moral intensity and that as a result, the entire culture had begun to enter what Nietzsche had called a 
‘weightless’ period.  Nietzsche had seen the secularizing process as part of a larger tendency in modern 
culture—a general blurring of moral and cultural boundaries and loosening of emotional ties, a weakening 
of the conviction that certain principles, certain standards of conduct, must remain inviolable, and a loss 
of the gravity imparted to human experience by a supernatural framework of meaning.  With the decline 
of Christianity, he had predicted, ‘it will seem for a time as though all things had become weightless.’”  
See Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture 1880-
1920 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 41. 
120 “I will teach men the meaning of their existence—the overman, the lightning out of the dark cloud of 
man” (Z 7).  Note that, for Nietzsche, the human being is not its own justification. 
121 GS 346: “If we simply called ourselves, using an old expression, godless, or unbelievers, or perhaps 
immoralists, we do not believe that this would even come close to designating us…” 
122 It is instructive that Nietzsche considered the Buddha capable of producing an equally ‘tremendous, 
gruesome shadow,’ particularly in light of his statement in Beyond Good and Evil that “Europe seems 
threatened by a new Buddhism” [BGE 202].  Nietzsche has some strange bedfellows in this recognition of 66 
                                                        
 
  
God, then, is already dead.  What, then, is truly ‘vanquished’ when the shadow of God is 
overcome? 
The announcement of God’s death continues directly from the final words of 
aphorism 107, already mentioned above: “And as long as you are in any way ashamed 
before yourselves, you do not yet belong with us” (GS 107).  The ongoing, as yet 
unconquered shadow of God is human shame. 
The madman’s parody of Diogenes, bringing news of God’s death in The Gay 
Science, continues with a series of questions: “Is not the greatness of this deed too great 
for us?  Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?” (GS 125). 
The future of human worthiness is the true question of God’s death. 
It is not only that confidence in the Christian God was a symptom of alienated 
human self-confidence and affirmation (Feuerbach’s argument), but also that the 
Christian God produced a peculiar and painful self-consciousness: “But he—had to die: 
he looked with eyes that saw everything—he saw the depths and abysses of man, all 
man’s hidden disgrace and ugliness.  His [compassion] knew no shame: he crept into my 
dirtiest corners.  This most curious, most over-importunate, over-compassionate god 
had to die.  He always saw me: I desired to take revenge on such a witness—or cease to 
live myself” (Z, ‘The Ugliest Man’).   
Buddhism’s potential cultural power in the modern West.  Then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger commented, in 
a March, 1997 interview with L’Express, that “Someone had rightly predicted in the 1950s that the 
challenge to the Church in the twentieth century would not be Marxism, but Buddhism.”  For a reflection 
on Ratzinger’s interview, see Leo Lefebure, “Cardinal Ratzinger’s Comments on Buddhism,” in Buddhist-
Christian Studies, Vol. 18 (1998), p. 221. 67 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
The moment has come in which the human capacity for affirmation of self and 
world will have to be structured by something other than theism.  This is in part why 
Nietzsche must quietly criticize Buddhism throughout The Gay Science.  At the moment 
when God’s death is announced, Buddhism threatens to emerge as a pleasantly non-
theistic Christianity, further undermining human confidence in the real source of joy—
the will to power. 
 “From the start,” writes Nietzsche, “the Christian faith is a sacrifice: a sacrifice of 
all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit; at the same time, enslavement 
and self-mockery, self-mutilation” (BGE 46).  On the face of it, Nietzsche’s strident 
critique of slave morality123 seems to make an empirical historical point: doulos, slave, is 
an extraordinarily prominent term in the Greek New Testament.  Among the metaphors 
for ‘Christian’ (which itself only appears three times), the doulos of God is the most 
frequent, with 124 separate occurrences.124 
Nietzsche was in fact mistaken about the slave origins of the Christian 
movement.  We find, instead, rich benefactors in archaeological inscriptions; women of 
status in the New Testament itself; the presence of some ‘wise’ and ‘mighty’ among the 
congregation at Corinth; Ignatius pleading with his readers in the Roman churches that 
123 “Christianity,” writes Nietzsche, “destroyed the faith in his [particular, personal] ‘virtues’ in every single 
individual; it led to the disappearance from the face of the earth of all those paragons of virtue of whom 
there was no dearth in antiquity—those popular personalities who, imbued with faith in their own 
perfection, went about with the dignity of a great matador” (GS 122).  The full force of Nietzsche’s wrath 
is reserved primarily for Christianity, but he also writes of Jews as forerunners of self-disdain: “The Jews... 
had a more profound contempt for the human being in themselves than any other people” (GS 136).  
Nietzsche is elsewhere deeply critical of modern anti-Semitism. 
124 John MacArthur, Slave (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2010), p. 15. Catholic liturgy accepts this core 
metaphor of Christian identity, implicitly, in its repetition of Kyrie, eleison: Lord, have mercy. 68 
                                                        
 
they should not interfere in his martyrdom, and thereby presuming their power to so 
intervene; and epistolary language designed to be heard by the educated.125 Nietzsche’s 
argument was rooted less in an accurate sociological reading of ancient literatures, and 
more in a need to present an origin for unnecessary shame. 
But if early Christian communities were not, in fact, composed primarily of slaves 
or lower classes, why did Paul and other New Testament writers so consistently use the 
term doulos to invoke the basic meaning of Christian identity?  Does this simply reveal a 
spirit of masochistic abjection?  “The entire morality of the Sermon on the Mount 
should be seen in this context: man takes positive pleasure126 in violating himself with 
excessive demands…” (HH 137). 
The New Testament metaphor of the doulos actually suggests very different 
meanings, not unrelated to Nietzsche’s own central concerns: the Christian as doulos 
certainly invokes an implicit turn toward the Kyrios, the Lord or Master, but this is 
125 Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 29-32.  
Rodney Stark has noted that “For most of the twentieth century historians and sociologists agreed that, in 
its formative days, Christianity was a movement of the dispossessed—a haven for Rome’s slaves and 
impoverished masses.  …These views seem to have first gained ascendency among scholars in Germany.  
Thus New Testament scholars trace this view to Deissmann [1908], while sociologists look to Troeltsch 
[1911].” But those years were, of course, the first and perhaps most intensive years of Nietzsche’s cultural 
influence: the early-century German origin of the thesis on the lower-class origins of early Christianity 
suggests a direct or indirect Nietzschean influence.  During the nineteenth century, historians had 
emphasized the under-representation of lower classes in the early church.  One senses that Nietzsche’s 
ideas became, for a brief historical moment, so broadly influential as to make invisible his interpretive 
innovation.  Most interestingly, in my view, is the fact that such historical views helped to justify the later 
rise of liberation theology.   
126 Lou Salomé, following her psychoanalytic training among Freud’s circle in Vienna, recalled that “The 
first person with whom I talked about the matter of [bisexuality] was Nietzsche, himself a sadomasochist.  
And I remember that afterwards we did not dare to look each other in the eye” (Quoted in Safranski, 337).  
The comment is interesting, less for its Freudian sexualization of psychology, and more for its frank 
appraisal of Nietzsche’s interest in self-inflicted pain. 69 
                                                        
 
simultaneously a turn away from the dominant, violent social moralities of the Roman 
imperium. 
Paul and Nietzsche both seek a disruption of de-humanizing social moralities.  
The New Testament doulos is in fact an ironic expression of independence from one 
kind of social-political relation, but also a profound metaphor of belonging within 
another set of relations.  For Paul, unlike Nietzsche, the turn away from one social 
morality is a turn toward another kind of community.  Belonging in Christ offers a 
deliverance from the norms of violence, freeing the Christian to act differently: “You 
were bought with a price; do not become slaves of men” (1 Cor. 7:23; emphasis added).  
Paul, unlike Nietzsche, will not assume that the person can do without any belonging at 
all.  It is pointless, for Paul, to imagine a total moral independence: this is an oxymoron.  
There can be no communion of Übermenschen.127 The doulos, though, is not a category 
of abjection or of blind obedience.  Its true meaning is human dignity. 
127 Julian Young argues, in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2006), that 
Nietzsche is in fact a far more communal thinker than most readers, including Kaufmann, have perceived.  
Young foregrounds, instead, Nietzsche’s “proximity to the Volkish tradition,” in which the health of a 
people is privileged over the health of any given individual.  For Young, “it is not the case that the social 
totality is valued for the sake of the higher types.  Rather, the higher types are valued for the sake of the 
social totality” (3).  Nietzsche does suggest at times that persons of noble stature belong together, and 
also writes, in Will to Power 287, that “My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic 
morality.  The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the 
herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the 
‘beasts of prey,’ etc.”   
However, Nietzsche’s master morality contains none of the enforcing or socializing mechanisms 
that constitute a ‘morality’ elsewhere in Nietzsche’s writing.  There is a quiet incoherence here.  Neither 
Nietzsche nor Young explain how a morality shared by noble persons can have any binding force.  
Zarathustra is, after all, the prophet who fails when he addresses himself to the people as a whole, and 
whose followers are barren of any noble trace.  (Compare Zarathustra’s encounters with his first listeners, 
following his emergence from the mountain, with the Buddha’s initial meeting on the road with an 
entirely indifferent skeptic.) 70 
                                                        
 
Early Christian writings are able to assert distance from one sort of political 
community because they simultaneously recognize the broader constitution of their 
lovedness in another kingdom.  Nietzsche’s kingdom of affirmation, however, is entirely 
contained in the individual—and this is not, in history or in fact, a viable anthropology.  
Affirmation and connection to others go together. 
Nietzschean autonomy attempts to advance the necessary social distance, 
sometimes named as nobility or ‘greatness,’ which will supposedly free us from the 
demands of shame and ‘bad conscience.’ A Nietzschean ideology of isolation, an 
‘argument of growing solitude’ (GS 50), is the basic condition of that greatness.  
Nietzsche made it seem plausible that moral independence,128 which is actually a 
quotidian feature of the modernist self-image, is in fact a mark of the highest heroism.   
However, what is most surprising is the fact that, at the moment of the noble 
person’s imagined and frankly romantic self-separation from others, the monstrous 
conscience does not actually disappear: 
Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong.  And 
whoever attempts it even with the best right but without inner constraint 
proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring to the point of 
recklessness.  He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the 
dangers which life brings with it in any case, not the least of which is that 
no one can see how and where he loses his way, becomes lonely, and is 
torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience. (BGE 29) 
 
128 These resonances are central to the power and allure of Nietzsche’s writing.  He is a master of the 
inclusively conspiratorial tone.  Nietzsche writes: “And the philosopher will betray something of his own 
ideal when he posits: “He shall be greatest who can be loneliest, the most concealed, the most deviant, 
the human being beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, he that is overrich in will.  Precisely this 
shall be called greatness: being capable of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full” (BGE 212).  It 
remains unclear how one may be deviant in isolation. 71 
                                                        
 
 In The Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil, shame is presented as the demand 
made by communal moralities; the ancient herd and slave morality each produce self-
accusation as a condition of belonging.  Nobility lies precisely in the avoidance of such 
entrapments.  There are hints in these works, however, that the singular conscience 
risks a savagery of its own.  “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the 
process he does not become a monster” (BGE 146). 
Nietzsche emphasizes that the Übermensch must be one given to his own self-
overcoming—and the primary focus of such overcoming is a victory over the herd 
instinct that makes us vulnerable to shame.  Self-overcoming is the will to power 
purifying itself of bad-conscience—all need for connection. 
The all-too-human “reactive forces” of the bad conscience, ressentiment, the 
ascetic ideal, and shame function to divide the will to power: “they decompose, they 
separate active force,” writes Deleuze, “from what it can do.”129 In the will to power, 
however, Nietzsche seeks to marshal the destructive aspect on behalf of its own 
destruction.  Delueze writes: 
Active negation or active destruction is the state of the strong-minded 
who destroy the reactive element within themselves ...;  “it is the 
condition of strong spirits and wills, and these do not find it possible to 
stop with the negative of ‘judgment’; their nature demands active 
negation” (WP 24).130 
 
Self-overcoming is the integration of the divided will. 
129 Gilles Deleuze, “Active and Reactive,” in The New Nietzsche, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985), p. 93. 
130 Ibid, 102. 72 
                                                        
 
In the Genealogy of Morals (1887), Nietzsche articulates more thoroughly the 
crucial importance of a noble self-contempt.  While shame had been, in Nietzsche’s 
earlier work, an affect which undermines all self-affirming nobility, and was therefore a 
focus of abrasive critique, Nietzsche now upholds a certain kind of self-contempt as self-
overcoming par excellence. 
No longer a pure abolitionist of shame, as he had been in his earlier work, 
Nietzsche speaks increasingly of the noble human being as “one who has power over 
himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard 
with himself and respects all severity and hardness” (BGE 260). Shame is the affect 
produced by the original communal threat of isolation, but self-severity is the work of 
self-fashioning greatness. Nobility requires an ineradicable capacity for creative self-
contempt. 
In the figure of the ascetic, Nietzsche had detected “an abundant, over-abundant 
enjoyment at one’s own suffering, at making oneself suffer—and wherever man allows 
himself to be persuaded to self-denial in the religious sense, or to self-mutilation… he is 
secretly lured and pushed forward by his cruelty, by those dangerous thrills of cruelty 
turned against oneself” (BGE 229).  The noble person, unlike others, is able to marshal 
their instinctual self-dominance, adopting an ascetic intensity for more vital purposes: 
For fundamentally [this instinct] is the same active force that is at work 
on a grander scale in those [noble] artists of violence and organizers who 
build states… only here [among the ascetics] the material upon which the 
form-giving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself is man himself, 
his whole ancient animal self—and not, as in that greater and more 
obvious phenomenon, some other man, other men.  This secret self-
ravishment, this artists’ cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon 73 
 
oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in burning a will, a 
critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this uncanny, 
dreadfully joyous labor of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself that makes 
itself suffer out of joy in making suffer—eventually this entire active ‘bad 
conscience’—you will have guessed it—as the womb of all ideal and 
imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of strange 
new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself. (GM 2.18) 
 
Nietzschean self-production depends upon askesis, and his former distinction between 
self-purifying ascetic and noble now becomes far less definitive. 
In the tonal centerpiece of Thus Spoke Zarathustra—the chapter entitled ‘Of 
Self-Overcoming’—self-overcoming itself is deeply intrinsic to the nature of the one who 
commands, for “he who cannot obey himself will be commanded.”  The noble mastery 
of an external world demands, first, an internal mastery of self.  The will to power that is 
turned toward others must be first turned toward oneself. 
Zarathustra announces: “Alas! The time of the most contemptible man is 
coming, the man who can no longer despise himself” (Z, Prologue, 5).  He reflects, “I 
have yet found no one who has despised himself more deeply: even that [would be] 
height.”  Noble self-despising, ‘despectio sui’ (GM 3.18)—these are forms of the most 
profound self-creation. 
Gilles Deleuze argues that this active, integrative negation is not at all the same 
thing as the turning against oneself that can be found in ‘bad conscience’ and shame.  I 
agree.  In fact, the creative destruction of the will to power, directed against reactive 
forms of negativity, is what separates Nietzschean self-affirmation from the more 
simplistic self-compassion of contemporary therapeutic Buddhist practice.  The 
structure of the will to power, in which negation is turned creatively against itself, is 74 
 
aligned much more closely with the pre-modern Mahāyāna lojong instruction: drive all 
blames into one. 
However, although Deleuze is right that Nietzschean negation is not the same 
thing as shame, neither does it actually heal self-aversion.  Nietzsche believes that once 
the will has been unified as affirmation, “The small, petty, reactive man will not 
recur.”131 But this unification depends upon, and then strengthens further, a fierce 
Nietzschean autonomy—an inviolable distance from the other.  The will to power does 
not connect the person to anything beyond himself, and there is no human being 
capable of such isolation, unified or not.  Unification of the affirmative will in isolation 
must necessarily be a failure; lack of connection is anthropologically untenable. 
 If we are to understand the failure of Nietzsche’s projects of affirmation, the 
importance of his ‘argument of growing solitude,’ his ideology of noble isolation, is 
difficult to overstate. Nietzsche’s attempts to draw on an extra-personal source of 
affirmative joy did not work, because they seek separation, which is actually a defensive 
goal, more than a human one. 
‘Greatness’ and nobility are dislocated from relation—even though greatness 
itself is a category of implicit comparison with others.  The incoherence of the position is 
simultaneously unresolved and attractive, because it allows the naïve reader to sense 
that ‘greatness’ is accessible merely through a pose of anti-heroic social alienation.    
Nietzsche’s rhetoric of self-separating greatness makes it appear that nobility itself is 
accessible through separation.  This is appealing anthropological nonsense. 
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In Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering, Eleanore 
Stump, following Thomas Aquinas, argues that ‘willed loneliness,’ a basic expression of 
human lostness, is only a problem because what we more fundamentally desire is to be 
creatures defined by connection.132 
Nietzsche seeks to empower the person, or one sort of higher person, to value 
autonomy instead as his or her most proper teleological purpose.  Moralistic self-
division can be ended, if one is great enough to renounce connection to all socializing, 
and therefore self-divisive, demands.  The noble person thus connects not to others, but 
supposedly to vitality itself. 
However, if, as Kaufmann suggests, Nietzsche is wrong that human beings are 
primarily expressions of the will to power, then his proposal of noble separation is 
unlikely to find acolytes—except perhaps for those who hope to project an adolescent 
pose of individuation.  Nietzsche is ultimately mistaken in his insistence that joy and 
connection exclude one another; they are in tension, but must be stay in relationship, 
for either to exist. 
Nietzsche is perhaps the clearest exemplar of and spokesperson for the turn-of-
the-century shift from Walter Susman’s ‘culture of character,’ defined by ‘ideals of duty, 
honor, integrity,’ toward a new ‘culture of personality,’ marked by singularly 
Nietzschean adjectives: “fascinating, stunning, attractive, magnetic, glowing, masterful, 
132 See Eleanore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), Chapters 7 and 8. 76 
                                                        
 
creative, dominant, forceful.” The voices of the early-century self-help manuals explored 
by Susman are positively Nietzschean: “To create a personality is power.”133 
Nietzsche might be helpfully read in light of such manuals of self-creation.  
Susman nowhere mentions Nietzsche, but one senses that Nietzsche’s explosively 
popular writing may be one aspect of the fin de siècle rise of new commitments to self-
criticism and self-projection, which are always mutually implicated.  The creation of the 
magnetic personality demands new keenness of self-evaluation.  
 It should be clear that there can actually be no such thing as a culture of 
personality; personality alone does not impose relational forms strong enough to 
constitute any but the most momentary culture.  Charisma, in its Weberian sense, is 
oriented toward social formation; personality, on the other hand, seeks recognition; it 
produces nothing longitudinal or communal. 
Nietzsche himself intuited this: “To say it briefly (for a long time people will still 
keep silent about it): What will not be built any more henceforth, and cannot be built 
any more, is—a society in the old sense of that word; to build that, everything is lacking, 
above all the material.  All of us are no longer material for a society; this is a truth for 
which the time has come” (GS 356). 
“I never speak to masses,” Nietzsche protests (EH, ‘Why I am a Destiny’), but the 
empirical evidence, and Nietzsche’s own rhetorical strategy of appealing to a stark 
desire for distinction, say otherwise.  Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, in order to test an 
133 Susman, 280.  One senses here, just as in the previous discussion of the twentieth century historical 
hypothesis of lower-class Christian origins, that Nietzsche is again invisibly, but profoundly, influential. 77 
                                                        
 
intuition regarding his own greatness, marshals an arbitrary force to prove his 
separation from the moral order.  The experiment of ‘greatness’ results, of course, in 
Raskolnikov’s imprisonment for the murder of a pitifully defenseless person.  Such 
greatness is predicated on an absurd and violent separation from others. 
The creation of the ‘magnetic, dominant, forceful, powerful’ self (Susman) 
requires not connection with others, but rather a sense of what others will consistently 
desire, fear, or respect.  Personality creation is a form of product development.  
Nietzsche’s self-overcoming is quickly reduced to the therapeutic slogans of middle 
management: to manage others we must manage ourselves (Drucker).  Gilles Deleuze 
writes: “Nietzsche—the creator of the philosophy of values—would have seen, if he had 
lived longer, his [philosophy]…serve and turn into the basest and most insipid 
ideological conformism.”134 
The ‘personality market’ is now entirely saturated.135 It is closely aligned with a 
widespread banality of self-hatred.  We moderns, Nietzsche writes, have acquired “a 
refined taste” for self-torture; it is our “distinctive art” (GM 2.24). 
 
 
 
134 Deleuze, 92. 
135 C. Wright Mills wrote, in 1951, that the rise of white collar work required the simultaneous 
development of a ‘personality market’: “For in the great shift from manual skills to the art of ‘handling,’ 
selling, and servicing people, personal or even intimate traits of the employee are drawn into the sphere 
of exchange and become of commercial relevance, become commodities in the labor market.  Whenever 
there is a transfer of control over one individual’s personal traits to another for a price, a sale of those 
traits which affect one’s impressions upon others, a personality market arises” (C. Wright Mills, White 
Collar [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951], p. 182). 78 
                                                        
 
2.3 AUTONOMY OVER ASSENT 
The Eternal Return occurs to Nietzsche with revelatory, heteronomous force.  It 
comes as something received.  But Nietzsche later ruminates: “I do not want life again.  
How did I endure it?”136 
Epiphanies, even those that arrive with joy, are of little use, where there are no 
practices of repetitive receptivity.  The assumption that insights alone are enough to 
produce transformation is one of the strangest conceits of therapeutic culture.  Any 
insight that remains merely propositional can always become an object of cognitive 
deliberation about its ‘reality.’  A more transformative trust is always dependent upon 
its own repetition. 
Religious imagination often or always depends upon specific ritual repetition to 
help us become more and more capable of the affirmation it calls forth in us.  Repetition 
is theoretically important for the Return as well.  “[T]ransfigured existence,” writes Paul 
Valadier, in a discussion of the Return, “is an ever renewed act….”137 Only in the light of 
repetition can the Eternal Return be understood “as radical and fundamental in scope as 
religion traditionally has been.”138 
 “It would perhaps not force Nietzsche’s thought too much,” notes Henri Birault, 
“if we said that, for him, the principal source of all that we call action today is hatred or 
136 Noted by Walter Kaufmann in Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 370.  It may be that 
Zarathustra is not so much a representative of Nietzsche’s views, but the attempt to create a figure 
capable of convincing Nietzsche of his own visions. 
137 Valadier, 255. 
138 Ibid., 253, 261 [footnote 29].  See also Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, in American Nietzsche: A History of 
an Icon and His Ideas (University of Chicago Press, 2012): “Nietzsche’s protests against Christianity as an 
ascetic, feeble denial of the strenuous life resonated, however uncomfortably, with his pious American 
readers” (99).   79 
                                                        
 
discontent with what is, while every veritable creation proceeds from love and love 
only, from an immense gratitude for what is, a gratitude that seeks to impress the seal 
of eternity on what is…”139 
Why, then, does no one submit themselves to the dictates of the Return, 
including Nietzsche himself? 
Birault articulates Nietzsche as he perhaps wished to be, but could not become.  
Our lives are too full of deadened affect and general somnambulism for any mere 
momentary sincerity or insight to make us capable of an eternal affirmation of 
imperfection in all its details.  Fatally, Nietzsche advocates no ritual, no practice of the 
body’s own repetition of receptivity to affirmation. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, tracing the changing meanings of ‘belief’ in early 
modernity, notes that whereas belief had previously been interchangeable with 
belove—and whereas it had been a verb meaning “to love, to hold dear, to cherish; 
conceptually, to recognize; actively, to entrust oneself to, to give one’s heart, to make a 
commitment”140—the meanings of belief and faith became, in early modernity, not only 
conflated, but reduced to a propositional assent without any essential involvement of 
the person herself.  The religious life becomes assertion rather than reception—an 
assertiveness which finds its way to the heart of the Eternal Return as well.  Affirmation 
139 See Henri Birault, ‘Beatitude in Nietzsche’ in David Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche, p. 230. 
140 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 116-17. 80 
                                                        
 
becomes not a characteristic of reality itself, to be received or not, but rather a 
formulation of the autonomous and assertive self.141  
‘Belief’ became in significant part the category of thought by which 
skeptics, reducing others’ faith [that of other Christian communities, and 
of other non-European religious traditions] to manageability, translated 
that faith into mundane terms.  …Therein was wrought a transforming of 
what had been a noble and open relation into a dubious and closed one.  
What had been a relation between the human and something external 
and higher… was transformed by the new thinking into a self-subsistent, 
mundane operation of the mind.142 
 
Nietzsche relies far too heavily on precisely such autonomous, self-subsistent 
assertion, rather than a repeated receptivity in faith.   When Zarathustra encounters a 
young shepherd with a serpent stuck fast in his throat—‘writing, choking, convulsed, his 
face distorted’—he orders the shepherd to bite the serpent’s head.  The serpent, 
circular symbol of eternity, is consumed.  Immediately, an astonishing change occurs: 
“No longer a shepherd, no longer a man—a transformed being, surrounded with light, 
laughing!  Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed!  O my brothers, I 
heard a laughter that was no human laughter—and now a thirst consumes me, a longing 
that is never stilled.”143  
141 The genealogy of this confusion is complex and debatable, traceable to a range of ecclesial and 
theological developments, including the advent of medieval nominalism (see Hans Boersma, Heavenly 
Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2011]).  
The modernist understanding of faith as projective assertion seems to originate also in the teachings of 
Luther.  Luther’s salvation by sole fide, while part of a bold attempt to reclaim faith as an experience of 
grace, may have produced the opposite of its intended effect—making faith instead, eventually, a work of 
the human mind and will.  Takes, for instance, Luther’s insistence that “It is not enough to know what the 
sacrament is and signifies,” but that one must “firmly believe that you have received it,” (Timothy Lull, ed. 
Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings [Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1989], p. 253).  If the 
sacrament is actually a source of faith, however, our reception of the sacrament obviates any need to 
make any attempt to firmly believe.  This is like forcing God’s hand when it is already open. 
142 Smith, p. 144. 
143 See Zarathustra, “Of the Vision and the Riddle,” Part 2. 81 
                                                        
 
The notion that the Eternal Return, so sacramentally received through the figure 
of the snake, need be received but once, is a basic Nietzschean and modern naïvete.  
The quiet longing for commitment, in Nietzsche and in others, displaces the necessary 
repetition of commitment itself.  The symbols of eternity must be consumed again and 
again.  Autonomy militates against such repetitions. 
Nietzsche speaks of Christian faith as ‘self-mutilation’—a “sacrifizio dell’intelletto 
a la Pascal” (BGE 229).    He seeks, therefore, “A new way of life, not a new faith” 
(Antichrist 33).  But his new way of life contains none of the formative repetition that 
would allow it to actually be renewed.  A new way of life, it turns out, depends upon a 
far greater trust, and a more thorough relinquishing of autonomy, than Nietzsche can 
actually produce or allow.  Faith is reduced to “some fundamental certainty that a noble 
soul has about itself” (BGE 287). 
It is incoherent to hope for Dionysian joy without relinquishing autonomy.  So 
autonomously imprisoned, Nietzsche’s assertions about loving fate ultimately lose their 
force.  His constructions of affirmation hold no persuasive power.  Autonomous 
assertion turns out to be less creative than the receptivity of faith, which connects us to 
both ourselves and to others. 
To show how dangerous human connection is, for the will to power, it is helpful 
finally to turn to Nietzsche’s critique of altruistic ‘compassion.’  Compassion connects us, 
and thereby fosters the very relationships that make shame probable for ourselves and 
others.  Compassion erodes the autonomy that allows the noble person to withstand 
communal demands.  It is also an expression of one’s own distorted will to power over 82 
 
the weak 144 —any power that seeks such an easy domination has no real 
superabundance.145  
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche had asked, “Is it good for you yourselves to be 
above all full of [compassion]?  And is it good for those who suffer?”  The answer, on 
both counts, is no.  “When people try to benefit someone in distress, the intellectual 
frivolity with which those moved by [compassion] assume the role of fate is for the most 
part outrageous; one simply knows nothing of the whole inner sequence and intricacies 
that are distress for me or for you” (GS 338).  Compassion ruins the whole process of 
self-overcoming and separation that is itself the path to vital growth. 
Nietzsche rightly protests the self-righteousness of those who assert solicitous 
simulations of intimacy, “I’m concerned for you,” when they are so often ignorant about 
what is painful for another, and about what kinds of suffering may in fact be necessary: 
“The whole economy of my soul… the way new springs and needs break open, the way 
in which old wounds are healing, the way whole periods of the past are shed—all such 
things that may be involved in distress are of no concern to our dear [compassionate] 
friends….” 
Nietzsche himself ironically accuses these ‘compassionate ones’ of having no 
shame in order to highlight his polemic subtext: the insistence that the compassionate 
ones produce shame. 
144 Among the lojong directives there is this: “Don’t seek others’ pain as the limbs of your own happiness.” 
145 Levinas, too, objects to any mere feeling, ‘compassionate’ or not, as the marker of the ethical; thus, his 
emphasis on receptivity to the infinite demand of non-violence, encountered in the concrete ‘face’ of the 
other.  For Levinas, no particular affective status is accentuated.  He emphasizes the ‘height’ of the 
vulnerable other in part to counteract the kinds of condescension that also troubled Nietzsche. 83 
                                                        
 
This is, for Nietzsche, unconscionable: “Truly, I do not like them, the 
compassionate who are happy in their compassion: they are too lacking in shame. If I 
must be compassionate I still do not want to be called compassionate; and if I am 
compassionate then it is preferably from a distance” (Z, ‘Of the Compassionate’146).  To 
keep another from their necessary suffering is a violence against them, an intervention 
that stunts their capacity for vitality and therefore for joy. 
Compassion also expresses an avoidance of one’s own nobility: “All such 
arousing of [compassion]… is secretly seductive, for our ‘own way’ is too hard and 
demanding and too remote from the love and gratitude of others, and we do not really 
mind escaping from it—and from our very own conscience—to flee into the conscience 
of the others and into the lovely temple of the ‘religion of [compassion]’” (GS 338).   
In his remarks on Mitleid, compassion, Nietzsche explicitly attacks ‘the morality 
that is very prestigious nowadays’ (GS 21).147  Nietzsche makes the celebration of any 
self-important compassion ridiculous, and he should be given immense credit for this 
critique of self-centered moral seriousness148: “I want to teach them what is understood 
146 See, also, ‘The Ugliest Man,’ in which Zarathustra is warned against his own propensity for Mitleid, and 
in which God himself is accused: “His [compassion] knew no shame…” 
147 “They are at one, the lot of them, in the cry and the impatience of [compassion], in their deadly hatred 
of suffering generally, in their… faith in the morality of shared [compassion], as if that were morality in 
itself, being the height, the attained height of man…” (BGE 202). 
148 “One might even say that wherever on earth solemnity, seriousness, mystery, and gloomy coloring still 
distinguish the life of man and a people, something of the terror that formerly attended all promises, 
pledges, and vows on earth is still effective: the past, the longest, deepest and sternest past, breathes 
upon us and rises up in us whenever we become ‘serious’” (GM 2.3). 84 
                                                        
 
by so few today, least of all by these preachers of [compassion]: to share not suffering 
but joy” (GS 338).149  
The question is how to foster any shared joy. 
Nietzsche is right that it is often far more effective and helpful to express one’s 
own hopeful confidence (GS 272) for a suffering human being, than it is to indicate that 
one believes one simply understands her suffering.  (Empathy, as Jesse Prinz and others 
have argued, contains a cognitive component, which distinguishes empathy from mere 
affective contagion, but which also means that empathy can be woefully inaccurate.150) 
The expression of empathy may become damagingly iatrogenic, inducing the suffering 
that it claims to perceive, because a suffering person so often seeks connection, and will 
accede even to a false diagnosis, when any diagnosis at all seems to promise a form of 
ongoing connection with the therapeutic observer. The pattern is potentially insidious. 
It may seem, then, that Nietzsche is simply to be congratulated for showing that 
human compassion, on its own, is so deeply imperfect.  (This would have been 
unsurprising, to say the least, to Nietzsche’s grandfathers and father, all Lutheran 
149 “Truly,” says Zarathustra, “I did this and that for the afflicted; but it always seemed to me I did better 
things when I learned to enjoy myself better.  …and if we learn better to enjoy ourselves, we best unlearn 
how to do harm to others and to contrive harm” (Z, ‘Of the Compassionate’). 
150 The Mahayana generally presents an interesting response to this problem: the gradual, epochs-long 
development of a Buddha involves the slow perfection of enlightened capacities of affective and cognitive 
perception, so that compassion becomes less and less prone to error, and increasingly generous, 
effective, and liberating in response to individual beings’ particular forms of suffering.  Compassion is the 
nature of Mahayana ontology, but compassion is not, therefore, generic in relation to beings. 85 
                                                        
 
pastors.  Luther is the original ‘master of suspicion’ about the hidden motivations of 
human love.151) 
Nietzsche’s basic denial of the vital value of connection was, however, a source 
of profound personal ambivalence for him.  He was consistently uncertain about the 
sort of absolute autonomy that he celebrates at times in his philosophical work. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche had been explicit that his way of thinking “requires 
a warlike soul, a desire to hurt, a delight in saying No, a hard skin,” and, without these 
attributes, one who attempts such thinking “would slowly die of open and internal 
wounds” (GS 32).  In Beyond Good and Evil, he writes: “Finally consider that even the 
seeker after knowledge forces his spirit to recognize things against the inclination of the 
spirit, and often enough also against the wishes of his heart—by way of saying No where 
he would like to say Yes, love, and adore—and thus acts as an artist and transfigurer of 
cruelty” (BGE 229).152 
The foremost requirement of creative cruelty is the denial of the heart’s 
sensitivity toward oneself and others.  Nietzsche, rather than living with ambiguity, 
seeks to overcome the values of humane connection, as a snare.  But it was almost 
certainly Nietzsche’s own extraordinary sensitivity that generated, and then threatened, 
his vision of the hard, heroic,153 and self-transcending figure of nobility. 
151 Luther often anticipates certain aspects of Nietzsche, though from a different direction of inquiry 
entirely: “Hence the loftiest virtues of the best of men are… not submissive to the law of God and not 
capable of submitting to it…” (Lull, 202). See The Bondage of the Will in particular, for a Lutheran prologue 
to The Gay Science. 
152 Here, again: modernist belief as assertive and intellectual force. 
153 Nietzsche hopes to be read by “the kind of people who alone matter: I mean those who are heroic” (GS 
292). 86 
                                                        
 
In August of 1880, a year before the revelation of the Eternal Return, Nietzsche 
wrote to his friend Peter Gast, “Even now my entire philosophy wavers after just an 
hour of friendly conversation with complete strangers.  It strikes me as so foolish to 
insist on being right at the expense of love.”154  In July, 1883, Nietzsche wrote to his 
friend Malwida von Meysenburg: 
Schopenhauer’s [compassion] has always been the major source of 
problems in my life… This is not only a soft spot that would have made 
any magnanimous Greek burst into laughter but also a serious practical 
hazard.  We should persevere in realizing our idea of man; we ought to 
be adamant about enforcing it on others as well as on ourselves, and thus 
exert a creative impact!  However, this also entails holding one’s own 
[compassion] in check and treating everything that goes against our 
ideal… as enemies.  You notice how I am ‘reading a moral lesson’ to 
myself, but attaining this ‘wisdom’ has almost cost me my life.155 
 
In 1888, less than a year before the Basel theologian Franz Overbeck travelled 
urgently to Turin to find his friend manically incapacitated, Overbeck had received a 
letter from Nietzsche that spoke of a ‘black despair,’ expressing sadness about a 
“perpetual lack of truly refreshing and healing human love, the absurd isolation [actual 
human contact] involves and the fact that any remaining connection to people only 
causes afflictions.”156 
The desire for human connection is a quiet presence throughout Nietzsche’s 
philosophical writing, albeit primarily as a focus of sharp, perhaps somewhat 
overwrought critique.  The ‘last temptation’ of Zarathustra is Mitleid.  Nietzsche himself 
clearly wishes to be free of his own compassionate sensitivity to suffering.  Zarathustra 
154 Safranski, 166, 204. 
155 Safranski, 167. 
156 Safranski, 312. 87 
                                                        
 
exclaims, “May my destiny ever lead across my path only those who… do not sorrow or 
suffer, and those with whom I can have hope and repast and honey in common!” (Z, ‘Of 
the Compassionate’). 
Zarathustra’s wish is of course utterly ridiculous.  In its objection to suffering, 
connection, and weakness, Zarathustra rejects precisely the full range of Dionysian 
acceptance and affirmation that Zarathustra claims to pursue.  Zarathustra laughs, but it 
turns out that he does so through clenched teeth; I find the laughter unconvincing. 
Nietzsche’s promotion of creative self-contempt, ‘artists’ cruelty,’ is necessarily 
directed against the human desire for connection: loneliness, the hope of acceptance, 
the need for care, and the desire to express care.  But autonomous self-cruelty steps 
into a hall of mirrors. The Nietzschean self is finally incoherent: self-cruelty will not 
coexist with an extra-personal joy. 
Personality culture and Nietzsche both demand a relentless self-fashioning 
autonomy.  There is nothing to which we can give ourselves, and nothing to receive.  In 
fact, “There is not enough love and goodness in the world for us to be permitted to give 
any of it away to imaginary things” (HH 129).  
Autonomy cannot allow itself to perceive the superabundance of love and 
goodness that it secretly desires.  To be constituted, instead, by relations of love that 
extend to all persons is to renounce all such self-manufacturing.  To be so constituted 
requires repeated refuge. 
We turn now to lojong. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AUTONOMY AS IGNORANCE: 
A COMMENTARY ON THE LOJONG SLOGAN—DRIVE ALL BLAMES INTO ONE 
 
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter begins with a critical overview of contemporary literatures of 
therapeutic Buddhist self-compassion.  This critique, however, serves a larger purpose in 
the pages below, which is to uncover a richer range of meanings in the Tibetan lojong 
(awareness-cultivation) teaching, Drive all blames into one, than those outlined in 
recent lojong commentarial literatures.   
 This instruction, nominally about a particular kind of ‘self-blame,’ may at first 
seem to some readers to have little to do with compassion of any kind.  Drive all blames 
into one, which does ask us to interrupt our aversion toward others by perceiving, 
instead, the roots of suffering in our own self-centered and self-constructing patterns of 
vision and affect, is in some sense a confrontational teaching.  But it is also a teaching 
that is deeply embedded in compassionate vision and intention.  And in order to 
recognize Drive all blames into one as a teaching of compassion, it will be necessary to 
briefly outline the Mahāyāna doctrinal developments that most directly inform the 
commentary below. 
 Both modern therapeutic self-compassion and Tibetan lojong are concerned 
with a re-habituation of the human person.  However, I will suggest that therapeutic 
self-compassion remains closely tethered to modernist assumptions about autonomy, 
and that such assumptions may ultimately impede access to the very sources of 89 
 
compassion that lojong itself seeks to cultivate, in ways sometimes quite different from 
the strategies of modernist therapeutic Buddhism. 
 In the first section of the chapter, I offer an overview of contemporary self-
compassion literatures, as well as an account of the relationship between therapeutic 
Buddhism and the Pali canonical and commentarial sources from which it claims to 
draw. 
 In the second section, I offer an account of important qualities of self-critique, 
hiri and ottappa, or shame and karmic imagination, in those early Buddhist sources, and 
attempt to say why these ‘bright guardians’ are so necessary for the path of creative sati 
(‘mindfulness,’ or skillful recollection).  This is in part a way to show how much more 
central creative self-critique has been for pre-modern Buddhist understanding, than has 
any autonomous self-compassion. 
 In the third section, I develop early Mahāyāna themes of emptiness, compassion, 
and the figure of the bodhisattva, as foundations for understanding the way that lojong, 
as an expression of the Mahāyāna, confronts false assumptions of autonomy while 
simultaneously accessing transcendent sources of wisdom and compassion from beyond 
samsaric and conditioned modes of perception. 
 In the fourth section, I have presented particular Tibetan Nyingma- Kagyü 
perspectives on emptiness, the altruistic intention of awakened compassion (Skt.: 
bodhicitta), and Buddha Nature (Skt.: tathāgatagarbha) that most directly inform my 
commentarial work on the lojong slogan Drive all blames into one.  I have drawn in 
particular from understandings of mind developed in the Uttaratantra, and on medieval 90 
 
Tibetan understandings of shentong, other-emptiness, as these views found expression 
in the work of the fourteenth-century Jonang figure Dölpopa, and later influenced the 
nineteenth-century lojong commentator and teacher Jamgön Kongtrul.  All of these 
doctrinal sources, both in their critical encounter with autonomous self-conditioning, 
and in their articulations of deep reliance on the unconditioned, help to disrupt 
assumptions about a self that is separate from others, and ultimately seek to turn us 
toward a compassion beyond all autonomy, self-compassionate or otherwise. 
 Finally, in the fifth section of this chapter, I develop an extended account of Drive 
all blames into one as a teaching, not of autonomous self-aversion or self-compassion, 
but of refuge in an always-present potentiality of pervasive compassion. 
3.2 SELF-COMPASSION IN CONTEMPORARY THERAPEUTIC BUDDHISM 
 AND BUDDHAGHOSA 
 
 We begin with contemporary therapeutic Buddhism.  In 1979, the year of 
Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism, and the year in which Walter Susman 
published his essay on twentieth-century ‘personality culture,’ the Buddhist teacher 
Stephen Levine dedicated a chapter of his book A Gradual Awakening to the problem of 
unworthiness:  “I see in some of the most beautiful beings I know,” wrote Levine, “that 
the hottest fire they have to work with is their sense of unworthiness.”157 
 Levine initially presented this unworthiness as an almost timeless human 
conditioning, but simultaneously expressed a basic uncertainty about the true sources 
of that negativity.  Unworthiness has been, he wrote, “acquired over many lifetimes—if 
157 Stephen Levine, A Gradual Awakening (New York: Anchor Books, 1979), p. 48. 91                                                         
 
not billions of mind-moments in this life—when we were told or thought we were 
wrong or inadequate.  Everybody seems to have it to some degree.  I don’t know if every 
culture encourages it to the same degree as ours, but it is very prevalent in this 
society.”158 
 Similar questions became increasingly prominent over the following decade.  
Jack Kornfield recalls the following exchange: 
In 1989, at one of the first international Buddhist teacher meetings, we 
Western teachers brought up the enormous problem of unworthiness 
and self-criticism, shame and self-hatred, and how frequently they arose 
in Western students’ practice.  The Dalai Lama and other Asian teachers 
were shocked.  They could not quite comprehend the word self-hatred.  It 
took the Dalai Lama ten minutes of conferring with Geshe Thupten Jinpa, 
his translator, even to understand it.159 
 
 The basic confusion is not, in the end, the Dalai Lama’s. 
 Self-aversion is intrinsic to personality culture.160 For Stephen Levine, those who 
are ‘most beautiful’ are also most exposed to feelings of unworthiness.161 Personality 
cultures foster performative power as a force of attraction.  Such power, however, 
depends upon a capacity for controlling judgment toward those aspects of self that 
cannot command the attention of others.  In an economy of intensified competition,162 
158 Levine, 52. 
159 Jack Kornfield, The Wise Heart: A Guide to the Universal Teachings of Buddhist Psychology (New York: 
Bantam, 2008), p. 27. 
160 I have already noted that there is really no such thing as a personality ‘culture,’ in any coherent sense.  
I retain the phrase here to keep continuity with Susman’s analysis.  ‘Character,’ in Susman’s work, is the 
real foundation of shared moral, economic, and social life.  Character, however, depends for its formation 
upon shame, albeit a shame rooted in the basic desire for greater connection to the life of the 
community.  This shame is quite different from the self-aversion of personality culture, which is a desire 
not so much to be connected, but to be recognized. 
161 Levine: “We are encouraged to be someone special, to be praiseworthy, to be outstanding” (49). 
162 Perfectionism and competitiveness are closely related.  See lojong slogan thirty-five: Don’t try to be the 
fastest. 92 
                                                        
 
we must quickly become competent in the marketing and sale of selfhood.  Such 
competencies depend in turn on our ability to generate, from a very young age, the 
recognition of others—accepted into the right schools and circumstances, valued 
precisely for our performative abilities, rather than for any intrinsic worthiness.163 
 The restlessly reinvented self, because it is so invested in producing the 
circumstances of its own recognition and success, is less able to perceive or receive 
those forms of love that cannot be earned, but only trusted.  Put another way, we lose 
the ability to accept the sort of love that already recognizes us as unconditionally 
worthy, whenever we accept our unworthiness.164 
 Love that is earned is always scarce and impermanent: not all persons, it would 
seem, can be a consistent focus of equal social acclamation; and all such acclamation 
must be constantly renewed.165 Wherever worthiness is limited enough that we must 
compete with others in order to access it—a basic condition of secularity—the always 
underlying threat of unworthiness will necessarily produce a fundamental anxiety.166 
 It is also true, however, that to be unworthy is to be a potential focus of concern, 
attention, and special care.  There are benefits to self-aversion as a basic mode of 
samsaric attachment.  To perceive oneself as unworthy, to be worse than others, is to 
163 I’m indebted here to Professor John Makransky, who has helpfully influenced the framing of these 
issues. 
164 John Makransky, personal communication, September 17, 2014. 
165 Buddhist traditions emphasize the necessary interrelation of ‘praise and blame’ as an inextricable pair. 
166 One might object that character is simply invested in a socially constructed set of rules—rules that 
individuals use to present or perform themselves in a certain way.  Character, just like personality, is 
about ‘earned care.’  Character cultures, however, depend on relatively stable accounts of human 
maturity that give us deepened access to ultimate sources of care and love, not just social approbation.  
Character cultures depend on affirmations of human persons that explicitly transcend particular cultural 
rules; character, to achieve stability, must be grounded in sources of uncontrollable, unearned care.  
Character is ultimately the expression of such care, rather than the earning of mere social acceptance. 93 
                                                        
 
sense, in a very direct way, one’s own distinctiveness.  If ultimate acceptance is always 
there to be received, performance in search of such acceptance quickly becomes 
unnecessary.  Ultimate acceptance is not controllable; self-aversion, on the other hand, 
is a form of control.  “Interestingly enough,” wrote Levine in 1979, as he speculated 
briefly on the etiologies of unworthiness, “it’s the sense of unworthiness which 
maintains ego.”167  
 Within families and within cultures, human beings are often terrifyingly exposed 
to forms of abuse, degradation, and hatred that make it far more difficult for us to sense 
ourselves as loved.  Feminist and psychotherapeutic thinkers are right to emphasize the 
destructive and epidemiological aspects of those hatreds.  External violence is 
internalized.  Violence seeks out, with observant skill, those already subjected to pain. 
 Public narratives or confessions of personal suffering are increasingly and 
understandably unassailable—perhaps rightly so: the silencing of victims makes the 
violent less accountable.  Therapeutic culture suggests that the narrative of pain is the 
overcoming of pain, and at this point, therapeutic and personality cultures coincide: the 
self-representation of pain is a method of receiving ‘recognition’ (See Illouz, above).168 
 Personality culture has found that pain, as much as joy, is capable of projecting 
authenticity and producing attraction. This is one source of the commodification of self-
expressive confession during the past half-century.  It may also be the case that to 
167 Levine, 49. 
168 Also Matthew 6:16-18. 94 
                                                        
 
confess one’s trauma is to project one’s own life as a narrative of secular self-
redemption.   
 “While trying to be good,” writes Kornfield, recalling his early life, “underneath I 
had a feeling of being unloved, of forever seeking acceptance.”169 He goes on to narrate 
a visceral vision of a childhood dominated by an unsatiated hunger for love.  Sharon 
Salzberg, the teacher who had actually asked the Dalai Lama the question about the 
prominence of shame and self-hatred among Western Buddhist practitioners, narrates a 
striking moment of emotional catharsis while on meditation retreat.  In the midst of her 
sitting practice, the memory of the truly horrible circumstances surrounding her 
mother’s death (Salzberg herself had been nine years old) comes to consciousness: 
This was more than I could handle sitting in the meditation hall, and I got 
up and went back to my room.  I lay on my bed sweating, too stunned to 
cry, almost unable to breathe.  The swelling of grief that had once closed 
off my heart drew tightly again.  I found myself in a mapless terrain of 
suffering, a flat, uncontoured land where no change seemed possible. 
Haunted by my mother’s death, I watched the world turn vague and very 
cold.  The despair of feeling completely alone, the anguish and desolation 
of my childhood once again suffused all time and eradicated all space. 170 
 
The first of the Buddhist ennobling truths, that of dukkha, is an unflinching admission 
that suffering occurs on both the obvious levels of intense loss and on the micro-levels 
of more subtle self-concern and its conditioning.  There is clearly something important 
about naming suffering as a fundamental aspect of normal human reality.  But Salzberg 
represents the encounter with her own pain explicitly as a form of counter-cultural, 
169 Kornfield, 28. 
170 Sharon Salzberg, Faith: Trusting Your Own Deepest Experience (New York: Riverhead Books, 2002), p. 
103. 95 
                                                        
 
redemptive heroism.  She recounts a conversation with the great Indian adept, Dipa Ma, 
in which Salzberg is encouraged to become a teacher of meditation precisely because of 
her status as one who has been exposed to great suffering: “The notion that the 
unhappiness of my earlier life could serve as the distinction of my abilities [as a 
meditation teacher] seemed most peculiar.  She hadn’t said, ‘You have a full grasp of the 
Buddhist cosmology and all theoretical applications, therefore you should teach.’  
Instead, her criteria were based in the power of moving through great heartache and, 
rather than being destroyed by it, coming to greater faith—faith in one’s self, faith in 
the power of love, faith in the movement of life itself.”171 This is a therapeutic faith, 
‘faith in one’s self.’  It effectively replaces ‘the Buddhist cosmology and all theoretical 
applications.’ 
 Relationships between autobiographical narratives of pain and therapeutic faith 
have shaped Western Buddhist understandings and experience in profound ways.  I 
want briefly to note that I believe Buddhist-therapeutic teachers have done very 
beneficial work.  I admire these teachers, and I am not opposed to practices of 
therapeutic self-compassion.  I seek, in fact, to enable an increased receptivity to 
compassion.  However, I also argue that the therapeutic Buddhist failure to place 
compassion in relationship with creative self-critique may actually prevent practitioners 
from fully accessing compassion itself.  This is in large part why I have chosen Drive all 
blames into one as the pre-modern Buddhist teaching that can be most clearly 
distinguished, in its assumptions and purposes, from therapeutic Buddhist teaching. 
171 Salzberg, 109. 96                                                         
 
 Modern Buddhist teachers of self-compassion as a healing of self-aversion have 
not usually reflected on self-aversion as an intensive karmic conditioning and self-
centered self-invention.  The modernist therapeutic sees self-aversion as the result of 
conditioning by others—shame is, for Tangney and Gilligan, as we saw in Chapter 1, 
primarily a result of familial abuse and socialization (in this we can now see that they 
follow Nietzsche).  Of course these forms of conditioning are quite strong.  But 
contemporary writing on self-compassion tends to understate the degree to which self-
aversion is a strong, and perhaps the strongest, form of continued self-conditioning.  
Self-aversion is an illusory creation of the damnable self, but a strong vision of self 
nonetheless.  
 After consulting with Thubten Jinpa about the strange problem of Western self-
hatred, the Dalai Lama turned finally to the assembled teachers and said: “But that’s a 
mistake.  Every being is precious!”172  This work takes the same view. 
* 
 Therapeutic psychology often takes on the prestige of an ancient soteriology 
without being clear about the striking differences between therapeutic and 
soteriological understandings of Buddhist practices.  The pre-modern history of Buddhist 
thought has viewed critical self-evaluation as essential to liberation.  And so the 
modernist representation of Buddhist practice as a self-compassionate confrontation 
with self-aversion conceals basic differences between the goals and assumptions of pre-
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modern Buddhist thought, on the one hand, and therapeutic culture, on the other.  Pre-
modern Buddhism is far less interested in self-compassion than has been admitted. 
 Jack Kornfield, Stephen Levine, Sharon Salzberg, Christopher Germer, Tara Brach 
and other teachers of the past several decades have spoken of self-aversion as an 
apparently universal human experience, rooted in the natural damages and distortions 
of family and culture.  (A majority of the teachers just listed hold doctoral degrees in 
psychology.)  But in this, Western teachers have simply answered their own question to 
the Dalai Lama, from one quite limited perspective. 
 Christopher Germer has written, “I often wonder why the Dalai Lama was so 
surprised by this phenomenon [of self-hatred].”173 But the Dalai Lama named a truth 
that none of the author-teachers mentioned here have actually pursued: self-hatred is a 
profound mistake of religious vision, a fundamental error of self-reifying karma.  Self-
hatred is self-invention. 
 No Western teachers wish to suggest, of course, that the Dalai Lama is ignorant 
of his own tradition, but if self-compassion as an antidote to supposedly natural self-
hatred had been so central to earlier forms of Buddhism as Western Buddhist teachers 
have regularly claimed, then both the Dalai Lama’s initial confusion about the question, 
and his answer, cannot make much sense. 
 One temptation for psychotherapeutic thinkers has been to suggest that cultures 
where self-hatred is prominent have simply been insufficiently exposed to therapeutic 
Buddhism itself.  Sharon Salzberg asks, “Why is it so hard to extend the same kindness 
173 Christopher Germer, The Mindful Path to Self-Compassion (New York: Guilford Press, 2009), p. 141. 98                                                         
 
to ourselves that many of us gladly offer to others?  Maybe it’s because in our 
conventional way of thinking in the West we tend to view compassion as a gift, and 
bestowing it on ourselves seems selfish or inappropriate.  But the ancient wisdom of the 
East tells us that loving-kindness is something everyone needs and deserves…”174 If, 
however, in ‘Western’ religions such as Christianity, compassion is a gift (the root 
meaning of gratia, grace), it is not clear why self-compassion would become necessary. 
It is not so much that self-focused compassion would seem selfish, in a situation of 
grace, but that it would seem redundant.175 There are almost certainly other reasons 
why practices of self-compassion feel strange or difficult in our own context. 
 In “Self-Compassion and Self-Construal in the United States, Thailand, and 
Taiwan,”176 psychologists Kristin D. Neff, Kullaya Pisitsungkagarn and Ya-Ping Hsieh 
found that self-compassion is more prominent in Theravada Buddhist Thailand than it is 
in the United States or Taiwan. The differential level of self-compassion is tentatively 
ascribed to the influence of Buddhist practice.  The entire article, however, naively 
reproduces a false equivalence between self-compassionate psychotherapeutic 
theorizing and Buddhist psychology itself.  The authors suggest at the outset that the 
writings of Jack Kornfield, Sharon Salzberg, and Tara Brach represent “Theravada” 
174 Sharon Salzberg, “Foreword,” in Germer, p. ix. 
175 Self-compassion is perhaps most relevant for those who do not sense their own participation in a 
broader field of affirmation.  The supposedly ancient wisdom of self-compassion is surprisingly rooted in 
modernist autonomy. 
176 Kristin D. Neff, Kullaya Pisitsungkagarn and Ya-Ping Hsieh, “Self-Compassion and Self-Construal in the 
United States, Thailand, and Taiwan,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2008; Vol. 39; 267-285. 99 
                                                        
 
Buddhist teachings, when in fact this claim is quite misleading.177  Modern therapeutic 
writers may have borrowed heavily from Southeast Asian Buddhist insights and 
practices, and the association with Buddhism affords those psychological writings a 
certain prestige of origin.  But modern therapeutic adaptations of Buddhist practice for 
purposes of self-soothing, and therapeutic alliances with Buddhist models of mind, do 
not make therapeutic psychology and Theravada Buddhism (an immensely diverse 
sociological and historical phenomenon) at all equivalent.178 
When Neff, et al., write that “An interesting question is whether individuals in 
Asian societies tend to have more self-compassion than those in the West, given that 
the construct of self-compassion is Asian in origin,” they are presuming a great deal 
about the origins of ‘the construct.’179 
It would be much more accurate for self-compassion to be understood as a 
modernist therapeutic usage of Buddhist thought and practice—which would be 
completely legitimate, and an extension of Buddhism’s own practical experimentation 
over more than two millennia.  This therapeutic usage of Buddhism would be quite 
177 Vipassana or ‘insight’ meditation is one aspect of Theravada Buddhism, just as it is an aspect of Tibetan 
forms of analytic meditation and Japanese Zen.  Theravada and Vipassana are not the same thing. 
178 Theravada Buddhism as it exists in Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka is internally and locally diverse—the 
‘Theravada’ includes spirit exorcisms, divination practices, astrological inquiry, and monastic rituals that 
modernist psychology totally eschews.  Most Thai (and many Thai monks) have never meditated in any 
sustained way at all.  The claim by Neff, et al., that “the type of Buddhism practiced in Thailand… is the 
closest to original Buddhist teachings” is dubious.  Other Buddhist traditions, of course, also claim to be 
rooted in the original teachings of the Buddha. 
179 Neff, et al., 267. It is widely thought that nineteenth-century Western constructions of Asian religions 
(re-constructions, for purposes of classification and control) came, ironically, to inform indigenous Asian 
religious identities and Asian resistance to Western political control.  Western religious scholarship may 
run a particularly strong risk of finding its own presumptions in non-Western traditions.  See, for instance, 
the notion of a rational and textual “Protestant Buddhism” in Richard Gombrich and Gananath 
Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed (Princeton University Press, 1990) and “Buddhist Modernism” in 
David McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 100 
                                                        
 
different, though, from claiming that therapeutic psychology is itself a central form of 
Buddhism. The conflation of therapeutic thought with Buddhist traditions conceals the 
richness and diversity of potential Buddhist responses to suffering. 
Take the following example.  Germer writes, “Detailed instructions for cultivating 
loving-kindness [toward the self] were first introduced by the Buddhist monk 
Buddhaghosa, in the 5th century CE, in the Visuddhimagga (‘Path of Purification’).  To 
our knowledge, the Buddha gave only brief instructions for loving-kindness (metta) 
meditation. The way we practice metta today is essentially Buddhaghosa’s elaboration 
of a discourse given by the Buddha to a group of monks who were afraid to live in the 
forest.”180 
There are several relevant things to say in response to this account.  First, in 
practice, the Metta Sutta (Karaniyametta Sutta, Sutta Nipata 1.8), is not used as an 
antidote to self-aversion in the Southeast Asian Theravada.  It most often functions 
instead as a prominent apotropaic, not unlike the Heart Sutra as that text has been used 
in East Asia.  (Theravada monks opposing the martial regime in Burma chanted the 
Metta Sutta, for instance, during their 2007 protests.)  Those who chant the sutta 
appear to understand themselves and others, very reasonably, as embedded within a 
set of competing forces, and they view the sutta as a vehicle for producing positive, 
protective force. 
Second, when Buddhaghosa himself discusses self-compassion, he is interested 
not so much in the Metta Sutta itself, but rather in the broader set of Brahmavihāras or 
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‘divine abidings’ discussed by the Buddha in a range of Pali suttas (and not in the Metta 
Sutta).  The Brahmavihāras, the ‘divine abidings’ that include metta (expansive 
friendliness), karuna (compassion), mudita (shared joy), and upekkha (equanimity), are 
often presented as practices that offer the practitioner greater access to concentration 
in strong states of deep absorption, or jhānas.  Samādhi, concentration, is 
Buddhaghosa’s fundamental concern throughout his discussion of metta—the 
cultivation of metta is a tool of that sati or mindfulness which allows for the arising of 
such intensive concentration and its graduated states of jhana. 
Metta is mentioned prominently throughout the Pali Canon, then, as a path to 
samādhi (Majjhima Nikaya 7, Digha Nikaya 13, Anguttara Nikaya 10.208, etc.), but metta 
is not mentioned anywhere as an antidote to self-aversion.  When Buddaghosa himself 
does discuss self-compassion, he calls attention to his own status as an innovator,181 
and is very explicit about the purposes of self-metta in his discussion: “First of all 
[metta] should be developed towards oneself, doing it repeatedly thus: ‘May I be happy 
and free from suffering’ or ‘May I keep myself free from enmity, affliction and anxiety 
and live happily.’  If that is so, does it not conflict with what is said in the [canonical] 
181 Buddhist history is one of practical experimentation.  Buddhaghosa is often unconcerned to conceal 
this fact.  In his discussion of metta, he tells the following humorous story, which nicely illustrates the 
complex relationship between practice, ongoing interpretation, and forms of experimentation that may or 
may not bear fruit: “An elder [monk] supported by a family was asked, it seems, by a friend's son, 
‘Venerable sir, towards whom should loving-kindness be developed?’  The elder told him, ‘Towards a 
person one loves.’ He loved his own wife.  Through developing loving-kindness towards her he was 
fighting against the wall all the night.  That is why it should not be developed specifically towards the 
opposite sex” (Vism. 9.6; trans. Ñãnamoli). 102 
                                                        
 
texts?  For there is no mention of any development of it towards oneself182 in what is 
said in the [Pali canon]” (Vism. 9.7-8; ital. added). 
Buddhaghosa’s own monastic audience would recognize, in self-lovingkindness 
or self-compassion, a practice that is formally absent from the canon.  Buddhaghosa 
notes that although self-focused metta does not actively conflict with Buddhavacana, 
the word or teaching of the Buddha, neither is self-directed metta sufficient as a 
practice of liberation: “But this [initial development towards oneself] refers to [making 
oneself] an example.  For even if he developed loving-kindness for a hundred or a 
thousand years in this way, ‘I am happy’ and so on, absorption [concentration] would 
never arise.  But if he develops it in this way… making himself the example, then desire 
for others beings’ welfare and happiness arises in him” (Vism. 9.10).   
Self-focused metta, therefore, is only an expedient to help us properly develop 
metta for others, and metta for others is the proper foundation for concentration—
emphases that are often overlooked in contemporary discussions of therapeutic self-
compassion.  As we come more thoroughly to recognize our own desire to be happy and 
free from suffering, we become more likely to see that the pain of others is as urgent as 
our own.183 And for reasons that are left unarticulated by Buddhaghosa, only metta for 
others helps us to actually cultivate the highest levels of concentration. 
182 This is technically true, but Buddhaghosa does seem to draw upon a brief analogy that the Buddha 
suggests in the Pali teachings on the Brahmavihāras.  See MN 7.13: “He abides pervading one quarter 
[direction] with a mind imbued with loving-kindness, likewise the second, likewise the third, likewise the 
fourth; so above, below, around, and everywhere, and to all as to himself, he abides pervading the all-
encompassing world with a mind imbued with loving-kindness…” (trans. Bodhi/Ñãnamoli). 
183 Buddhaghosa’s analogical approach to motivation resembles similar strategies in Mahayana literatures.  
In the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva writes: “Since I and other beings both, / In wanting happiness, are 103 
                                                        
 
Self-compassion alone is clearly deficient in some crucial way, when it comes to 
developing the concentration that can support the insight that liberates us from the 
most subtle patterns of self-grasping and misguided desire.  Buddhaghosa’s account of 
metta explicitly avoids a too-intensive focus on the self, in part, perhaps, to avoid the 
very reification of selfhood that the Buddhist teachings of anattā (no abiding selfhood) 
and anicca (impermanence) so directly challenge and disentangle.  Pre-modern 
Buddhism emphasizes metta primarily as a quality that should pervade and encompass 
the world beyond the self.184  For Buddhist modernism, metta is autonomous and self-
contained in ways that it has never been before.185 
Modern practitioners of self-compassion often seem to develop a subtle sense 
that this modern form of self-focused metta can at times become difficult or alienating, 
reporting a sense of inner resistance to practices of self-compassion.  This sense of 
resistance and difficulty has often been interpreted simply as evidence of the very self-
aversion that stands in such need of self-compassion in the first place: “Ironically,” 
equal and alike, / What difference is there to distinguish us, / That I should strive to have my bliss alone?” 
(Bodhicharyāvatāra 8.95; The Way of the Bodhisattva, Padmakara Translation Group [Boston, 
Massachusetts: Shambhala Publications, 1997]). 
184 “Again, a bhikkhu abides… pervading the all-encompassing world with a mind imbued with loving-
kindness, abundant, exalted, immeasurable, without hostility and without ill will.  [But he] considers this 
and understands it thus: ‘This deliverance of mind through loving-kindness is conditioned and volitionally 
produced.  But whatever is conditioned and volitionally produced is impermanent, subject to cessation’” 
(Majjhima Nikaya 52.8; The Middle Length Discourses, ed. and trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi [Somerville, 
Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 1995]). 
185 David McMahan writes, “Meditation in the [North Atlantic] modern context is detraditionalized 
precisely at the point where it can now become a mode of open-ended inquiry, a tool of self-investigation 
that may lead to any conclusion whatever.  Here is where it has become disembedded from the 
traditional worlds of Buddhist practice and has taken up residence in an entirely new realm as one among 
other tools of psychology and self-exploration.  In this context, its ends are no longer determined solely by 
the authority of Buddhist tradition but also by modern psychology, which in turn is embedded in the 
broader discourses of modernity that stress autonomy, self-direction, and self-discovery.”  See McMahan, 
p. 211. 104 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
writes Germer, “it’s precisely when we need love the most that it is hardest to give it to 
ourselves.”186 (This in itself should suggest to us that self-aversion offers certain ongoing 
benefits, however illusory the benefits may be.)  The psychologist Paul Gilbert and his 
colleagues have argued that, where a person’s patterns of connection or attachment 
have been previously disrupted due to abuse or neglect, the re-awakening of capacities 
for connection through practices of self-compassion may result in a basic fear that 
traumas of disconnection may re-occur.187 
Self-compassion may, no doubt, sometimes accentuate the internal pressures of 
our conditioning, creating ‘backdrafts’ of long-held negativities, which may suddenly be 
more free to find expression within more accepting forms of awareness.  However, 
there are other reasons why one may feel a sense of difficulty or strangeness when 
directing compassion toward oneself. 
Self-compassion is imbued in much recent Buddhist literature with the aura of an 
ancient path of awakening.  But these discussions of self-compassion actually rest upon 
a quiet presumption that one’s own flawed and pain-producing prior conditioning can 
successfully create, on its own power, a less conditioned state.  The common resistance 
to self-compassion is, perhaps, not always evidence of self-aversion, as it is a different 
kind of aspiration making itself known—a desire to access a source of love from beyond 
the divided and conditioned self. 
186 Germer, 141. 
187 Paul Gilbert, Kirsten McEwan, Marcela Matos, and Amanda Rivis, “Fears of compassion: Development 
of three self-report measures,” Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice (2011), 
242. 105 
                                                        
 
The subtle feeling of resistance may be a search, in part, for access to a less 
conditioned form of compassion than what we can provide, autonomously, for 
ourselves. 
3.3 UNRAVELING AUTONOMY PART I: 
MINDFULNESS, DEPENDENT CO-ORIGINATION, ANATTA, NIRVANA 
 
Not only is autonomous self-compassion largely absent from pre-modern 
Buddhist traditions, but those traditions have also consistently emphasized the essential 
importance of critical self-evaluation in the process of liberation from an illusory self-
enclosure. 
This section looks briefly at self-evaluative aspects of early Buddhist 
understandings of mindfulness (Pali: sati), particularly the crucial qualities of hiri 
(capacity for moral shame) and ottappa (karmic imagination).  These critical aspects of 
mindfulness, however, can only be creative in the context of a larger goal: a deep 
recognition of the fundamental truth of anattā (non-self), which in turn gradually de-
conditions the negativities (Skt.: kleśa, chiefly greed, hatred, and ignorance) that result 
or flow from our unconscious misrecognition of self.188  
188 See Thanissaro Bhikkhu, The Paradox of Becoming (Self-Published 2008. Available in PDF Format at: 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/index.html#bmc1), p.5.  “Many writers have tried 
to resolve this paradox by defining non-becoming in such a way that the desire for Unbinding (nibbāna) 
would not fall into that category [of ‘becoming,’ bhavana].  However, the Buddha himself taught a 
strategic resolution to this paradox, in which the fourth noble truth—the path to the end of suffering—
involves creating a type of becoming where the mind is so steady and alert that it can simply allow what 
has come into being to pass away of its own accord, thus avoiding the twin dangers of craving for 
becoming or for non-becoming.”  This bears some superficial resemblance to the allowing of experience 
that one finds in the lojong slogan: In post-meditation, be a child of illusion. 106 
                                                        
 
For therapeutic Buddhism, self-acceptance and self-compassion are consistently 
represented as the most direct antidotes to human negativity.189  In early Buddhist 
discourse, however, our proliferating negativities (Skt.: kleśas) cannot be confronted or 
finally ended without a careful evaluation of the ‘self’ as the true source of that ongoing 
karmic confusion.  In the next several pages, we will examine early Buddhist 
understandings of mindfulness, non-self, and nirvana as direct confrontations with the 
unconscious assumption of autonomy that is the most fundamental form of human 
ignorance—a form of ignorance that the therapeutic risks rendering increasingly difficult 
to perceive. 
Therapeutic and colloquial uses of ‘mindfulness’ leave this basic question 
unanswered: mindfulness of what?  ‘Mindfulness’ (Pali: sati), remembrance, or skilled 
recollection, is a practice of attention repeatedly outlined in early Buddhist discourses 
as a foundational commitment for anyone seeking access to unconditioned nirvana.190 
Its purpose is therefore soteriological rather than therapeutic.  For the earliest stratum 
of Buddhist literature,191 sati involves the deployment of attention to four broad areas: 
processes of the body, anchored in awareness of the breath; changing sensation tones 
189 If we assume that all religious forms of critical self-evaluation must simply be outdated forms of 
penitential self-aversion, we will have cut ourselves off from significant access to any progressive path 
(Skt.: marga).   
190 “Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and 
lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the 
realization of Nibbāna—namely, the four foundations of mindfulness” (MN 10.2 and 10.47, beginning and 
end of the sutta).  Bodhi, 1995. 
191 The Pali discourse collections (nikāyas) and associated literatures were passed down only orally for 
approximately two centuries following the Buddha’s death.  Different monastic groups likely took on 
responsibility for the memorization of separate sections of the three pitakas, or ‘baskets,’ of early 
teachings.  Nonetheless, the oldest known written Buddhist manuscripts are in fact Mahayana works, 
roughly contemporaneous with the Dead Sea Scrolls or early New Testament manuscripts. 107 
                                                        
 
of positive, negative, and neutral; the nature of consciousness in relationship to its 
objects; and evolving mind-states themselves, including hindrances such as doubt or 
agitation, as well as positive factors of awakening such as energy or joy.192 
Sati involves relevant recognition both of current experiential patterns and an 
intentional recollection of the specific factors of awakening that must be developed in 
response to current experience.  In response, for instance, to the arising of agitation, 
one might activate the skill of equanimity: “If the enlightenment-factor of equanimity is 
absent in himself, he knows that it is absent.  And he knows how the unarisen 
enlightenment-factor of equanimity comes to arise, and he knows how the complete 
development of the enlightenment-factor of equanimity comes about”193 [ital. added].  
Sati in this canonical sense requires a significant range of conceptual resources, as well 
as a sense for which mind-states should be aroused or activated in particular contexts of 
experience.194 
Sati is a skill that expresses something like an Aristotelian phronesis, or practical 
wisdom; the Buddha often compares the mindful practitioner to a careful craftsperson 
(e.g., MN 10.4).  If we are unable to carefully recognize the specific conditionality 
(idapaccayatā) for a given sort of wholesome or unwholesome experience, we will be 
unable to intervene in that particular karmic formation—whether it be one of rage, or 
192 See the four ‘foundations’ of mindfulness (satipatthāna) as outlined in Majjhima Nikāya 10 and Dīgha 
Nikāya 22. 
193  Dīgha Nikāya 22.16.  The Long Discourses of the Buddha, trans. Maurice Walshe (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 1987). 
194 Thanissaro Bhikkhu, “The Agendas of Mindfulness,” Access to Insight, 5 June 2010 (2002 Original), 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/agendas.html.  Retrieved on 23 September 2014. 108 
                                                        
 
one of deep and attractive tranquility—for the purpose of liberation.195 And without a 
map of the foundational causes and conditions for suffering, it would be difficult to 
traverse the terrain of awakening with any sense of purpose at all.  In the early Buddhist 
suttas, dependent co-origination (Skt: pratītyasamutpāda; Pali: paticcasamuppāda) 
provides the crucial description of the ongoing conditioned nature of samsaric 
experience, as well as the possible cessation of that experience. 
Dependent co-origination is so central to the early discourses that the Buddha 
himself insists: “One who sees paticcasamuppada sees the Dhamma [reality itself]; who 
sees the Dhamma sees paticcasamuppada.”196   The twelve factors or links197 of 
dependent co-origination delineate the way in which “blinded by ignorance [avijjā] and 
driven by craving [taṇhā], a person engages in various unwholesome and mundane 
wholesome activities [kammas].”198  
195 Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. The Great Discourse on Causation: The Mahānidāna Sutta and its Commentaries 
(Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984), pp. 2, 10-13. 
196 See the Great Elephant Footprint Simile Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 28): ‘Yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati. 
So dhammaṃ passati. Yo dhammaṃ passati. So paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatī'ti.’  Bhikkhu Bodhi, The 
Middle-Length Discourses (Somerville, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 1995), p. 284. 
197 Dependent on (1) ignorance arise (2) kammic formations. 
(3) Dependent on kammic formations arises consciousness. 
(4) Dependent on consciousness arises mind-and-matter. 
(5) Dependent on mind-and-matter arise the six sense bases. 
(6) Dependent on the six sense bases arises contact. 
(7) Dependent on contact arises feeling. 
(8) Dependent on feeling arises craving. 
(9) Dependent on craving arises clinging. 
(10) Dependent on clinging arises existence. 
(11) Dependent on existence arises birth. 
(12) Dependent on birth arise decay-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. 
    Thus arises this whole mass of suffering. 
Bhikkhu Bodhi, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma (Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1993), 
p. 295. 
198 Ibid, 301.  This is a good representative of the difference between soteriological and therapeutic 
discourse. 109 
                                                        
 
The point of dependent co-origination is not that these links somehow arise in a 
linear sequence, but that the complex originations of suffering all involve multiple 
conditions rooted directly in our misperception of experience as ‘self.’  The fifth-century 
CE Theravada commentator Buddhaghosa, writing about the Mahānidāna Sutta (Dīgha 
Nikāya 15), suggests that the sutta is “bound together” by the Buddha’s consistent use 
of a particular image for the way that this misperception of self leads to suffering—the 
image of the ‘tangled skein’: “When weaver’s yarn which has been badly kept and 
gnawed by mice becomes tangled all over, it is difficult to distinguish its beginning and 
end and to straighten it out from beginning to end.  Similarly, beings have stumbled 
over the principle of [dependent] conditionality…”199 
The process of destroying the causes of suffering200 cannot occur without 
directly perceiving, in progressive states of deepening concentration (Pali: jhāna), the 
way that ignorance about the nature of the self leads to anxiety, aggression, and desire: 
“Not knowing [dependent co-arising] for what it truly is,” writes Phra Prayudh Payutto, 
199 Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. The Great Discourse on Causation: The Mahānidāna Sutta and its Commentaries 
(Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984), pp. 87, 85.  Wittgenstein notes: “Why is philosophy 
so complicated?  It ought to be entirely simple.  Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that we have, 
in a senseless way, put there.  To do this it must make movements as complicated as these knots are.  
Although the results of philosophy are simple, its method cannot be, if it is to succeed.  The complexity of 
philosophy is not its subject matter, but our knotted understanding.”  Quoted in Karl Brunnhölzl, The 
Heart Attack Sutra (Boston: Snow Lion, 2012), p. 40. 
200 We will see shortly that drive all blames into one is itself a deep expression of the creative destruction 
of basic ignorance. ‘Self-blame’ re-perceives the conventional reality of aversive blame from a new 
perspective—that of dependent co-origination, which focuses instead on ignorance as the true origin of 
suffering.  This is not even really our ‘own’ ignorance in an ultimate sense, because there is no true 
owner; we need not take ‘self-blame’ too personally.   110 
                                                        
 
“results in the mistaken belief in a self and causes people to cling to a notion of a self, 
which is fraught with inherent fears…”201 
The purpose of sati, then, is to enter skillfully into this unfolding of karmic 
activity, such that our damaging ignorance about ‘self’ can be dispelled by insight into 
the true nature of non-self, anattā.  The process of dependent co-origination, rooted in 
ignorance, can therefore be ‘reversed’ (e.g., MN 38.20) by a de-conditioning of 
ignorance itself.202  Dependent co-origination is not, in the Pali canon, awakening itself, 
but a diagnosis of the basic conditioning that must be skillfully discarded on the path to 
awakening. 
The path of sati, then cannot be limited to a form of self-kindness, though 
certainly it is not an aversion, either; it involves, simultaneously, the cultivation of 
positive qualities that aid awakening, and the careful abandonment of unskillful mind-
states (e.g., DN 2.68) that strengthen the ferocious but false sense of a separate and 
defendable self. 
In order to determine which states are to be cultivated, and which to be 
abandoned, sati must involve some form of prudence, some imaginative capacity that 
will allow the practitioner to distinguish between the skillful and the unskillful, in 
relationship to an ultimate goal.  In the Pali canon, two qualities of self-evaluation in 
particular, hiri and ottappa, are described as ‘bright guardians.’  The Pali scholar and 
201 Phra Prayudh Payutto, Buddhadhamma: Natural Laws and Values for Life, trans. Grant A. Olson 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 94. 
202 The ca. sixth-century CE commentator Bhadantācariya Dhammapāla writes, “’Reverse order’ means: 
through the cessation of the condition the conditionally arisen phenomena ceases [not literally that the 
links of dependent origination simply go ‘backwards’].”  See Bodhi, 1984, p. 76. 111 
                                                        
 
translator Bhikkhu Bodhi, following the medieval commentator Anuruddha, discusses 
hiri as “an innate sense of shame over moral transgression; ottappa is… fear of the 
results of wrongdoing…. It is the voice of conscience that warns us of the dire 
consequences of moral transgression: blame and punishment by others, the painful 
kammic results of evil deeds, the impediment to our desire for liberation from 
suffering.” 203  Here, again, shame is a deeply humanizing necessity, rather than 
something in need of therapeutic revision. 
 The roots of ottappa—ut (fear) + tappati (to regret or grieve)—specifically invoke 
a capacity to imagine the potential future causes of remorse. Taken in the context of the 
Buddha’s discourses, ottappa involves a moral imagination for what is and isn’t likely to 
produce negative consequences.  Ottappa implies a mature realization that human 
beings are often sources of karmic harm to themselves and others; we can speak of 
ottappa as karmic imagination.  
 Andrew Olendzki writes that “everything we do that is unwholesome can only be 
done when these moral guides [hiri and ottappa] are disregarded.  So if there is 
something morally reprehensible occurring in an individual or in a society, it means that 
we lack sufficient clarity of awareness of what we are doing.  It means we are 
temporarily blinded by our greed, hatred, or delusion, or by some combination of the 
three, such that we refuse to attend openly to the deeds we are committing.”204  
203 Bhikkhu Bodhi, “The Guardians of the World,” Access to Insight, 5 June 2010, 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_23.html . Retrieved on 3 May 2013. 
204 Andrew Olendzki, Unlimiting Mind: The Radically Experiential Psychology of Awakening (Somerville, 
MA: Wisdom Publications, 2010), p. 53.   112 
                                                        
 
However, the notion that we can always correctly perceive our own negativities of 
ignorance, greed, and aversion is perhaps a kind of moral naïvete intrinsic to Buddhist 
Modernism.  Certainly we should try to perceive these negativities and their effects, 
wherever possible—but these negativities damage our ability to perceive them in the 
first place.205 
 Without a developed imagination for the seriousness of samsaric suffering, and 
for our own very active participation in that suffering, we will pursue no thorough 
renunciation of conditioning itself.206  In the early Buddhist suttas, the ariya, the noble 
one,207 is defined quite clearly by a series of ethical and characterological guidelines—
including faith, mindfulness, and strong energy, but also, quite prominently, the core 
self-evaluative capacities of hiri and ottappa (Sekha Sutta, MN 53.11-12; Jhana Sutta, 
AN 7.6).  Without a strong model of karmic moral imagination to help us envision the 
real and potential harms that we do or might do, no progress toward freedom is 
possible (Anottāpi [Unconcerned] Sutta SN 16.2).   
205 Shantideva writes: 
 
For beings do not wish their own true good, 
So how could they intend such good for others’ sake? 
…They long for joy, but in their ignorance 
Destroy it, as they would a hatred enemy.    (Bodhicharyāvatāra 1.25; 1.29) 
 
Shantideva, pp. 36-7. 
 
206 Levinas writes, “Morality begins when freedom [the human propensity to follow the will unskillfully 
wherever it leads], instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent.” For Levinas, 
however, unlike the Buddhist, the moment of arbitrariness or violence is followed by no clear turn toward 
deep refuge in that which transcends the conditioning of violence itself.  See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality 
and Infinity, 84. 
207 The Buddha, unlike the Matthean portrait of Jesus, is not interested in the active disruption of the 
family (Mt. 10:34), but he does often address his followers as members of a new family of re-habituation, 
as ‘sons and daughters of noble lineage.’  Families form, or fail to form, our habits, and both Jesus and the 
Buddha are explicit in offering new habituating relationships. 113 
                                                        
 
 Sati, with its careful deployments of karmic moral imagination, as well as its 
honesty about the basic violence implied in views of self that require us to endlessly 
confirm and protect that self,208 undercuts the very assumptions upon which autonomy 
depends: separate reified identity and the supposed capacity of that identity to 
generate its own belonging or importance.   The pursuit of awakening is not a bourgeois 
hobby of self-realization, but a necessity for any who truly perceive the unawakened self 
as a genuine source of suffering and violence. Unless we come to identify potential 
patterns of pain before they become even further entrenched as habit, the liberating 
cessation of greed, hatred and delusion will always remain an abstraction.  And it is only 
the sustained protective working of hiri and ottappa that can help us to actively identify 
and uproot our own negativities, particularly in their embryonic form as intention 
(cetenā), so that the karmic imprinting of those negativities does not continue to 
generate new patterns of pain.209 
 Hiri and ottappa help the practitioner to distinguish between a skillful karmic 
imagination and far less skillful forms of self-critique, such as the compulsive remorse 
described by the Buddha in the Sankha [Conch] Sutta (SN 42.8):  “A disciple has faith in 
that teacher and reflects: 'The Blessed One in a variety of ways criticizes & censures the 
208 Thanissaro Bhikkhu is characteristically direct: “As the Buddha points out, the end of suffering requires 
that we abandon craving and ignorance, but if we can't be honest with ourselves about our intentions, 
how can we perceive craving in time to abandon it?”  See “The Road to Nirvana Is Paved with Skillful 
Intentions,” Access to Insight, 8 March 2011, 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/intentions.html . Retrieved on 3 May 2013. 
209 Critical inquiry into the causes and conditions of our deepest negativities is not at all the same thing as 
self-aversion, and such critical inquiry may actually have to be guided in some way by kindness.  Critical 
investigation (Pali: dhammavicaya) is a core ‘factor’ (Pali: bojjhanga) of awakening, and is, in the 
Abhidhamma literature of the Theravada, “a designation for wisdom.”  See Bodhi, 1993, p. 281. 114 
                                                        
 
taking of life, and says, "Abstain from taking life." There are living beings that I have 
killed… That was not right. That was not good. But if I become [compulsively] remorseful 
for that reason, that evil deed of mine will not be undone.'”210 Rather than helping to 
prevent future harm, this form of compulsive remorse is unskillfully destructive. (Among 
the lojong slogans, we find this: “Do not wallow in self-pity.”) 
 The Buddha of the Pali literature nowhere discusses self-aversion as a discreet 
phenomenon.211 However, the Buddha does insist that “When a Bhikkhu is practicing in 
accordance with the Dhamma, he should dwell engrossed in revulsion [nibbida] toward 
the aggregates.”212 These words move us somewhat closer to drive all blames into one.  
To witness the actual process by which the five aggregates213 generate mistaken views 
of self and other is simultaneously to recognize the total, even horrifying214 impotence 
of our normal strategies of self-construction.  The resulting disenchantment with that 
210 This sutta, the Conch Trumpet Sutta, instructs the listener that when unskillful actions are ended, the 
Brahmaviharas—compassion, equanimity, considerate care or love, and sympathetic joy—become 
boundless, like the unrestrained notes of the conch: “Thus above, below, & all around, everywhere, in its 
entirety, he keeps pervading the all-encompassing cosmos with an awareness imbued with [the 
Brahmaviharas]—abundant, expansive, immeasurable, without hostility, without ill will.”   Thanissaro 
Bhikkhu, trans. “Sankha Sutta,” Access to Insight, 
www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn42/sn42.008.than.html.  Retrieved on May 10, 2013. The 
Mahayana would later amplify this early suggestion that positive qualities such as compassion and love 
could be experienced as immeasurable, when moral and characterological obscurations have been 
brought to an end. 
211 Vibhavataṇhā, ‘craving for non-existence,’ is one expression of the second noble truth (Dhammacakka-
ppavattana Sutta: SN 56.11), and thus an object of the Buddha’s critique.  And while self-aversion may 
include a form of such craving for non-existence, it is also an acceptance of a certain kind of existence—
the unloved or unlovable. 
212 Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Samyutta 
Nikaya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), p. 882. 
213 Material form, sensation, perception, conception, consciousness. 
214 Buddaghosa, in the Visuddhimagga, notes that nibbida is not essentially different from “knowledge 
arising from the contemplation of terror (bhayatupatthānañāna).”  Quoted in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and 
Donald S. Lopez, Jr., eds., The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), p. 581.  This is relevant also to Marvin Shaw’s discussion of anattā as a 
confrontation with potentially frightening vulnerability. 115 
                                                        
 
process of mutually conditioned ignorance and suffering is one foundation for the 
relinquishment discussed above.  But neither is nibbida a globalized, reifying self-
disgust.  What ultimate selfhood is there to hate?  Again: self-hatred depends upon, and 
reinforces, just such a reified vision; whereas nibbida is rooted in a commitment to 
some real option for bringing our most profound negativities to an end. 
 Here, too, is the structure of religious self-evaluation we explore throughout 
these pages: the limited and mistaken understanding of ‘self,’ including the damnable 
self, is acknowledged and renounced only in relationship to a larger context of peace or 
compassion.  This is a movement beyond what William Blake called ‘single vision.’215 
One outcome of this more complex vision is a gentle irony about our habits of denial, 
and about our constant avoidance of peace—an irony found both in Buddhist literatures 
and in the Desert Fathers’ narratives of ‘self-reproach.’216 Sati is a skill of seeing two 
things at once: the conditioned self and an unconditioned reality, connected.217 
How, then, does sati as a path of cultivation (Pali: bhavana) lead toward the 
complete cessation of self-concerned conditioning? 
Sati is a form of intentionality (Pali: cetenā) that shapes subsequent 
intentionality, refining the feedback loops of habitual karmic activity in such a way that 
215 William Blake critiques a narrow scientism: “May God us keep / From Single vision & Newtons sleep.” 
Letter to Thomas Butt, 22 November, 1802.  The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. David 
Erdman (New York: Anchor Books, 1988 [Revised]), p. 722. 
216 Nietzsche could perceive no humor in religious self-reproach.  This has been a serious loss for later 
interpretations of religious selfhood. 
217 Nāgārjuna’s work on the relationship between dependent co-origination and emptiness is a particularly 
representative example of such creatively multiple vision.  See following section. 116 
                                                        
 
this karmic intentionality can allow itself, in the end, to be given up.218  At the end of the 
path, “the final development is that of relinquishment (vossagga), the relinquishment of 
intention.  And with that there is an abandonment of the kammic [karmic] domain.”219 
That is, the entry into unconditioned nirvana, into some form of final safety, involves 
the complete relinquishing of our attempts to control or generate the conditions of 
illusory forms of safety for ourselves.220  This is a capacity of relinquishment that the 
therapeutic does not cultivate, and therapeutic psychology risks an endless investigation 
of the traumatic past in order to conceptualize and control its power. 
The passage to nirvana involves what Marvin Shaw has called a ‘paradox of 
intention’—an attainment that comes about only through a final renunciation of 
attainment.  In a discussion of the Buddhist doctrine of non-self (Pali: anattā), Shaw 
writes that “this may not be the situation we choose, but we do not come to ourselves 
until we accept it.” 221  The “attainment ethic” of the autonomously willful and 
defendable self is ultimately “based on denial of that which is disclosed about our 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ajahn Sucitto, Kamma and the End of Kamma (Hemel Hempstead, England: Amaravati Publications, 
2008), p. 150. 
220 Later Mahayana or great-vehicle practitioners would seek new, more efficient ways to allow for this 
fundamental relinquishment, and sometimes suggested that certain abhidharma ways of conceptualizing 
perception and its objects could devolve into the very sorts of self-centered control that must ultimately 
be given up.  The early Mahayana philosopher Nāgārjuna, whom we will meet again in a moment, insists: 
 
 ‘I, without grasping, will pass beyond sorrow, 
 And I will attain nirvana,’ one says. 
 Whoever grasps like this 
 Has a great grasping.   
     (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 16.9; Garfield, 1995, p. 229) 
221 Marvin C. Shaw, The Paradox of Intention (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1988), p. 198. 117 
                                                        
 
situation by the experience of anxiety.”222  Non-self (anattā), for Shaw, relieves us of our 
endless attempts to deny the basic, ineluctable fact of our impermanence: “The mark of 
the reversal ethic [such as anattā] in its authentic form is the willingness to accept 
vulnerability.”223 The practitioner of sati gains increasing insight specifically into the self 
as a contingent process.224 (Nietzsche, clearly perceiving the composite nature of self, 
relies upon an inflated account of will in order to hold the tenuously composite self 
together; this doubles a bet that is already lost.)   
 Shaw’s emphasis on anattā as a confrontation with habitual denial also allows 
him to insist, interestingly, that self-aversion is in part an attempt to avoid precisely that 
vulnerability.  Self-aversion, writes Shaw, “is either a form of magic which seeks to 
coerce divine aid through the use of suffering, or a stratagem which seeks escape by 
annihilating the self before anything painful occurs to it.”225  Self-aversion is control.  
The self that is in such constant need of defense and augmentation, however, turns out 
not to exist. 
 The intentionality that directs the process of its own skillful dissolution is also, 
finally, non-self.  We have already noted above the paradox that nirvana is the 
222 Ibid, 199. 
223 Ibid, 201. 
224 Sati, as a skill that intentionally uses conditioned patterns of experience in an encounter with other 
conditioned patterns, increasingly comes to recognizes the impermanent (Pali: anicca) nature of the 
conditioned patterns themselves.  The Satipatthāna Sutta directs the practitioner to attend not only to 
the skillful generation of ‘factors of awakening,’ but also to the passing-away of those always-
impermanent conditions: “In this way he abides… contemplating in the body its nature of arising, or he 
abides contemplating in the body its nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating in the body its 
nature of both arising and vanishing” (MN 10.5).  The intensive concentration necessary for such careful 
observation ideally proceeds through ever more refined states of absorption, or jhānas. 
225 Ibid. 118 
                                                        
 
unconditioned result of a conditioned process or path.226 A similar paradox is embedded 
in attempts to use conditioned language to describe that which is beyond 
conditioning.227 In the Questions of King Milinda, a set of dialogues between the second-
century BCE Greek King Milinda (Menander) and the Buddhist monk Nagasena, 
Nagasena speaks of nirvana as an unfathomable ocean, so that “although Nibbana [i.e., 
nirvana] really exists, it is impossible to make clear the form or figure of age or 
dimensions of Nibbana, either by an illustration or by a reason or by a cause or by a 
method.”228 
 Considered from the perspective of what it is not, nirvana is ‘empty’ (Pali: 
suññata) precisely of those negativities that flow from our mistaken unconscious views 
of self and other: “Nibbana is called [suññata] because it is devoid of greed, hatred, and 
delusion, and because it is devoid of all that is conditioned.”229 The negative definitions 
of nirvana in the Pali canon include ajāta, the unborn, and amata, the deathless—terms 
that will recur, like ‘emptiness,’ in the interpretative shifts of the Mahāyāna.230 
226 “The path to the goal,” writes Steven Collins, “cannot be said straightforwardly to cause the goal, since 
that would make it part of the conditioned universe from which liberation is sought; but at the same time 
the goal cannot be completely unrelated to the path to it.  … [P]erhaps the most general formal solution 
has been to hold that the path is a necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining the goal.”  See 
Steven Collins, Nirvana: Concept, Imagery, Narrative (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 55. 
227 “In the face of Nirvana, words falter, for language is a product of human needs in this world, and has 
few resources with which to deal with that which transcends all worlds.”  Peter Harvey, An Introduction to 
Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 
74-5. 
228 The Questions of King Milinda, trans. E.W. Burlingame, quoted in The Island: An Anthology of the 
Buddha’s Teachings on Nibbana, ed. Ajahn Pasanno and Ajahn Amaro (Redwood Valley, California: 
Abhayagiri Monastic Foundation, 2009), p. 34. 
229 Bodhi, 1993, p. 260. 
230 Pasanno and Amaro, pp. 30-31.  The authors draw from Samyutta Nikaya 43. 119 
                                                        
 
 However, nirvana is also spoken of in Pali literature as asankhatadhātu, the 
positive unconditioned element.231  “[Nirvana] is not merely an absence,” writes Steven 
Collins.232  “In the lexicon of Buddhist systematic discourse, nirvana is a real Existent, not 
merely a conceptual one; it is an element in the classificatory scheme of ultimately 
existing things.”233 That is, nirvana “can be an object of awareness,” though it is not in 
fact viewed as “part of the mind of a person to whom it appears as a mental object.”234 
This understanding of nirvana as ‘external’ will become a significant target of later 
Mahāyāna critique, but the notion of nirvana as an element or dimension of reality is 
important for understanding how nirvana can be a focus of reliance and trust.235  The 
ennobling truth of nirvana may be ultimately unfathomable, but it must also be 
understood as a genuine end of the path: 
 … [T]here is no pointing to the bourn [i.e., destination] 
 Of those perfectly released, 
 Who have crossed the flood 
 Of bondage to sense desires 
 And attained unshakeable bliss. (Udāna 8.10)236 
 
This invocation of bliss as a primary form of nirvanic experience is also echoed in the 
Dhammapada (vv. 202-204), where nirvana is spoken of as a supreme peace; in the 
Suttanipāta (vv. 369-373), which frames nirvana as that which is ‘secure,’ a trustworthy 
231 Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans., The All-Embracing Net of Views: The Brahmajāla Sutta and its Commentaries 
(Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1978), p. 189. 
232 Collins, 54. 
233 Collins, 47 
234 Collins, 53. 
235 Collins translates a Pali commentary on the Buddha’s awakening-utterance in Udāna 3 as follows: 
“Monks, if there were no Unconditioned Element whose individual nature is to be without birth, etc., then 
there would be no escape in this world… remainderless calming would not be made known, would not 
occur, would not come about” (Collins, 50). 
236 John Ireland, trans., The Udana and the Itivuttaka: Two Classics from the Pali Canon (Kandy, Sri Lanka: 
Buddhist Publication Society, 1998). 120 
                                                        
 
‘refuge’237; and in the Samyutta Nikāya  (36.31), where the final destruction of self-
concerned negativities (as opposed to the pursuit of mere satisfaction) results in a 
happiness beyond that of any prior experience.238  
 Religious self-evaluation, like that embedded in the early Buddhist path of sati as 
skillful recollection, only functions from a perspective that thoroughly trusts in a 
relationship to what is unconditioned—understood in early Buddhist sources as peace, 
tranquility, refuge, and joy. Nirvana is the final destruction of the very self-concern that 
offers us the false sense of separate, autonomous selfhood in the first place. 
Therapeutic Buddhism offers a vision of ‘mindfulness’ that assumes sati can 
function apart from a deep trust in some full soteriological goal, and apart from 
relationship to sources of awakening and instruction that transcend the limited 
conditioned self.  The modernist therapeutic thereby fails to confront the real 
mercilessness of our habitual clinging to an intrinsic, separate self.  It is no accident that 
reliance on the refuges of Buddha, dharma, and sangha are so central in pre-modern 
forms of Buddhism.  We should not confuse the nobility of the ariya with a self-
sufficient therapeutic individualism. 
 In the next section, we will discuss several Mahāyāna developments of thought 
and practice which further confront all vestiges of self-concerned autonomy, and which, 
in so doing, expand the soteriological goals of the path in a way that brings us closer to 
the purposes of lojong. 
237 Luis O. Gomez, “Nirvana,” in Robert Buswell, Jr., ed., Encyclopedia of Buddhism (New York: Macmillan 
Reference, 2004), p. 602. 
238 Pasanno and Amaro, Chapter 20. 121 
                                                        
 
3.4 UNRAVELING AUTONOMY PART II: 
EMPTINESS, COMPASSION, AND THE BODHISATTVA 
IN THE EARLY MAHĀYĀNA PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ 
  
 In order to understand the full implications of lojong as a path that directly 
deconstructs autonomy while simultaneously accessing qualities of compassionate 
awareness, freedom, and basic openness, it is first necessary to understand several 
further developments in Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine that will inform lojong itself.  The 
following discussion of ‘emptiness,’ compassion, and the figure of the bodhisattva will 
also help us to confront the tendency of some Western commentators to present lojong 
in a way that obscures its full devotional and aspirational contexts.239 
 We have already noted that in Pali literature, the term ‘emptiness’ (Pali: 
suññata) referred in part to the final absence of those negativities which unfold from 
our basic ignorance about self. 240   For the medieval Abhidhamma commentator 
Anuruddha, “Nibbana is called void [empty: suññata] because it is devoid of greed, 
hatred, and delusion, and because it is devoid of all that is conditioned.”241 This absence 
of conditioned negativities is the goal of the early Buddhist path; emptiness, here, refers 
to a full cessation of dependent co-origination, but suññata is not a central or common 
term in the early suttas. 
 Understandings of ‘emptiness’ underwent a series of important shifts in the 
sutras and doctrinal elaborations of the early Buddhist Mahāyāna, or ‘great-vehicle,’ 
239 See in particular the commentarial work of Norman Fischer, discussed below. 
240 Suññata also referred, in the Pali suttas, to the lack of ‘cleanliness’ in the five aggregates that make up 
the human person—so that the Buddha regularly directs monks to examine the foulness of the body in 
part to cultivate nibbida towards the aggregates.  See Buswell and Lopez, 2013, pp. 871-72. 
241 Bodhi, 1993, p. 260. 122 
                                                        
 
beginning with the family of texts known as the Prajñāpāramitā: ‘perfection of wisdom.’    
These sutra texts—which include the Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines; 18,000 lines; 
25,000 Lines; 100,000 Lines; the far more concise 300-line Diamond Sutra; and the one-
page Heart Sutra242—detail the path of those who pursue complete awakening, not for 
themselves alone, but on behalf of all beings; this is the path of the bodhisattva.243 
We turn to the Prajñāpāramitā because these texts first delineate connections 
between new understandings of ‘emptiness,’ compassion, and the bodhisattva’s 
aspiration to the complete awakening of the Buddhas—all of which are foundational 
themes of lojong.  To enter the Prajñāpāramitā is to join a world of expansive power 
and possibility.244  At the outset of Edward Conze’s translation of the Prajñāpāramitā 
Sutra in 25,000 lines (hereafter the Large Sutra),245 and here at the outset of the 
Mahāyāna, we find the Buddha Shakyamuni, the Buddha of our own epoch, as a radiant 
cosmic presence, perceiving and affecting immense realms with extraordinary capacities 
of insight: “[W]orld systems as numerous as the sands of the Ganges were illumined by 
His splendor.  And the beings who were touched by this splendor, they were all fixed on 
242 Harvey, 114. 
243 Ibid, 116. 
244 “The ‘greatness’ of the new vehicle was seen to lie in three areas: its compassionate motivation, 
directed at the salvation of countless beings; the profundity of the wisdom it cultivated; and its superior 
goal, omniscient Buddhahood.”  See Harvey, 110. 
245 Conze’s text is in fact a redaction of components of the Prajñāpāramitā sutras of 18,000 lines, 25,000 
lines, and 100,000 lines, but Conze takes the sutra of 25,000 lines as a primary organizing focus, allowing 
him to align his text with the divisions of the Abhisamayālankāra—a compact summary-analysis of 
Prajñāpāramitā thought that became influential in medieval Tibet.  See Edward Conze, trans., The Large 
Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1975), Preface.  See also John 
Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet (Ithaca, New York: Snow 
Lion Publications, 1997), p. 109. 123 
                                                        
 
the utmost, right and perfect enlightenment.”246 The Buddha of the nascent Mahāyāna 
Prajñāpāramitā is imbued with qualities and capacities that far exceed any psychological 
naturalism: in the omniscience and purity of his perception, he directs his healing power 
and skillful healing means (Skt: upayakauśālya) not only to the original sangha of 
monks, nuns, and laypersons, but also to “hundreds of thousand of niyutas or kotis of 
Bodhisattvas”—that is, the Prajñāpāramitā addresses its empowering qualities to beings 
beyond conception on the path to Buddhahood.247  The ‘whole universe,’ the cosmos 
itself, gathers to hear the Prajñāpāramitā.248  
This vision of an empowering Buddhahood will be important at the outset of 
lojong practice as a fundamental commitment of the lojong practitioner.  We will see, in 
the final part of this chapter, how the lojong practitioner’s access to transcendent 
sources of compassion and awakening will depend directly on the initial framing practice 
of guru yoga—in which the practitioner encounters the embodiment of the Buddha’s 
clarity and compassion as manifested by their own teacher or guru, descending into the 
heart where the guru rests in a pavilion of light.249  Guru yoga allows the practitioner to 
access the awakened empowerment of beings that is first expressed by the radiant 
Buddha of the Prajñāpāramitā. 
246 Ibid, 39. 
247 Ibid, 37.  It might even be said that the reader’s capacity to envision this full radiance of Buddhahood 
marks the reader himself or herself as a potential bodhisattva; if these characteristics of Buddhahood 
were not fully visible to prior traditions, was this not a fault of vision?  The Prajñāpāramitā draws the 
reader into its world. 
248 Ibid, 534, 572, and 621. 
249 Jamgön Kongtrul, The Great Path of Awakening (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1987), p. 8. 124 
                                                        
 
In the Large Sutra, following this display of expansively luminous perception, the 
first words spoken by the Buddha to the great assembly gathered to hear this sutra are 
addressed specifically to the disciple Ven. Śāriputra: “A Bodhisattva, a great being who 
wants to fully know all dharmas in all their modes should make endeavors in the 
perfection of wisdom.”250  
The polemic force of this opening utterance is directed toward Śāriputra as a 
symbolic representative of early Buddhist Abhidharma classificatory and commentarial 
systems, which were ostensibly developed to discipline and guide the intimate 
meditative discernment of the arising and passing away251 of distinguishable mind-
states.252 In the Abhidharma of the early Sarvastivāda school, which survives in Chinese 
translation, 253  practitioners were encouraged to analyze “physical and mental 
phenomena into their ultimate components” as an aid to meditative concentration; in 
this system, Buddhahood was also viewed as a set of undefiled and ‘real’ dharmas, 
thereby offering an authentic, but quietly reified, focus for refuge.254 
These reifications likely had practical consequences.  Practitioners may have 
become adept at the analytic identification of dharmas as a mark of intellectualistic 
distinction (not unlike the contemporary practice of sharing psychologized insights 
250 Large Sutra, 45. 
251 In Conze’s Large Sutra redaction, we find the following implicit rejection of any abhidhamma emphasis 
on the arising and falling away of unique dharmas: “Thus a Bodhisattva, a great being who courses in the 
perfection of wisdom, also does not review the production (of any dharma); not its stopping (or abiding, 
its decrease or increase), defilement or purification” [Large Sutra, 57]). 
252 On the symbolic significance of Śāriputra, see Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight 
Thousand Lines and its Verse Summary (Bibliotheca Indo-Buddica 134, 1973), p. xii. 
253 Harvey, 93. 
254 Makransky, p. 30. 125 
                                                        
 
about oneself and others, to no apparent purpose beyond the display of analytic 
prestige).255 It may be easy to substitute an obsessive identification of dharmas for the 
actual relinquishment of those modes of experience. 
From the perspective of the Prajñāpāramitā authors, earlier traditions pursued 
nirvana far too narrowly as an individualized achievement—a critique that is almost 
certainly related to the reification of dharmas as objects of analysis for supposedly 
superior or inferior perceptive skills.  Reification and competition are somehow 
intimate.  The Prajñāpāramitā distinguishes forcefully between the figures of the 
arahant and the bodhisattva, between the path to personal nirvana and the way to the 
supreme and shared awakening of the Buddhas (Skt.: anuttarā samyak sambodhi). This 
important distinction has to do above all with the bodhisattva’s quality of motivation: 
If this Continent of Jambudvipa were filled with monks similar in worth to 
Śāriputra… like a thicket of reeds, bamboos, or sugar cane, of tall grass, or rice, 
or sesamum plants—their [combined] wisdom does not approach the wisdom 
of a Bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom by one hundredth part, nor by 
one thousandth part, nor by one-hundred-thousandth part; it does not bear 
number, nor fraction, nor counting, nor similarity, nor comparison, nor 
resemblance.  To such an extent does the wisdom of a Bodhisattva, who, 
coursing in perfect wisdom, develops it for one day only, surpass the wisdom of 
all the Disciples…  And why? Because that wisdom of a Bodhisattva… is 
concerned with Nirvana for all beings.256  
What, then, is the relationship between the Prajñāpāramitā’s deconstruction of 
all reifications, on the one hand, and this basic concern for the awakening of all beings? 
255 This is necessarily speculative.  However, the Prajñāpāramitā polemic is almost certainly addressed not 
only to a doctrinal problem, but to issues of soteriology and community that are always embedded in 
doctrinal problems. 
256 Conze, Larger Sutra, pp. 57-58. 126 
                                                        
 
Here we come to the Prajñāpāramitā’s fundamental exposition of ‘emptiness’—
śunyatā, the essencelessness of all things, including or especially ‘dharmas.’  In the 
Large Sutra, the Buddha and the bodhisattva Subhuti engage in the following key 
dialogue:  
Subhuti: What is the real truth about dharmas such as they are? 
The Lord [Buddha]: Emptiness. 
Subhuti: What emptiness? 
The Lord: The emptiness of own-marks [i.e., separate intrinsic existence; 
svabhāva].  Through this kind of insight he discerns that ‘all dharmas are empty.’  
Not of any dharma does he see [intrinsic existence] which would provide him 
with an existent on which he has stood when fully knowing enlightenment.257 
 
Prajñāpāramitā is the perception that there is no self-existent thing, no separate 
identity or essence, anywhere—not even in nirvana itself: 
 Subhuti: Is, then, enlightenment nonexistent? 
 The Lord: So it is, Subhuti, so it is, as you say.  Enlightenment also is a nonexistent.258 
 
This is not the assertion of a total nihilistic nothingness. The Buddha of the 
Prajñāpāramitā does not deny the phenomenal realm—that is the realm which is empty 
of any separate existents259: “[Physical form; rūpa] is not one thing, and emptiness 
another; emptiness is not one thing, and form another.”260 Nirvana is not a separate 
reality; it is intimately nondual with the experience of ‘samsara’; nirvana is nondual in 
fact with all dharmas, which “have non-existence for their own-being, and [which] are 
257 Ibid, 631. 
258 Ibid.  Compare to Steven Collins’s exposition of Pali Abhidharma accounts of nirvana, above. 
259 “The perfection of wisdom does not destroy the existence of anything, but is the very mode by which 
one investigates and truly perceives the essential nature of phenomenal reality as it is, a universal 
correlativity and mutual interdependence” (Brian Edward Brown, The Buddha Nature: A Study of the 
Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991], p. 152). 
260 Conze, Larger Sutra, 61. 127 
                                                        
 
the same as final Nirvana, because of their [ultimate] unreality.” 261  For the 
Prajñāpāramitā and its Madhyamaka interpreters (Madhyamaka meaning a ‘middle 
way’ between extremes of naïve believe in intrinsic identities, on the one hand, and 
total denials of any conditionality at all, on the other) interpreters, even the fullest 
awakening of the Buddhas cannot be “a collection of dharmas, no matter how exalted, 
but [are instead] the nondual realization of the real nature of all dharmas (dharmatā), 
which is their emptiness (śunyatā).”262 
Here is the realization in which the bodhisattva ‘courses,’ completely 
unsupported by any intrinsic identity or essence.  For the Large Sutra, if a bodhisattva, 
“thus coursing in the perfect wisdom, does not become cowed or stolid, does not 
tremble, is not frightened or terrified, then it should be known that that Bodhisattva is 
near to the knowledge of all modes.”263 That is, the bodhisattva who can fully accept a 
total immersion in foundationless conditionality, or emptiness, is close to the supreme 
awakening to which the Mahāyāna aspires. 
 Several issues can now be raised in a new way.  First, the absolute emptiness of 
all dharmas means that the ‘attainment’ of a separate existing reality, whether that of 
nirvana or anything else, is not relevant to the bodhisattva. Emptiness, on this account, 
is no longer the effect of the cessation of dependent co-origination, but is instead the 
ultimate nature of dependent co-origination itself.264   The wisdom that non-dually 
261 Ibid, 571. 
262 Makransky, 31. 
263 Conze, Larger Sutra, 105. 
264 The paradigmatic and foundational version of this teaching can be found in the twenty-fourth chapter 
of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: 128 
                                                        
 
realizes emptiness thus cuts off any sense of the need to enter into some reality other 
than this one.  The Prajñāpāramitā, in its radical insistence on the ultimate non-
existence of the very objects, experiences, and projections that we so often take to be 
truly real, directly deconstructs our basic habit of forging the perceptual-emotional 
grounds for a security that ultimately does not and cannot exist. 
 It should be clear that, for one thoroughly coursing in śunyatā or ‘suchness’ 
(tathatā: ‘supreme truth apprehended by nondiscriminating wisdom’265), the notion of 
an intrinsically autonomous individual (Skt.: satkāya-drsṭi) does not arise. 266  The 
bodhisattva does not cling even to the idea of a bodhisattva.267 The residual adherence 
to any false projection of an intrinsically separate, autonomous existence is what the 
epistemology of the Prajñāpāramitā overcomes. 
 In as far as the bodhisattva delivers others from suffering, he or she introduces 
those others to their own basic groundlessness or non-separation—a redefinition of the 
third noble truth of nirvana, away from any final recognition of an ultimately separate 
  
Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
That is explained to be emptiness.  
That, being a dependent designation  
Is itself the middle way. (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18) 
 
See Jay Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 304. 
265 William H. Grosnick, “Tathagatagarbha,” in Buswell, 2004, p. 827.  In the Large Sutra, the bodhisattva 
Subhuti has the following exchange with the Buddha:  
 
Subhuti: What then is that which the Lord has expounded as purification? 
The Lord: It is the sameness of all dharmas. 
Subhuti: And what is the sameness of all dharmas? 
The Lord: It is Suchness, nonfalseness, unaltered Suchness, the nature of Dharma…  (Large Sutra, 636) 
 
266 Ibid, 77. 
267 Ibid, 56. 129 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
existent or reality.  The early Mahāyāna Madhyamaka thinker Nāgārjuna, reflecting 
systematically on the Prajñāpāramitā, writes: 
 If nirvana were existent, 
 Nirvana would be compounded. 
 A non-compounded existent 
 Does not exist anywhere. 
 …There is not the slightest difference 
 Between cyclic existence [samsara] and nirvana. 
   (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 22:5-6; 22:19)268 
 
Nirvana, then, is not some other thing, some other place to go, or a separate state to 
achieve, but is rather a mode of apprehending the conditionality that only unfolds in 
relationship to other conditions; nirvana is no longer understood as the opposite of 
conditioned samsara, but is instead a nondual awareness of interconnected 
conditionality itself.  This renegotiation of nirvana, for the Prajñāpāramitā and its 
Madhyamaka expositors, is in part a rejection of any assumption, implicit or explicit, of 
an intrinsic autonomy, and also subverts any temptation to view nirvana as a pleasant, 
autonomous, distant escape from conditionality. 
Importantly, our habitual refuge in a false autonomy is predicated upon, and in 
turn produces, the experience of fear, because the assumption of autonomy requires 
endless defense and assertion.  To take refuge so thoroughly and consistently in our 
own sense of a separate selfhood may offer us the sensation of control, but our 
strategies for managing life’s conditions cannot ultimately succeed if reality itself is so 
fundamentally impermanent, empty, and therefore impervious to lasting control.  Fear 
and anxiety are the result of this basic disjunction between our strategies of safety, on 
268 Garfield, 1995, pp. 324-25; 331. 130                                                         
 
the one hand, and the world as it is, on the other.  It might even be said that self-
aversion has recently become a primary strategy for deepening the powerful sensation 
of control.  And so, while self-aversion may necessarily be induced and encouraged by 
familial or cultural conditions—the psychologists and sociologists are not wrong on this 
point—it is also the case that self-aversion offers persons a certain sense of their own 
intrinsic, autonomous reality, however costly that sensation of being real may become 
for them and others.   
The work of the bodhisattva goes against the grain of that habitual refuge in 
aversion.  The bodhisattva’s path is instead a process of increasingly fearless 
engagement with conditionality. 269  And in order to skillfully enter into that 
foundationlessness on behalf of all beings, the bodhisattva must be one who 
increasingly recognizes two aspects of truth—the ‘conventional’ aspect of truth, which is 
everyday reality as we habitually experience, perceive, and name it in terms of concrete, 
separate essences; and the ‘ultimate’ aspect of truth, which does not refer to some 
other reality, but to the way in which, as Atiśa writes, “If one examines… the 
conventional as it appears, nothing [stable or permanent] is found.  That nonfindingness 
269 Fearlessness, ‘engaged Buddhism,’ is a primary Prajñāpāramitā outcome. Shantideva expresses this 
most directly: 
 
If such a thing as ‘I’ exists indeed, 
Then terrors, granted, will torment it. 
But since no self or ‘I’ exists at all, 
What is there left for fears to terrify?   (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra 9.56)   Shantideva, p. 145. 
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is the ultimate.  It is the true nature of things.”270  The contemporary philosopher Jay 
Garfield, in an attempt to prevent readers from viewing ultimate truth as somehow 
separate from the conventional, writes, “The ultimate truth about any phenomenon is 
that it is merely a conventional truth. …To fail to take conventional truth seriously as 
truth is therefore not only to deprecate the conventional in favor of the ultimate but 
also to deprecate truth per se.”271 It is nonetheless crucial, for the bodhisattva, to be 
able to skillfully distinguish between the conventional and the ultimate, in order to 
creatively release himself and all others from doomed attempts to create safety through 
endless manipulation of conventional conditions alone. 
 The practical relevance of the early Mahāyāna’s redefinition of emptiness as the 
dependent co-origination (Skt: pratītyasamutpāda) of interconnected conditionality 
cannot be overstated, in part because it directs the Buddhist practitioner 
epistemologically and affectively toward suffering as a shared phenomenon.  Perhaps 
the most visible and striking practice in the set of teachings encompassed by medieval 
Tibetan lojong, for example, is that of tonglen, or ‘giving-taking.’ Tonglen intensifies and 
formalizes an engagement with suffering in and beyond the self—an engagement 
articulated with particular force by Shantideva, an eighth-century CE Indian 
Madhyamaka author, in his Training in the Way of the Bodhisattva: 
 Is there need for lengthy explanation? 
 Childish beings look out for themselves, 
270 See Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2009), p. 77. 
271 Jay Garfield, “Taking Conventional Truth Seriously,” in Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist 
Philosophy, ed. The Cowherds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 37-38. 132 
                                                        
 
 While Buddhas labor for the good of others… 
 
 If I do not give away  
 My happiness for others’ pain, 
 Awakening will never be attained. (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra 8.130-31)272 
 
The lojong practice of taking on others’ suffering for oneself, and offering of all our 
resources of joy and freedom to those others, is deeply indebted to this practical 
radicalization of śunyatā in the Prajñāpāramitā and in the works of Madhyamaka 
thinkers like Nāgārjuna and Shantideva.  No exchange or substitution is possible in a 
world of intrinsically separate persons.  From the perspective of śunyatā, there is in fact 
no reason to privilege our own pain above that of another: 
 Strive at first to meditate 
 Upon the sameness of yourself and others. 
 In joy and sorrow all are equal. 
 Thus be guardian of all, as of yourself.  (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra 8.90)273 
 
Here the basic truth of śunyata is implicit as the foundation for the cultivation of a 
compassionate attitude toward all beings, even as this same compassion begins to 
loosen the seemingly Gordian knot of habitual self-concern that constrains our 
perception of śunyatā in the first place. 
 For the Madhyamaka thinkers Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Shantideva, the 
relentless emphasis on śunyata does not at all result in a denial of the problem of 
suffering (e.g., Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 12; Madhyamakavātāra 1; 
Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra 6).  Śunyatā is not only a refutation of any intrinsic identity 
anywhere, but also expresses a potentially positive valence: to recognize śunyata is to 
272 Shantideva, 128-29. 
273 Ibid, 123. 133 
                                                        
 
recognize the inseparability of others’ suffering, and others’ awakening, from our own.  
This is no doubt part of the immense power of the Prajñāpāramitā: its deconstruction of 
autonomy is simultaneously an introduction to compassion.  This will be true of Drive all 
blames into one as well. 
 The pages below will suggest further that the lojong teaching Drive all blames 
into one is best understood as a form of refuge.  This raises, of course, a basic question: 
refuge in what? 
3.5 UNRAVELING AUTONOMY PART III: 
BUDDHA NATURE AND MIND 
 
 Let us begin our discussion of Buddha Nature, an important foundation for the 
exploration of lojong below, by noting some doctrinal tensions that can be traced in part 
to the Prajñāpāramitā itself.  Glimpsing these tensions will also help us to better 
understand some distinctions between the Madhyamaka doctrinal commitments of the 
Tibetan Geluk order and the Nyingma 274—Kagyü 275 revitalization of more diverse 
Mahāyāna practical and doctrinal commitments during the Ri-mé (‘impartial’; 
‘unlimited’) movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.276 
274 Nyingma, ‘ancient’ in Tibetan, is also one of the four major sects of Tibetan Buddhism, and traces its 
origins to the ‘early dissemination’ of Buddhism in Tibet, and particularly to the semi-mythic figure, 
Padmasambhava, in the eighth century CE.  The Nyingma is known particularly for its emphasis on tantric 
study and practice, and for its emphasis on atiyoga or Dzogchen, the practice of the ‘great perfection’ 
(Buswell and Lopez, 719). 
275 The Karma Kagyü sect is one of the four major sects of Tibetan Buddhism, founded by the first 
Karmapa, Dusum Kyenpa, in the twelfth century CE.  In the realm of practice, the Kagyü are known for 
their emphasis on Mahamudra (see below; Ibid, 419). 
276 The Ri-mé sought to revitalize a range of Tibetan textual and practice traditions, including lojong, 
which had fallen into relative decline following the rise to power of the Geluk order in the seventeenth 
century.  Ringu Tulku writes, “Ri-me is not a way of uniting different schools and lineages by emphasizing 
their similarities.  It is basically an appreciation of their differences and an acknowledgement of the 
importance of variety to benefit practitioners with different needs.”  See Ringu Tulku, The Ri-Me 134 
                                                        
 
 We have already seen that, for the Prajñāpāramitā, it is the quality of the 
practitioner’s motivation, his or her intention to awaken for all, which separates the 
Mahāyāna bodhisattva from those who seek nirvana primarily or only for themselves.277 
More specifically, this is understood as bodhicitta—the wider scope or expanded quality 
of aspiration to awaken on behalf of all beings—which the Prajñāpāramitā seeks to 
introduce and develop. 
 I think there is good reason to view the Prajñāpāramitā sutras themselves as 
agents of compassionate activity for reasons that will become clear in a moment—
though of course one reason to see them in this way is the fact that this is how they 
present themselves.  The sutras of the Prajñāpāramitā (as well as other Mahāyāna 
sutras, e.g., the Saddharmapundarīka) proclaim that those who copy them will cultivate 
“a merit which is immeasurable, incalculable, inconceivable, incomparable, illimitable, if, 
having copied this perfection of wisdom and made it into a book, they will learn and 
study it, bear it in mind, preach it and wisely attend to it, and if, in addition, they will 
honor, revere, adore, and worship it…”278 It is easy for the contemporary academic 
reader to perceive, in passages such as this one, only the desire of a nascent sub-
Philosophy of Jamgön Kongtrul the Great: A Study of the Buddhist Lineages of Tibet (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 2006), p. 3.  Douglas Duckworth writes that “attention to a broad range of interpretations 
can be seen as a general quality of what it means to be nonsectarian in Tibet.  Such attention to a plurality 
of interpretations does not (necessarily) mean a coercive amalgamation of others’ views with one’s own, 
but involves a move in the direction of inclusiveness that contrasts with a more insular model of 
scholarship that frames the boundaries of discourse within a more narrowly delineated tradition of 
interpretation.”  This statement also contains similarities to contemporary Comparative Theological 
purposes and attitudes.  See Douglas Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature (Albany, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2008), pp. xii-xiii.  
277 [A] Bodhisattva, a great being who wants to lead to Nirvana… all the beings who are in each of the ten 
quarters, in world systems as numerous as the sands of the Ganges…” (Large Sutra, 46). 
278 Large Sutra, 236. 135 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
tradition to perpetuate itself; a text or scripture seeks such prominence only as the 
representative of a given sub-community vying for status.  Gregory Schopen has 
suggested that such passages are rooted in a self-legitimating ‘cult of the book’ in the 
early Mahāyāna, which had to “contend at every step with the historical priority and 
dominance of the stūpa/relic cult of early Buddhism in the milieu in which [the cult] was 
attempting to establish itself.”279 
 This hypothesis of mere legitimation may obscure, however, more central 
doctrinal and practical issues embedded in the process of sutra-copying.  Schopen writes 
that because his “interest is merely ‘structural’ and ‘historical,’” he must “set aside for 
another time the rich material contained in our texts on the ideology or theology 
underlying the cult [of the book].”280 This is, I suspect, a mistake—one that has to do 
with bodhicitta, a term Schopen does not address. 
 It is important to note that the Prajñāpāramitā sutra is the vehicle that provides 
its reader with access to the new intentionality and aspiration of bodhicitta as a central 
norm—one that distinguishes the bodhisattva from other sorts of practitioners.  It is an 
error, in my view, to deny that the sutra does actually bring some set of readers within 
the field of a larger purposiveness (to gain a more definitive and expansive purpose is 
not a rare human hope).281 For those readers who have viewed bodhicitta as a gift 
279 Gregory Schopen, “The Phrase sa prthivīpradeśaś caityabhūto bhavet in the Vajracchedikā: Notes on 
the Cult of the Book in Mahāyāna,” in Figments and Fragments of Mahayana Buddhism in India (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2005), p. 42. 
280 Ibid. 
281 “[I]n each direction countless world systems were lit up and illumined… and in all the world systems, 
the same thought occurred to each one of these gods and men: ‘It is for me that the Tathagata, seated 
there, demonstrates Dharma’” (Large Sutra, 41).  See also Bodhicharyāvatāra 3.26. 136 
                                                        
 
received,282 the sutra itself functions as an expression of skillful means; the sutra is in 
some sense an expression of awakened power and agency.283 
 This question of agency, however, exposes an important potential ambiguity in 
the Prajñāpāramitā.284 The path that leads to a full awakening, the path capable of 
bringing all beings to nirvana, depends upon a multi-lifetime access to bodhicitta—but 
the exact nature of that ongoing access is not fully articulated. 285  For the 
Prajñāpāramitā, bodhicitta is not intrinsic, because nothing is; it is not even a purpose 
we come to on our own, apart from the ‘external’ power and compassion expressed by 
282  For I am like a blind man who has found 
 A precious gem within a mound of filth. 
 Exactly so, as if by some strange chance, 
 [Bodhicitta] has come to birth in me.  (Bodhicharyāvatāra 3.28)  See Shantideva, 
p. 52. 
283 The Large Sutra invites its readers to “worship [the text] with flowers” (Large Sutra, 236); in the first 
chapter of the sutra, we have already heard that “Both gods and men then strewed these flowers, etc., 
over the body of the Tathagata” (41).  The sutra thereby places itself in relationship to the reader as an 
emanation of Buddhahood.  Note, too, that such ritual gifts allow the reader to relate to the text as a way 
of relating directly to the Buddha, who, when presented with lotuses early in the sutra, “threw them in 
the Eastern direction into countless world systems, which were lit up…” (43).  Devotion is itself an aspect 
of the training in perfect generosity through which a bodhisattva fully realizes the full awakening of 
Buddhahood.  The text, as an embodiment of Buddhahood, induces the practices of bodhisattva.  Finally, 
note that by copying the text, the bodhisattva is extending the skillful means of the Buddha who speaks it, 
and the one who copies the text thereby becomes a vehicle for the expression of Buddhahood. A larger 
methodological point, of course, is that the ‘structural’ and ‘historical’ can hardly be separated from the 
‘theological.’ 
284 The discussion in this paragraph is indebted to Brian Edward Brown, The Buddha Nature: A Study of the 
Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991), pp. 150-159. 
285 The seventh-century CE Madhyamaka commentator Candrakīrti opens his Madhyamakavātāra by 
invoking bodhicitta’s long-term karmic efficacy.  In this Candrakīrti may be responding indirectly to 
tathāgatagarbha thought, implicitly insisting that there is no need to posit any potentially reified Buddha 
Nature: 
 
 Compassion, nonduality, the wish for Buddhahood for others’ sake 
 Are causes of the children of the Conqueror. 
     (Madhyamakavātāra 1.1)  See Chandrakirti, 59 
 
Although the last chapters of the Bodhicharyāvatāra offer a Madhyamaka account of emptiness and its 
ethical implications, the extraordinarily robust account of bodhicitta as a timeless source of soteriological 
power in the first chapters of the Bodhicharyāvatāra appears to draw upon Yogācāra and 
tathāgatagarbha concepts and literatures (e.g., 1.14-15). 137 
                                                        
 
the Buddha in and through the Prajñāpāramitā sutras themselves, which therefore 
function in part as Buddhas. 
 What, then, can be the ongoing basis for the bodhisattva path? 
 For the Prajñāpāramitā sutras, śunyatā allows for the complete mutability of 
awareness and its capacities—the lack of any intrinsic identity is an opportunity for 
immense soteriological transformability and creativity.  However, there is no reason 
why inherent mutability should necessarily, on its own, lead to Buddhahood.286  The 
wisdom that realizes śunyatā must be continually informed by bodhicitta itself, in order 
for Buddhahood to be ‘achieved.’  This creates a dualism not only between the 
bodhisattva as he or she actually is, on the one hand, and ultimate awakening, on the 
other, but also results in a dualism between those persons who are on the path toward 
that ultimate awakening, and some set of lesser others, who are not.  Emptiness 
without qualities demands a relentless effort to achieve those qualities—precisely the 
sort of dualistic achievement-orientation that the Prajñāpāramitā itself so sharply 
critiques. 
 On the path of the bodhisattva, then, a significant question becomes: how 
should the relationship between emptiness and bodhicitta be understood, so that the 
path of bodhicitta may be sustained without devolving into dualisms of achievement 
and status? 
286 For Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha texts, “The tathāgatagarbha is the basis of aspiration towards 
nirvana because it is the tathāgatagarbha which experiences suffering.  There can be no experience and 
retention (no learning from experience) in the case of an impermanent flow of everyday consciousness” 
(Williams, 106-7, discussing the Śrīmālādevīsimhanādasūtra). 138 
                                                        
 
 One doctrinal strategy for addressing these issue can be found in the 
Samdhinirmocanasūtra (ca. first through third centuries CE), which distinguishes 
between a bodhicitta that is ultimate (paramārtha), and that which is relative or 
conventional (smvrtti).  Ultimate bodhicitta, for the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, is “beyond 
this world, cannot be formulated by concept or speech, is extremely radiant, the image 
of the Ultimate, immaculate, unshakeable, and very bright like the steady glow of a 
lamp on a calm night.” 287   Conventional bodhicitta, generated within ritual and 
meditation as an initial aspiration (bodhicittopāda) and then as an increasingly active 
imaginative and practical compassionate engagement with others, is necessarily 
dependent upon ultimate bodhicitta as its ground or foundation288—an open and 
compassionate reality which is “both the innate potency to become awakened and the 
mind that has attained the ultimate goal, awakening itself.”289 Ultimate bodhicitta may 
thus function as the ongoing basis of the path itself without creating sharp dualisms 
between completely different sorts of persons, or between current reality and an 
inaccessible compassionate future.   Compassion is not a distant goal to be achieved, 
but a reality to be relied upon. 
 In an important sense, from the perspective of ultimate bodhicitta, emptiness 
and compassion are indivisible.  It is not that compassion results from our recognition of 
emptiness, but that emptiness expresses or has the quality of compassion itself.  Atiśa 
287 Williams, 2009, p. 199. 
288 Luis O. Gómez, “Bodhicitta (Thought of Awakening)” in Buswell, 2004, p. 55. 
289 Ibid. 139 
                                                        
 
(982-1054), the Indian master whose pith instructions to his Tibetan disciples would 
become the foundation for lojong, insisted that 
There is no emptiness meditation not permeated by compassion; 
For the practice of compassion is solely [the practice of] emptiness. 
As for emptiness, even those seeking tranquil abiding must practice it. 
For this vehicle, however, emptiness is compassion; 
And the self-nature of this compassion is emptiness. 
So understand that compassion is the essential nature.290 
 
 To better understand how Atiśa and others came to understand compassion and 
emptiness as a unity, or even as the kind of ‘self-nature’ or ‘essential nature’ that the 
Prajñāpāramitā wholly rejects, it is necessary first to look at a series of Mahāyāna sutras 
which locate beings’ capacity to progress toward supreme awakening in the 
tathāgatagarbha, that which ‘contains a Buddha,’ the ‘essence of the Buddha,’ or 
Buddha Nature.291 
 Beginning in the third century CE, further articulations of the basis for the path 
of the bodhisattva were developed in several new Mahāyāna sutras that either explicitly 
or implicitly gestured toward Buddha Nature as a characteristic of beings—the 
Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Śrīmālādevīsimhanādasūtra, Mahāparinirvānasūtra, 
Lankāvatārasūtra, and the Avatamsakasūtra.292 The Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra 
(The Sūtra of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines) had taught that 
bodhicitta is, “in its essential original nature… transparently luminous,” 293  a 
characterization that will become important for later tathāgatagarbha thought and 
290 Atiśa Dīpankara, “Advice to Namdak Tsuknor” in Jinpa, 2006, p. 267. 
291 Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
p. 104. 
292 Buswell and Lopez, 897. 
293 Edward Conze, Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines, §5. 140 
                                                        
 
practice, but had not identified this luminosity with any essence or ‘self.’294 The 
Mahāparinirvānasūtra, however, explicitly speaks of the tathāgatagarbha as an ātman, 
or ‘self’295—a characterization later taken up by Dölpopa, the fourteenth-century 
Jonangpa thinker whose unique presentations of emptiness and Buddha Nature became 
influential for Nyingma and Kagyū thinkers (see below). 296  The third-century CE 
Tathāgatagarbhasūtra presents a particularly strong view of Buddha Nature through a 
series of striking similes: “[G]ood sons, all sentient beings have the tathāgatagarbha.  It 
is like pure honey in a cave or tree, but it is covered by kleśas [negativities; see above], 
which, like a swarm of bees, keep one from getting to it.”297 
Good sons, all beings, though they find themselves with all sorts of kleśas, have 
a tathāgatagarbha that is eternally unsullied, and that is replete with virtues no 
different from my own.  …[T]he Buddha can really see the tathāgatagarbhas of 
sentient beings.  And because he wants to disclose the tathāgatagarbha to 
them, he expounds the sūtras and the dharma, in order to destroy kleśas and 
reveal the buddha nature.298 
 
This is no longer a bodhicitta initiated from without, as in the Prajñāpāramitā, but 
rather a set of innate qualities to be more and more thoroughly actualized.299 This 
process of activation, the process of being perceived in our true nature, is precisely what 
294 Harvey, 143. 
295 Williams, 108.  
296 Jeffrey Hopkins, trans., Mountain Doctrine: Tibet’s Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the 
Buddha-Matrix (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2006), p. 53. 
297 William H. Grosnick, “The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra,” in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Buddhism in Practice 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 97.  “The majority of the Tathāgatagarbha 
Sūtra’s similes portray something extremely precious, valuable, or noble (such as buddhas, honey, kernels 
of wheat, gold, treasure, golden statues, or future princes), contained within something abhorrent and 
vile (such as rotting petals, angry bees, useless husks, excrement, poor hovels, dirty rags, soot-covered 
molds, and impoverished, ugly women)” (Grosnick, 93). 
298 Ibid, 96. 
299 Both reception and activation, of course, require ongoing cultivation or development. 141 
                                                        
 
develops in us the awakened capacity to perceive others in this same way.  Buddhahood 
perceives—and, in so perceiving, activates—what is most true in persons.300 
This process of mutual perception between beings and fully awakened 
Buddhahood can be seen with increasing clarity in the Gandhavyuhasūtra, the capstone 
of the Avatamsakasūtra, in which the young pilgrim Sudhana proceeds toward 
awakening by encountering a sequence of awakening bodhisattvas. To be a bodhisattva 
is to seek connection with, and empowerment from, bodhisattvas—Sudhana, the 
paradigmatic bodhisattva, is necessarily a pilgrim toward others. 301   Sudhana is 
addressed at length by Maitreya: 
 Look at Sudhana, pure in mind, born of enduring riches; 
 Seeking the practice of supreme enlightenment, this wise one has come to me. 
  
 …From the embryo of the aspiration for enlightenment, compassion, and love… 
 You will perfect beings, purify the world, and establish 
 The realm of knowledge...302 
300 “The practice of envisioning the Buddha… is not merely an expression of a human need but the 
enactment of a deep intuition about the nature of reality.  Reality discloses itself as a communicative and 
transformative power present to anyone whose vision becomes sufficiently purified through practice.  For 
this reason ‘devotional’ practices such as buddhānusmrti [recollection or mindfulness of the Buddha] 
were… one element within a wide framework of Mahāyāna practice: cultivation of bodhicitta and 
compassion, ritual practices, perfection of insight into emptiness, practice of perfections, etc.  …Thus, in 
the view of Mahāyāna systematicians, ‘devotional’ practices are not merely expressions of human need 
but the forms needed to elicit and express basic intuitions concerning the nature of reality itself” 
(Makransky, 333). 
301 Here again we can see the problem of the bodhisattva who insists upon saving lesser others—he or she 
cannot learn from the other as one who is on the path to awakening in their own right.  This capacity to 
be awakened by others is, simultaneously, a way of awakening them, allowing them to function as 
bodhisattvas as well. 
302 Timothy Cleary, The Flower Ornament Scripture (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1993), pp. 1463-67.  
The Avatamsakasūtra’s account of awakened cognition, ‘Buddha knowledge’ (buddhajñāna), very much 
seems to be a step in the direction of a full tathāgatagarbha.  The Avatamsaka may even offer a 
rhetorical model for the similes of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra: 
 
Just as water flows under the ground 
So those who seek it find it, 
Without thought, without end, 
Its effective power all-pervasive, 142 
                                                        
 
 
It is important here that the bodhisattva Maitreya’s confirmation of Sudhana as a 
bodhisattva himself closely mirrors Sudhana’s own praise of the bodhisattvas he has 
encountered up to that point.  Through a process of pilgrimage, during which Sudhana 
has repeatedly recognized the awakened potential and qualities of others, Sudhana’s 
own awakened potential has been gradually confirmed.  One becomes a bodhisattva by 
recognizing bodhisattvas. 
 Sudhana’s pilgrimage of devotion is itself a fundamental training in a purity of 
perception—a perception increasingly able to commune with and actively value others 
as expressions of “holy mystery, beyond the grasp of self-centered, reductive 
thoughts.”303 Who or what, however, actually performs this pure perception?  John 
Makransky writes: “Only our inmost goodness can sense so directly the essential purity 
and goodness of others.  We let our buddha nature, our primordial capacity of wisdom 
and love know others in their buddha nature, their intrinsic worthiness and holiness.”304  
The development of this primordial capacity depends, crucially, on our willingness to be 
known in our own intrinsic worthiness and holiness—a willingness that manifests itself 
in practices of visualization, devotion, confession, and offering, all of which place us in 
repeated relationship to the ground of awakened power and compassion.305  These 
Buddha knowledge is also like this, 
Being in all creatures’ minds…  (Cleary, p. 1004) 
 
303 John Makransky, Awakening Through Love (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2007), p. 134. 
304 Ibid. 
305 This ground (Tib.: shi) can be described through “a set of three terms, ngowo or essence (described as 
both ‘open’ and ‘innately pure’), rangshin or ‘nature’ (described as characterized by ‘spontaneity’ and 
‘luminosity’), and tukjé.  Tukjé is the standard Tibetan term for ‘compassion’ (Skt.: karunā), but with a 143 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
counter-repetitions are what allow us to reform our far less skillful repetitions of 
externalized and internalized aggression and fear—habits which utterly fail to produce 
the safety they at first appear to promise. 
 Self-aversion is the refusal of a greater refuge—aversion toward either self or 
other necessarily takes its shelter in the sense of control, power, and dualistic selfhood 
that aversion itself helps us to construct.  The lojong instruction Drive all blames into 
one asks us to do something different; it interrupts or offers an intervention into the 
experience of aversion, so that we might choose, within that experience, the more 
formative refuge of our own and others’ true nature.  This is not to say that such a 
choice is at all a simple or easy matter; it is almost certainly the case that most human 
beings will need to repeatedly turn toward an alternative refuge in primordial, timeless, 
unconditioned compassion and love, in order to give up the false safety offered by 
habitual aversion.  I do not pretend that compassion and love are easy refuges, for 
anyone long given to the false safety of aversion—lojong offers no romanticism.  But it 
will be difficult to understand Drive all blames into one without understanding the 
doctrinal and practical focus of that greater trust, and the way in which a deepening 
refuge in the Buddha and in the nature of mind creates new possibilities for the 
perception of both self and other. 
 If we accept ourselves instead under the identity of damage, thus limited and 
reified, we are likely to seek mere therapeutic relief from that damage, rather than 
somewhat different emphasis.  Tukjé here is energy of activity, the compassion-driven movement that 
leads to the arising of phenomena out of the ‘ground’ or shi” (Geoffrey Samuels, Introducing Tibetan 
Buddhism [New York: Routledge, 2012], p. 84). 144 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
pursuing an awakening that connects us far more fully to the awakened potentiality of 
others.  The commitment to Drive all blames into one, the refusal to blame others for 
our own suffering, functions in part as a protection for our own capacity to perceive the 
awakened nature of those others, which is one way to activate our own awakened 
nature.306 From the perspective of tathāgatagarbha thought, any externalizing and 
reifying blame forecloses the perceptual capacities of our own awakened nature; blame 
is rooted in, and further habituates, a misperception of reality. 
 The twelfth-century lojong author Sé Chilbu Chökyi Gyaltsen (1121-1189) writes: 
“If you lapse and find yourself noticing… [another’s] shortcoming, think, ‘This is my own 
deluded perception; no such flaw exists in them.  All sentient beings are endowed with 
the essence that shares the Buddha’s own nature.’”307  The twentieth-century Nyingma 
teacher Zhechen Gyaltsab Padma Gyurmed Namgyal writes that “The essential nature of 
all sentient beings is the spontaneous Buddha-nature, the innate heart or potential for 
enlightenment.  Therefore, do not dwell on the wrongdoing of others or on their 
mistakes.  Rather, think of the vast possibilities of others, and think of their path as your 
own.  Do not think about the faults of others; think about your own faults.”308 
306 Some lojong teachings might be innovatively applied both to oneself and to others in our own cultural 
context.  For instance, in the case of Don’t talk about injured limbs, we might understand the teaching to 
mean not only that we should avoid contemplating the defects of others, but also that we should avoid 
valorizing our own pain.  Lojong rejects the glorification of the wounded self as a strategy of self-
invention.  After a certain age, we should not constantly ask others to sign our protective casts, or go 
around looking for casts to sign.  To ruminate on defects, either our own or others’, obscures our own 
perception of Buddha Nature, which is itself the perception that Buddha Nature performs.  
307 Sé Chilbu Chökyi Gyaltsen, “A Commentary on the Seven-Point Mind-Training,” in Thupten Jinpa, ed., 
Essential Mind Training (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012), p. 85.   
308 Zhechen Gyaltsab Padma Gyurmed Namgyal, Path of Heroes: Birth of Enlightenment Volume 2, trans. 
Deborah Black (Oakland, CA: Dharma Press, 1995), p. 487. 145 
                                                        
 
 Both teachers, one from the twelfth century and one from the twentieth, orient 
us away from externalizing blame, and guide us toward a deepened perception of the 
essential nature of others.  And while it may seem that considering our own faults could 
be a return to the path of aversion, it must be understood that in a context where 
Buddha Nature is taken seriously, faults and misperceptions are not ultimately real—
there is in fact no ultimate identity of damage, and it is for this very reason that harms, 
damages, misperceptions, and faults can be fearlessly encountered and re-
habituated.309 The nineteeth-century Nyingma- and Kagyü-trained polymath Jamgön 
Kongtrül writes that for “those individuals… who believe that buddha nature does not 
exist… [they come to] hold what is not true—[i.e.,] the relative, adventitious [moral] 
stains—to be truly existent.”310 The encounter with one’s own fault is necessarily an 
encounter with one’s own essential nature as the context within which any fault can 
make sense in the first place: “Supposing that [Buddha Nature] was definitely not 
present, not a single person would grow to feel sorrow and remorse over the suffering 
of samsara. …[S]uch a person feels weariness with fault, which is the suffering of 
samsara, and joy over the quality, which is the happiness of nirvana.  This weariness and 
joy arise from the presence of the disposition to buddhahood.”311 The recognition of 
fault is not separable from the path of awakening. 
309 The doctrine of buddha nature thus allows aversion toward self, or what contemporary psychologists 
understand as ‘shame,’ to be converted into a generative guilt, which focuses on specific actions and 
habits instead of the person’s total worthiness. 
310 Jamgön Kongtrül Lodrö Thayé, Buddha Nature: The Mahayana Uttaratantra Shastra with [‘The 
Unassailable Lion’s Roar’] Commentary, trans. Rosemarie Fuchs (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 
2000), p. 179. 
311 Ibid., p. 125. 146 
                                                        
 
 Buddha nature can be interpreted in different ways, and these differences 
matter for our understanding of Drive all blames into one.  For Je Tsong Kha Pa and the 
subsequent Geluk tradition, the tathāgatagarbha, when properly interpreted, actually 
directs us back to the definitive final truth of śūnyatā understood in Madhayamaka 
terms.  Paul Williams summarizes Geluk views312 toward tathāgatagarbha thought this 
way: “[W]hen the Buddha spoke of the tathāgatagarbha what he was really referring to, 
the real truth behind his teaching, was none other than emptiness (śūnyatā) understood 
in its Madhyamaka sense as simply a negation, absence of intrinsic existence…  After all, 
the tathāgatagarbha is said to be that within sentient beings which enables them to 
attain Buddhahood.  ...Thus when we say that all sentient beings have within them the 
Buddha-essence or the Buddha-nature we mean that all sentient beings have minds 
which can change and become Buddha’s mind.”313 
 The Geluk model of Buddha Nature, drawing from Candrakīrti,314 might be called 
‘weak’ or ‘developmental,’ in as far as the qualities of Buddhahood, on such a view, are 
not intrinsic to beings, but must be assiduously cultivated over numerous lifetimes—a 
cultivation that rests upon a Madhyamaka account of śūnyatā, because only what is 
312 Debates between Prāsangika and Svātantrika understandings of Madhyamaka are not covered here in 
detail.  However, note simply that the Geluk view, following Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, is that of 
Prāsangika Madhyamaka (a retrospective label for prior thinkers, applied in later Tibetan debates), which 
suggests that Buddhist logic should deconstruct opponents’ arguments based on the unintended reifying 
consequences (Skt.: prasanga) that follow from those arguments.  From the Prāsangika perspective, 
Svātantrika thinkers such as Bhāvaviveka and Śāntaraksita, by using autonomous syllogisms in order to 
advance their positive positions about the meaning of emptiness, risk producing unhelpful reifications of 
emptiness.  This debate about the correct role of reasoning is in part a precursor to debates about 
rangtong and shentong views of emptiness, which are more central to our exposition of the doctrinal 
background to lojong below. (See, for example, Buswell and Lopez, 664.) 
313 Williams, 113. 
314 Buswell and Lopez, 898. 147 
                                                        
 
empty of intrinsic existence can be so profoundly transformed.  However, Buddhahood 
in Geluk thought therefore remains distant from and other than the mind as it is—
reproducing the sort of duality between self and ultimate awakening that the 
Prajñāpāramitā had originally sought to criticize.  A developmental model of Buddha 
Nature as mere mutability may also compromise our capacity to perceive the current 
actuality of awakened nature in others; if we take on identities as persons on the true 
path of cultivation toward supreme awakening, it may be quite easy to perceive others, 
who are not obviously on that path, as inferior.315 
 The contemporary scholarly notion that the teaching of Buddha Nature may 
have been simply an attempt to recruit non-Buddhists, and was therefore primarily 
economic or competitive in its purpose,316 ignores the genuine doctrinal and practical 
tensions that tathāgatagarbha thought sought to resolve in the burgeoning Mahāyāna.  
The Mahāparinirvānasūtra’s confrontational use of ātman to describe the 
tathāgatagarbha, for instance, upholds a genuine basis for the path in a primordially 
315 Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), noted that paradigms create new 
problems at the moment when they solve others.  This is certainly true of the Prajñāpāramitā.  It is 
unfortunate that contemporary scholars often view tathāgatagarbha thought as showing “little interest 
in… doctrinal philosophical precision” (Williams, 315), when in fact tathāgatagarbha literatures often seek 
to resolve problems that such ‘precision’ may actually create. 
316 “Stressing the presence of a fully-enlightened Buddha in each and every sentient being may… have 
been intended to encourage support for the Mahāyāna, including material support from the wider lay 
community” (Williams, p. 315, note 10, following the work of Michael Zimmerman).  As in my comments 
about Gregory Schopen’s writing on the ‘cult of the book,’ it seems to me that the widespread Religious 
Studies hermeneutic of economic suspiciousness must ignore, or is unable to see, the ways in which 
doctrinal development usually articulates a logic of thought and practice that responds directly to 
doctrinal tensions present in prior aspects of the tradition.  The lack of a ‘theological’ imagination seems 
to render such historical judgment very limited, so that we are only able to see our own economic 
suspicion in others.  Ironically, the problem of perceiving others more generously is arguably a 
foundational or even central issue in the tathāgatagarbha sutras and the Ratnagotravibhāga. 148 
                                                        
 
existent reality317—an implicit response to the risk of hopelessness or ‘pathlessness’318 
in the Prajñāpāramitā-Madhayamaka presentation of śūnyatā as a totalizing 
deconstruction.319 And unlike the Geluk view of Buddha Nature, which identifies the 
tathāgatagarbha directly with a Madhyamaka account of śūnyatā, Nyingma and Kagyü 
understandings uphold a stronger model of Buddha Nature as a set of intrinsic 
awakened qualities that are already present in the mind and as the mind, and are 
therefore available to the bodhisattva through practice, or realized as the actual power 
of practice. 
 Tathāgatagarbha teaching reconfigures the meanings of ignorance.  If ignorance, 
for tathāgatagarbha texts, has to do with a failure to perceive the immense 
potentiality-presence of pure awareness in ourselves and others,320 this ignorance is 
precisely what prevents the bodhisattva from accessing the primordial emptiness that 
317 Buswell and Lopez, 504.  The use of language intended to shock its audience is a standard use of 
‘skillful means’ in Mahāyāna sutras.   ‘Atman,’ here, refers to not a conventional self, but points instead to 
an empty awareness that is nonetheless endowed with certain capacities, including nirvanic perception.  
Mahāyāna sutras consistently use key terms in new ways, in part to disrupt reified, static understandings 
within Buddhist traditions themselves. 
318 Just as the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras responded to problems of reification in early Buddhist abhidhamma 
traditions, problems that may have led to a dualistic intellectualization of practice (see above), the 
totalizing deconstruction of the Prajñāpāramitā may have tempted its own followers in turn to simply 
assert deconstruction as the ‘correct’ content of ultimate truth, without pursuing deconstruction as a 
necessarily process to be undergone through or within the conventional, ‘relative’ aspect of reality.  This is 
one reason why it may be helpful to view Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā primarily as an argument 
for the deep importance of engaging conventional truth as not-other-than the ultimate.  This is likely also 
the reason why Nāgārjuna so vigorously insisted that anyone who simply ‘believes’ in emptiness is 
completely lost; emptiness, for Nāgārjuna, connotes a process to be undergone rather than a position for 
mere assertion and defense. 
319 Paul Williams with Anthony Tribe, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition 
(New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 163. 
320 Here the tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra traditions draw in part from the Prajñāpāramitā in Eight 
Thousand Lines, which, as we have seen, briefly describes awareness as “transparently luminous.”  Cittam 
prakrtiprabhāsvaram, “luminous purity of mind,” is a doctrine that becomes far more prominent in 
Yogācāra texts, where “the mind of each sentient being is essentially pure, luminous awareness, while the 
affective and cognitive impurities that cover the mind, being adventitious to it, are not part of its very 
nature” (Makransky, 90). 149 
                                                        
 
he or she claims to seek.321 When we speak in the next section about Drive all blames 
into one as a practice not of aversion but of refuge, we will draw directly from 
tathāgatagarbha understandings of mind as possessed of an unchanging, unobstructed 
compassionate wisdom.  If the tathāgatagarbha is purified through a process of 
recognizing the very qualities of luminous awareness that we so regularly misperceive 
due to the adventitious negativities which arise in ignorance, then ignorance is dissolved 
through our ongoing relationship to the nature of awakened awareness itself, accessed 
through refuge practices of guru yoga—devotion to the power of Buddhahood in one’s 
own teachers—as well as mandala offerings, the seven-limbed puja, and vajrasattva 
confession or purification practice. Refuge, purification, and insight are, in 
tathāgatagarbha thought, not different from one another. 
 Nascent tathāgatagarbha perspectives are most visible in an important series of 
five texts, the ‘Maitreya Treatises,’322 attributed simultaneously to the fourth-century CE 
321 Similar questions about the anthropological basis for ongoing sanctification are crucial in Christian 
thought.  There is a significant practical difference, for instance, between Aquinas, for whom operative 
grace informs each human being and for whom cooperative grace enables the person to decisively move 
through the process of sanctification—and Calvin, for whom there is no human basis at all for either 
salvation or sanctification, and for whom only some persons are actually empowered through grace 
toward any salvation at all (Institutes 2.1.7). 
322 Five texts are attributed to Maitreyanātha, of which we will briefly discuss several: 
 
A. Abhasamayālamkāra: Ornament for the Realizations—mentioned above as a Prajñāpāramitā 
outline, but which contains significant Yogācāra influences as well (see Makransky, Chapters 6 
and 7) 
B. Mahāyānasutrālamkāra: Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras—important not only for Nyingma 
thinkers, but also for Atiśa, the Kadampa teacher who introduced lojong into Tibet in the 
eleventh century (Ringu Tulku, 162) 
C. Madhyāntavibhāga: The Discrimination of the Middle from the Extremes 
D. Dharmadharmatāvibhāga: The Discrimination of Dharmas and their True Nature [dharmatā] 
E. Ratnagotravibhāga: Lineage Analysis of the Three Jewels or Uttaratantra: Sublime Continuum 
Śastra. 
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scholar-practitioner Asanga and to the transcendent bodhisattva, Maitreyanātha.323 
Among these treatises, the ca. fourth-century CE Mahāyāna-Uttaratantraśāstra, 
‘Sublime Continuum of the Mahāyāna Treatise,' is particularly foundational for later 
Kagyü and Nyingma reflections on Buddha Nature and nature of mind. 324   The 
Uttaratantra, like the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāna, Tathāgatagarbha, 
Śrīmālādevīsimhanāda, and Avatamsaka sūtras, outlines specific qualities of 
Buddhahood and fully awakened awareness that the bodhisattva may rely upon as a 
basis or ground for his or her path: 
Without middle or end—exceedingly vast, 
Buddhahood is all-pervading, just like space. 
Perfectly seeing that this treasure of unsullied qualities 
Is in every being, without the slightest distinction, 
[Buddhas] dispel clouds of defilement and knowledge 
With the wind of their perfect compassion.   
   (Uttaratantra 4.2; Thrangu Rinpoche, 172)325 
 
The Uttaratantra is also clear that these qualities are not merely a possibility of future 
‘achievement,’ and thus avoids a dualism between current state and future state; 
primordially awakened awareness is completely intrinsic to beings.    
 The nature of mind is like the element of space; 
 it has neither causes, nor conditions, nor these in combination, 
 nor any arising, destruction, or abiding 
 
 This true nature of mind—clarity—is like space, 
Williams with Tribe, pp. 154-55. 
323 Reginald Ray, Indestructible Truth: The Living Spirituality of Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 2000), pp. 422-23. 
324 Thrangu Rinpoche, 7.  The works of Dölpopa, which were a focus of much Geluk opposition, proved 
foundational for later Nyingma and Kagyü reflections on mind.   Dölpopa quotes over 200 lines of the 
Uttaratantra in a major work on shentong: Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning, trans. Jeffrey 
Hopkins (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications 2006), p. 41. 
325 Thrangu Rinpoche, The Uttara Tantra: A Treatise on Buddha Nature (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 
2001), p. 172. 151 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 unchanging, not defiled...  
    (Uttaratantra 1.62-63; Thrangu Rinpoche, 67) 
 
This nature of mind is accessed and activated precisely through beholding (and, 
ultimately, being beheld within) the awakened awareness of Buddhahood:326 
 There is nothing whatever to remove from this, 
 nor the slightest thing thereon to add. 
 truly beholding the true nature—when truly seen—complete liberation 
    (Uttaratantra 1.154; Thrangu Rinpoche, 95) 
 
The Uttaratantra, like the sutras that expound the tathāgatagarbha, directly confronts 
distortions of thought and practice that may result from the teaching of radical 
emptiness (śūnyavāda).  The virtually endless accumulation of causes for enlightenment 
entailed by the bodhisattva path, as it is outlined by the Prajñāpāramitā and its 
Madhyamaka interpreters, can become overwhelming and seemingly impossible for a 
bodhisattva who does not realize his or her close connection to enlightenment. 
 The five Maitreya-Asanga texts appear more attuned to the potential problem of 
spiritual despair, and the implications of such despair for our active love of others, than 
prior Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises.  Maitreya’s Mahāyānasutrālamkāra, or Ornament 
for the Mahāyāna Sutras, notes that, apart from confidence in Buddha Nature, “beings 
326 The process of recognizing one’s own tathāgatagarbha is structurally similar to the overturning of the 
‘basis’ in Yogācāra thought and practice.  For the Yogācāra, “The final attainment comes suddenly… [in an] 
event known as the ‘reversal of the basis’ [or ‘fundamental transformation’] (āśraya-parāvrtti).  It is 
where the usual flow of the worldly mind suddenly stops, so that the six sensory consciousness [including 
mind] no longer present information.  Having stopped discriminating ‘objects’ in the flow of the six 
consciousnesses, manas [mind] ‘turns round’ from these and attains direct, intuitive, noble knowledge 
(ārya-jñāna) of ālaya as its basis” (Harvey, 137).  The lojong directive, “Rest in the nature of the ālaya” 
induces the lojong practitioner into the practice-goals of both Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha teaching.  
Lojong can thus be flexibly interpreted across multiple Mahāyāna sub-traditions.  Without an intrinsic 
capacity for rest in the nature of mind, Drive all blames into one may become much more likely to 
advance a reifying self-critique.  Lojong advances precisely the sort of “interplay between ultimate and 
relative awareness” that Makransky outlines as a fundamental aspect of Mahāyāna sūtra literature (see 
Makransky, Ch. 13). 152 
                                                        
 
do not feel a love even for themselves, not to speak of [love] for beloved others’ lives, 
[not] anything like the love the compassionate (bodhisattva) feels for other beings” 
(8.15).327 All beings may contain deep capacities for love and connection, but the 
bodhisattva is one who actually has a greater trust in those very capacities.  Maitreya’s 
Madhyāntavibhāga, or Distinguishing the Middle, repeatedly names, as an ‘extreme’ to 
be avoided, the deprecation of self and other (e.g., 3.4-3.5; 5.23; etc.), and calls 
attention to the ‘feeling of inadequacy’ as a basic obscuration that prevents full access 
to awakening (2.7).328 The Uttaratantra notes: 
 There are five mistakes: faintheartedness, 
 Contempt for those of lesser ability, to believe in the false, 
 To speak about the true nature badly, 
 And to cherish oneself above all else.  
    (Uttaratantra 1.157; Thrangu Rinpoche, 97) 
 
However, the Uttaratantra continues, the śūnyavāda teaching that experience can be 
likened to a dream or a conjuration may not heal the five mistakes at all: 
 Not learning in this fashion [i.e., through the śūnyavāda] 
 Some people are disheartened 
 through mistaken self-contempt 
 and bodhicitta will not develop in them.  
    (Uttaratantra 1.161; Thrangu Rinpoche, 99) 
 
The Uttaratantra is specifically concerned to provide an antidote for the disheartened 
who suspect that the bodhisattva path is not, finally, navigable to its ultimate end; 
tathāgatagarbha teaching implicitly critiques the śūnyavāda for re-introducing the very 
dualism between what is (samsara) and what should be (full supreme awakening; 
327 Maitreyanātha-Āryāsanga, The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature: Mahāyānasutrālamkāra, ed. 
Robert Thurman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 67. 
328 Middle Beyond Extremes: Maitreya’s Madhyāntavibhāga with Commentaries by Khenpo Shenga and Ju 
Mipham, trans. Dharmachakra Translation Committee (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2006). 153 
                                                        
 
anuttarā samyak sambodhi) that the śūnyavāda itself had initially sought to 
deconstruct.  The tathāgatagarbha teachings re-negotiate the very paradox of intention 
that the Prajñāpāramitā, too, had been concerned to emphasize. 
 It is worth noting, as a way to further foreshadow our commentary on Drive all 
blames into one, that among the ‘five mistakes’ named in Uttaratantra 1.157 (see 
above), we find both ‘self-contempt’ and contempt for others of supposedly ‘lesser’ 
capacity.  This problem of the bodhisattva’s potential deprecation of others—not only 
self-centered arhats or pratyekabuddhas, but any supposed non-bodhisattva—can be 
read as simply an intertextual Mahāyāna disagreement about proper hermeneutics in 
the interpretation of diverse Buddhist traditions.  However, the logic of 
tathāgatagarbha thought and practice cannot actually abide the ultimate 
disparagement of anyone,329 in as far as such contempt prevents the practitioner from 
recognizing Buddha Nature in others, which is precisely the process of his or her own full 
awakening. 
 The reification of a contemptible otherness is necessarily the disruption of 
unimpeded compassion at the heart of the non-dual tathāgatagarbha. 330  If the 
awakening of mind’s self-recognition of its own true nature depends upon recognizing 
that nature in Buddhas, and being thus recognized by Buddhas, the vision of all others as 
329 E.g., Uttaratantra 1.162. 
330 In the early, shorter version of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvānasūtra, the text speaks of the icchantika, 
one who is ‘incorrigible,’ or intrinsically unable to proceed upon the path to Buddhahood.  The later and 
longer version of the Mahāparinirvānasūtra, however, suggests that even the icchantika has an intrinsic 
capacity for supreme awakening (Buswell and Lopez, 504). This development occurs almost certainly as a 
result of the text’s own core epistemic commitment to the tathāgatagarbha, which purifies the text itself 
of its own initially dualistic perspective toward supposedly different kinds of beings.  The text, in this case, 
models the progress it seeks to induce in its readers. 154 
                                                        
 
Buddhas fosters a devotional epistemology, a shift that is directed toward everyone—
this is precisely the kind of loving perception that may allow ‘others,’ in turn, to begin to 
access their own transcendent capacities for compassion.  Thus, through practices of 
devotion to Buddhas, love and compassion for beings becomes more and more non-
dual; one does not merely direct compassion toward ‘self,’ or toward ‘other,’ but one is 
increasingly able to abide in the active power of the compassionate nature of mind 
beyond dualistic distinctions.331 ‘Self-compassion,’ while certainly far more skillful than 
self-aversion, may nonetheless quietly reinforce those distinctions.  For Jamgön 
Kongtrül, only the bodhisattva’s trust in his or her own true nature allows the 
bodhisattva to “attain the great love that sees oneself and all sentient beings as having 
the same nature, as being equally the absolute buddha.”332  To Drive all blames into one 
is to protect one’s foundational commitment to an increasingly nondual epistemology of 
devotion and compassion; lojong drives an increasingly expansive refuge.333 
331 “The deepest prayer of the [Kagyü] Mahamudra or [Nyingma] Dzogchen practitioner is for non-
contrived or non-conceptual devotion which, as the means of ultimate realization, is none other than self-
originated Jnana” (S.K. Hookham, The Buddha Within [Albany, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1991], p. 66). 
332 Kongtrül, 2000, p. 179. 
333 The epistemological commitment to cognizing others in their deep capacity of awakening is so 
important that multiple lojong directives seek to protect our capacity to recognize and confirm others in 
their fundamental awakened nature, chiefly through a refusal to reify others in competitive vision: Don’t 
ponder others; Don’t try to be the fastest; Don’t be jealous; Don’t seek others’ pain as the limbs of your 
own happiness; etc.  Lojong also speaks of ‘śūnyatā protection’—a directive that draws in part from 
Shantideva’s Bodhicharyāvatāra, where the principles of emptiness, non-duality, and compassionate 
power find simultaneous expression in the following lines: 
 
Whoever wishes to quickly protect 
Himself and all others, 
Should engage in the sacred secret 
Called ‘exchanging oneself for others.’  (8.120) 
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 It is also important that, among the five mistakes, we find self-contempt and 
self-cherishing together.  While this may appear at first as a contradiction, self-
cherishing is fundamentally an expression of despair; we will see in a moment that Drive 
all blames into one explicitly confronts self-cherishing as ‘the one’ that creates the 
conditions for suffering in the first place.  Self-cherishing will be spoken of as a ‘demon.’  
This is not accidental: to habitually place our hope for freedom and happiness in 
ongoing reifications of selfhood is to commit ourselves to endless cycles of advancing 
and defending that selfhood through misguided desire and anger—which harm us 
deeply even as they give us the illusory feeling of being real (one aspect of emotional 
capitalism; see Chapter 1 above).  That exhausting, damaging commitment to the reified 
self is necessarily a denial that we are capable of accessing something more. 
 The problem of ‘self-contempt’ in the Uttaratantra is not identical with the 
therapeutic discourse of shame as a form of self-hatred in modern cultures of 
performative personality.  The Uttaratantra overtly insists that ātmāvajñāna, spiritual 
self-denigration, can only be understood in relation to an ultimate telos of the human 
being—that of supreme awakening.  This is not a context or possibility that 
contemporary psychology takes seriously, which is one reason why therapeutic 
Buddhism has sought to conflate the rhetorics of soteriology and adjustment.334  We 
saw in Chapter 1 that Eva Illouz speaks of the exchange of “recognition” as a primary 
foundation for emotional-therapeutic capitalism; but this is recognition primarily at the 
This version of the stanza’s translation is used in Chökyi Dragpa, Uniting Wisdom and Compassion, trans. 
Heidi Köppl (Somerville, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 2014), p. 78. 
334 Kierkegaard speaks of ‘levelling,’ a term also applicable to therapeutic Buddhism. 156 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
level of the performative self.  Mahāyāna resources of devotion and guru yoga activate 
a different form of “recognition”: that which actively perceives and confirms others in 
their deepest capacities of compassion and freedom. This essence of the tathāgata 
within the sentient being is characterized in the Uttaratantra as 
 like the element of space; 
 it has neither causes, nor conditions, nor these in combination, 
 nor any arising, destruction, or abiding.  
     (Uttaratantra 1.62; Thrangu Rinpoche, 67) 
 
 There is nothing whatever to remove from this, 
 nor the slightest thing thereon to add. 
 truly beholding the true nature—when truly seen—[that is] complete liberation. 
     (Uttaratantra 1.154; Thrangu Rinpoche, 95) 
 
The nature of mind is both spontaneous and compassionate. Gampopa, an early 
twelfth-century commentator on Madhyamaka and Mahamudra themes, described the 
nature of mind as “self-authenticating, spontaneous and unchanging.”335 The twentieth-
century Dzogchen master Nyoshul Khenpo writes: “When one realizes the natural state, 
the true nature of all beings, there is naturally a welling up of inconceivable 
spontaneous compassion, loving-kindness, consideration, and empathy, because one 
realizes there is no self separate from others.  One then treats others just like 
oneself.”336 Longchenpa, a central fourteenth-century Nyingma scholar, noted that 
Out of this open range [i.e., the nature of mind] an impartial compassion arises, 
And the person is urged onto and engages in what is wholesome 
    both for himself and others.337 
 
335 Gampopa, The Jewel Ornament of Liberation, trans. Herbert V. Guenther (Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, 1986), pp. 214-15. 
336 Nyoshul Khenpo and Lama Surya Das, Natural Great Perfection: Dzogchen Teachings and Vajra Songs 
(Ithica, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1995), p. 120. 
337 Longchenpa, Kindly Bent to Ease Us, Part One: Mind, trans. Herbert V. Guenther (Emeryville, California: 
Dharma Press, 1975), Chapter 11, page 192. 157 
                                                        
 
Longchenpa’s close contemporary, the Jonang scholar Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (1292-
1361), interpreted the Uttaratantra and the Maitreya texts, and especially the 
Mahāyāna tathāgatagarbha sutras, as foundational teachings about what Dölpopa, for 
the first time, called shentong, or ‘other-emptiness.’338  Shentong, a unity of basic space 
and luminous awareness containing the timelessly liberated and compassionate 
capacities of the Buddha, is also ultimately empty and intrinsically purified of anything 
that is not that luminous awareness: 
…that which is primordial 
awareness of the basic space 
of phenomena is a permanent, 
unconditioned primordial awareness… 
 of natural great bliss.339 
 
What pedagogical purposes did Dölpopa have in mind?  He is most fundamentally a 
teacher and defender of refuge.  For Dölpopa, there are potential problems in the 
standard Madhymaka presentation of śunyatā as ‘emptiness of self’ (rangtong): 
“through merely knowing that things are self-empty,” writes Dölpopa, “one is not 
released,” at least not in any sense that gives access to the truly liberating qualities of 
Buddhahood.340 The doctrine of ‘other-emptiness,’ on the other hand, offers a focus for 
338  Carefully distinguishing 
 empty of self-nature and empty of other, 
 what is relative is all taught 
 to be empty of self-nature, 
 and what is absolute is taught 
 to be precisely empty of other.   —Dölpopa, Fourth Council 
 
See Cyrus Stearns, The Buddha from Dölpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dölpopa 
Sherab Gyaltsen (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2010), p. 137. 
339 Ibid, 155. 
340 Hopkins, 2006, p. 394.   Douglas Duckworth writes that for Dölpopa, “self-emptiness alone leaves one 
with ‘the extreme of non-existence,’ which is simply the lack of true identity held as a mere absence.  This 158 
                                                        
 
precisely the fundamental qualities of belief and faith 341  through which “many 
obstructions [to unconditioned awakened awareness] are purified.”342  Dölpopa directs 
the reader toward the primordially other-empty ground of awareness as itself the 
liberated and liberating essence of Buddhahood: 
Precisely that ground of emptiness 
is the sugata essence… natural luminosity, 
natural purity, primordially pristine… 
 
It is the Tathāgata free 
from the very beginning, 
initially liberated enlightened mind 
with the nature of space 
Buddha even before all the Buddhas.343 
 
For Dölpopa, the teaching of dependent co-origination or ‘self-emptiness’ cannot finally 
explain the possibility of a supreme awakening, and may detract from the depth and 
quality of Buddhist refuge that does support that awakening—a key issue in our 
examination of the meanings of Drive all blames into one.  In Dölpopa’s view, if 
dependent co-origination, or self-emptiness, were in fact the final truth of things, then 
“even final true cessations [of self-centered awareness] would not be beyond 
dependent-arisings … [and also] would not be beyond compounded phenomena, in 
is a stale negation that can ossify into a static referent of deconstruction”—i.e., a mere intellectual 
assertion without imaginative or creative power, dependent entirely upon its object critique.  See Douglas 
Duckworth, “Onto-Theology and Emptiness: The Nature of Buddha Nature,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion (2014): 6. 
341 “The exact meaning and significance of faith (Skt. sraddha) in Buddhism must be approached with 
caution. …[T]rue faith is the faculty of trust that allows one to let go into one’s experience.  Hence it leads 
to the signless liberation in which there is nothing to hold on to.  In Shentong terms, complete 
signlessness means ‘Buddhajnana’ [the wisdom or nondual perception of the Buddha].  Therefore, a clear 
connection between faith and Jnana [awakened perception] is indicated here” (Hookham, 57). 
342 Hopkins, 2006, p. 396. 
343 Stearns, 169. 159 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
which case they would most absurdly have the attributes of impermanence, falsity, and 
deceptiveness and would not be final sources of refuge.”344 
 That is, whatever is only dependently and ephemerally arisen cannot be a stable 
basis for either a sustained full awakening or a sustainable refuge.  Only a refuge in what 
is finally absolute can allow for the ongoing origination of Buddhas through the 
spontaneous manifestation of an unconditioned, primordial awareness—and this is why 
the teaching of the primordially creative power of other-emptiness, or Buddha Nature, 
as a focus of refuge, is so important.  For instance: will our recognition of fault turn us 
only toward the basic emptiness of that fault as an action that is dependently co-
originated?  Or can the recognition of fault also turn us, simultaneously, toward refuge 
in the nature of mind itself, so that we are aware not only of the contingent, 
dependently arisen nature of defilements or faults, but are also empowered to rely 
upon an unconditioned source or ground of primordial wisdom and compassion? 
 This is one among many practical questions at stake in Dölpopa’s thought.  He 
distinguishes between two different forms of origination—the dependent origination of 
the Madhyamaka ‘self-empty’ position, and the spontaneous origination of 
unconditioned primordial awareness of the ‘other-empty’ position, without dismissing 
either.345 This is the integrative position that Dölpopa calls Great Madhyamaka—a 
344 Hopkins, 2006, p. 399. 
345 “[I]t is now clear that Dölpopa was not simply setting up the viewpoints of an emptiness of self-nature 
and an emptiness of other as opposed theories located on the same level.  He obviously viewed the pair 
as complementary, while making the careful distinction that the view of an ‘emptiness of other’ applied 
only to the absolute and an ‘emptiness of self-nature’ only to the relative” (Stearns, 3).  The notion that 
Dölpopa was an opponent of Madhymaka understanding is an anachronistic projection of Tsong Kha Pa’s 160 
                                                        
 
‘middle way’ between the possible extremes of rejecting either shentong or 
rangtong.346  Dölpopa’s shentong position was roundly rejected by Je Tsong Kha Pa 
(1347-1419), founder of the Geluk order, who gave rangtong Madhyamaka texts pride 
of place in the powerful Geluk monastic curriculum.347 But Tsong Kha Pa’s rejection of 
Jonang shentong views348 does not mean that we should anachronistically interpret 
Jonang scholars and practitioners as opponents of ‘self-emptiness.’  The point, instead, 
is that if we fail to differentiate the conditioned (rangtong) processes of consciousness 
from pervasive unconditioned reality (shentong), we will fail to rely upon that 
unconditioned awakened wisdom as it genuinely exists in and through beings.349 
opposition between rangtong and shentong views back into prior texts by Dölpopa himself, for whom 
those views are distinguished, but not opposed. 
346 Douglas Duckworth writes, “The statement that other-emptiness incorporates relative phenomena as 
empty of their own essences is a crucial point.  Without explicitly affirming such emptiness, the traditions 
of other-emptiness risk becoming characterized as accepting a naïve metaphysical realism that conflicts 
with a Buddhist view, particularly the view of emptiness as expressed in the middle wheel of doctrine” 
(Duckworth, 2008, p. 62). 
347 The Gelukpas have thus far most directly influenced the Western academic reception of Tibetan 
Buddhism.  This has to do in part with the political-institutional prominence of the Geluk order, which was 
reconstituted in India following the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and which was available (and able to render 
its texts available) to Western scholars in ways that other Tibetan traditions could not approximate. 
Refined Geluk anthropological, epistemological, and logical doctrines invite secular and safe academic 
philosophical engagements, whereas it is difficult to pursue an understanding of Nyingma and Kagyü 
traditions without also attending to ritual and devotional practices both within and beyond the texts of 
those traditions.  It is also the case that Geluks themselves strongly suppressed shentong texts and 
understandings starting in the seventeenth century (Stearns, Introduction).  S.H. Hookham writes, 
“Gelugpas have already produced far more published works in Western languages on Buddhism and 
Madhyamaka than any of the other Tibetan traditions.  It is important that readers in the field be alerted 
to this and that it become common knowledge that, although an initial impression might suggest the 
Gelugpa is the most orthodox of the Tibetan traditions, in fact the reverse is true.  The Nyingma, Kagyü, 
and Sakya traditions are older and have stronger links with their Indian forbears than the relatively late 
Gelugpa” (17). 
348 “Simply put,” writes Douglas Duckworth, “the Geluk school explains the relationship between [śunyatā 
and tathāgatagarbha doctrines] in a way that inverts the Jonang school’s interpretation of the import of 
these teachings, and emptiness as absence of essence is held to be the ultimate truth rather than the 
immanent ground of wisdom that is buddha-nature..”  See Duckworth, 2014, p. 9. 
349 Dölpopa writes, for instance, that he “cannot yield to those [Madhyamaka figures] who accept, ‘All is 
groundless’” when they fail to locate or trust in the true ground.  See Stearns, 189.  Dölpopa advised the 
physician Tsultrim Ö, to seek out practical instructions “which separate natural luminosity and the 161 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 Dölpopa’s shentong view was further refined and critiqued by the key 
nineteenth-century Nyingma and Ri-mé teacher Ju Mipam (1846-1912), for whom 
rangtong and shentong teachings are less radically separated than they had been for 
either Dölpopa or his Geluk critics.  Douglas Duckworth writes that “Rather than a 
dichotomous relationship between a separate ground of the ultimate and relative [as 
found in Dölpopa’s teaching], we can say that Mipam maintains a dialectical relationship 
between the two truths, a dialectical unity.” 350  Mipam questions whether the 
metaphysical realism of Dölpopa’s ‘other-emptiness’ can adequately represent a reality 
that is ultimately “beyond cognitive representations and linguistic constructs.”351 Rather 
than become caught between Geluk denials and Jonang affirmations of any 
metaphysical construct, Mipam proposes, instead, a unity or ‘dynamic presence’ that is 
itself, writes Duckworth, “buddha-nature, a truth [Mipam] consistently emphasizes 
cannot be objectified, for it is a unity of emptiness and appearance that constitutes a 
lived and living cognitive presence.”352  To objectify that unity, or to deny it altogether, 
is to purge buddha-nature of “its mystery or dynamic dimension, its creative potential as 
a transformative ultimate reality that is alive not (pre)determined.”353 
 On this account, importantly, buddha-nature “as a groundless ground challenges 
the mind’s tendency to pin it down. …What [Mipam] presents here as a dialectical unity 
incidental stains like separating clear water and sediment.  Without it, this incidental mind and deceptive 
mental events will be taken to be… primordial awareness… which is like taking poison to be medicine or 
taking brass to be gold” (Stearns, 109). 
350 Duckworth, 2008, pp. 80-81. 
351 Duckworth, 2014, p. 10. 
352 Ibid, 12. 
353 Ibid, 12. 162 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
of emptiness and appearance poses a challenge to the stultifying tendencies of 
monological determinism in a metaphysics that either collapses buddha-nature into a 
stagnant absence or presumes an inert, transcendent presence.” 354  Duckworth 
proposes, as a shorthand way to describe Mipam’s view, “the buddha-nature of buddha-
nature”—questioning both the Jonang romanticism of other-emptiness and potential 
Geluk ossifications of self-emptiness.  It is clear, however, that Mipam’s position is a 
dynamic vivification of Buddha Nature doctrine, which, in my view, renders Mipam 
closer to Dölpopa in his pedagogical and philosophical intent than he is to Tsong Kha Pa. 
 For our purposes, what is important is the fact that Dölpopa, as well as later 
Kagyü and Nyingma lojong commentators, all trust that we are able to access the 
omnipresent, awake, primordially pure, unconditioned and actively compassionate355 
awareness of the Tathāgata with radical directness.  It is this robust, ‘discovery model’ 
of Buddha Nature as a true reality intrinsic to all beings, which serves as a focus for 
ongoing reliance and empowerment in the pages below. 356 Without that radical 
directness of access to awakened power, Drive all blames into one becomes a teaching 
that is only about self-critique—rather than a teaching that directs us simultaneously 
toward a direct critique of the self-reifying tendencies that obscure the ground of 
354 Ibid, 13-14. 
355 “The ultimate conduct that serves as a method for achieving enlightenment is a great compassion 
intent on liberating all sentient beings from suffering and its causes.  And this ultimate compassion has a 
quintessence of nonconceptual primordial awareness…” (Stearns, 382n.444). 
356 Duckworth traces Nyingma other-empty teachings at least as far back as the Nyingma scholar Lochen 
Dharmaśrī (1654-1717), who in turn appeals to Longchenpa (1308-1364), a contemporary of Dölpopa.  
See Duckworth, 2008, Chap. 3. 163 
                                                        
 
refuge, and then also toward refuge itself in the dynamic ground of compassionate 
clarity.  Unless we drive all blames into one, we cannot rely on that which is blameless. 
 Drive all blames into one serves an important clarifying purpose.  It involves, 
first, a recognition of the process of self-grasping as ‘the one’—that which creates 
divisions between the reified, supposedly defendable self, and the reified, supposedly 
blameworthy other.  This is as far as Gelukpa commentators tend to go in their 
understanding of Drive all blames into one; there is nothing to do beyond recognizing 
one’s own self-clinging as the primary source of suffering.  From a Nyingma or Kagyü 
perspective, however, Drive all blames into one is both a critical engagement with the 
processes of suffering, while also functioning as an expression of the very 
compassionate awareness that allows us to perceive suffering in the first place.  
Nyingma-Kagyü styles of interpretation, more than Geluk, will understand Drive all 
blames into one not only as a recognition of the pain-producing mistake of reifying the 
faultless self and the contemptible other (even self-hatred is structurally the hatred of 
another), but also as a reliance on primordial awakened awareness itself. 
 In a situation of lovelessness or despair, which is the situation of personality 
culture, it is tempting to attempt to feel more real through depression or rage, aversion 
toward either self or other.  Is there, finally, anything more real?  To Drive all blames 
into one is in some way to be turned back toward the ground and source of awareness 
itself; it is an act of compassion and refuge in sources of perception beyond aversion. 
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3.6  DRIVE ALL BLAMES INTO ONE 
 
 Lojong instructions are rooted in the oral pith teachings of the early Kadampas—
eleventh-century teachers who reintroduced Indian Buddhist teaching into Tibet 
following a period of significant decline in patronage and practice.  The origins of lojong 
teaching are particularly associated with the first of the Kadam masters, Atiśa 
Dīpamkara of Vikramaśīla Monastery in Northern India.357  Atiśa, yielding finally to 
several requests from the King of Western Tibet, Yeshe Od, crossed the border from 
Nepal into Tibet in 1042, at the age of 60.  He would teach for another 13 years, passing 
on oral lojong teachings to several disciples, including Dromtönpa, a figure we will meet 
again in the pages below.358 Thupten Jinpa writes, 
It does appear that Atiśa never actually explicitly authored a mind training 
[lojong] text in the sense of a coherently organized work.  These lines are most 
probably based on spontaneous instructions that Atiśa gave to different 
individuals on numerous occasions and that were later compiled by various 
teachers into oral transmissions so that they would not be lost.  Their origin in 
oral transmissions is evident from their brevity and vernacular style.  It is 
perhaps also due to this oral origin that so many redactions of the root lines 
came about, some of which do not demonstrate any familiarity with the 
others.359 
 
 Drive all blames into one is the twelfth of the fifty-nine interrelated lojong 
directives systematized by Geshe Chekawa Yeshe Dorje (1101-1175), a century after the 
initial introduction of Kadam teaching in Tibet. Chekawa avidly sought instruction in 
lojong after an encounter with the striking Kadam lojong instruction, ‘Take all defeat 
357 Thupten Jinpa, Mind Training: The Great Collection (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2006), 
Introduction. 
358 For a particularly good summary of the initial Kadampa transmission of lojong teaching in Tibet, see 
Glenn Mullin’s introduction to the lojong commentary authored by Gyalwa Gendun Druppa, the first Dalai 
Lama, in the 15th century: Training the Mind in the Great Way (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 
1993), pages 17-38. 
359 Jinpa, 2006, p. 11. 165 
                                                        
 
upon oneself; give all victory to others’—a line found in the early 8-stanza versification 
of lojong composed by Langri Thangpa (1054-1123).360  And while Chekawa’s later 
systematization of fifty-nine lojong directives under seven thematic headings, or ‘points’ 
has remained a particularly prominent organization of lojong teaching, lojong is more 
accurately a broader collection of attitudes, motivations, and directives that have been 
presented in various forms, but are always intended to support the basic altruistic heart 
of awakening: bodhicitta.361 
 In order to reveal basic relationships between lojong teachings themselves, on 
the one hand, and fundamental Mahāyāna teachings on compassion and wisdom, on 
the other hand, lojong commentaries have sometimes functioned as highly curated 
anthologies of related Buddhist literatures.  It is possible to see this anthological practice 
from the first lojong commentaries, including that of Sé Chilbu Chökyi Gyaltsen, one of 
Chekawa’s students, who draws from Shantideva in particular, but also prior lojong 
teachers and treatises.362 Chökyi Dragpa (d. 1908), a student of the Ri-mé Nyingmapa 
Patrul Rinpoche (1820-1892), exemplifies this anthological practice in his commentary 
on the Thirty-Seven Practices of a Bodhisattva, a classic lojong text composed by Gyalse 
360 Langri Thangpa shorter verse recension of lojong is a more succinct, easily memorized summary of the 
fundamental perspectives of lojong.  This verse prayer, however, is not so susceptible to extended 
commentary as is Geshe Chekawa’s seven-point organization of lojong teaching, and has less often been a 
focus of scholastic attention.  Langthangpa’s nickname, ‘ever-weeping,’ may suggest a point of similarity 
between the effects of lojong practice and the effects of penthos among the Desert Fathers, discussed in 
the next chapter.  Thupten Jinpa writes of lojong as “a kind of metanoesis”; metanoia is a basic focus of 
these pages as well (see Jinpa, 2006, p. 2). 
361 Jinpa, 2006, p. 7.  Also Mullin, 1993, pp. 17-38.  Jinpa writes, “Almost all Tibetan sources agree that 
Langri Thangpa, and later Chekawa, were responsible for bringing the ‘secret’ mind trainings teaching into 
the wider public domain” (Jinpa, 2006, p. 11). 
362 Sé Chilbu Chökyi Gyaltsen, “A Commentary on the Seven-Point Mind Training,” in Jinpa, 2006. 166 
                                                        
 
Togme (1295-1369). 363 Zhechen Gyaltsab (1871-1926), a student of both Jamgön 
Kongtrul and Ju Mipam, reproduces extensive passages from Shantideva, Asanga-
Maitreya, Atiśa and other Indian Mahāyāna figures in his early-twentieth century work 
on lojong.364 The lojong commentarial process often involves a careful synthesis of 
fundamental Mahāyāna texts. 
 Lojong teachings demand and presume a context of interpretation. The 
teachings themselves, although offering a “highly practical approach” to the cultivation 
of compassionate awakening from one perspective,365 actually combine directness with 
a certain invitational abstraction (see the story of Chekawa’s encounter with ‘Take all 
defeat upon oneself,’ above).  Lojong asks the student to recall this doctrinal 
background in order to inform a process of developing counterintuitive skills of practical 
wisdom.  In this sense, lojong may function in part as a mnemonic for an entire lineage 
of teachings.  For instance, the lojong directive “Be grateful to everyone” takes on a 
range of meanings for teachers who accept tathagatāgarbha texts as ultimate or 
definitive.  In those communities, all persons are potentially objects of devotion in their 
deepest human nature, or Buddha Nature—a devotion that is one potential meaning of 
“Be grateful to everyone.”  The same teaching may appear to another person as an 
impossible and even dangerous naïveté. 
363  Chökyi Dragpa, Uniting Wisdom and Compassion: Illuminating the Thirty-Seven Practices of a 
Bodhisattva, trans. Heidi I. Köppl (Somerville, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 2014). 
364 Zhechen Gyaltsab Padma Gyurmed Namgyal, Path of Heroes: Birth of Enlightenment Volumes 1 and 2, 
trans. Deborah Black (Oakland, CA: Dharma Press, 1995). 
365 Jinpa, 2006, p. 4. 167 
                                                        
 
 We are told to offer gratitude to those who seem at first to cause pain, but who 
may perfectly illumine our own self-concern.  The instruction to “Always meditate on 
whatever provokes resentment” similarly reverses the natural habit of avoiding the 
unpleasant, in order to help us identify those situations in which we most regularly seek 
our own self-protection.  These teachings, including Drive all blames into one, dare and 
require us to ask: why do this strange thing, and on what authority?  Lojong instructions 
do not simply or unambiguously stand on their own; they tend to induce inquiry. 
 Once memorized and internalized within a particular lineage of understanding, 
lojong directives emerge in unexpected ways across a range of life-situations, and this 
mysterious active quality of the lojong phrases themselves is also worth brief mention 
here.  The directives seem to arise from a way of perceiving that is beyond normal 
discursive habits, and though rooted in a total philosophical vision, lojong teachings may 
be thought of as a set of attitudinal guideposts marking a path out of habitual self-
concern.  In some sense, however, they are guideposts that come looking for you, rather 
than the other way around. 
 Lojong directives might be initially illuminated in part through brief comparison 
to the koans of Rinzai Zen. 366  One of the better-known koans directs the Zen 
366 Norman Fischer makes the same general point very briefly at the outset of Training in Compassion: Zen 
Teachings on the Practice of Lojong (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2012).  Fischer writes that 
“Although the Indo-Tibetan practice of slogans is perhaps more psychological and intentional than [Koan 
practice], it is in its essentials quite similar” (Introduction, p. xviii).  I disagree that lojong is more 
‘psychological’; the lojong slogans point immediately beyond the instrumental psychological reason that is 
arguably the default epistemological perspective for most human beings.  Koans disrupt our normal habits 
of instrumental reason, so that a new form of openness, awakening, or kensho may arise.  Lojong, 
alternatively, begins from an experience of basic openness, and seeks to actively cultivate compassion 168 
                                                        
 
practitioner to seek his ‘original face,’ prior to all births.  One of the first lojong 
teachings in both the early annotated version of the Root Lines and in Chekawa’s seven-
point architecture likewise asks us to ‘examine the nature of unborn awareness.’367  
Lojong and Rinzai koans both seek to invoke a new access to awakened perception prior 
to all conceptualization.  Candrakīrti writes: “Suchness is unborn, and mind itself is also 
free from birth; and when the mind is tuned to this, it is as though it knows the ultimate 
reality.”368  
 Lojong begins with precisely the wisdom of suchness that is also its intended end 
or fruit; it is easy to see, therefore, why questions about the ‘basis’ for practice, whether 
emptiness of intrinsic identity, or pristine nature of mind, will matter a great deal to 
different lojong interpreters.  One stream of early lojong interpretation, the ‘northern 
lineage’ of Radrengpa (fourteenth-fifteenth c.), understood the lojong instruction “Place 
your mind on the basis of all, which is the actual path” as an instruction about 
emptiness of intrinsic identity, while Gyalse Togme (see above; a near-exact 
contemporary of Dölpopa) and the ‘southern lineage’ of lojong teaching understood the 
same line to refer to “uncontrived natural mind.”369 Despite such differences and their 
implications for refuge and practice, it should be clear that lojong, from either basic 
perspective, is something more than a psychological intervention. 
from within that experience of interdependent openness or wisdom.  Both forms of practice are founded 
on faith. 
367 The annotated Root Lines, unlike Chekawa, ask us to ‘experience’ unborn awareness (Jinpa, 2006, p. 
75). 
368 Chandrakīrti, Madhyamakavātāra 11.13, p. 106. 
369 Jinpa, 2006, p. 12.  Interestingly, the line itself does not appear in the Root Lines on lojong attributed to 
Atiśa. 169 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 While most previous lojong commentaries have offered relatively short 
discussions of each lojong ‘slogan’370 in a defined sequence, this commentarial practice 
has certain weaknesses, if it leads to a limited engagement with each slogan, rather than 
a depth of overall investigation (some lojong commentators have adopted an 
anthological method in order to address the same issue).  This commentary focuses in a 
sustained way on a single lojong teaching—Drive all blames into one—but shows how 
that particular teaching is deeply interwoven with a range of other lojong teachings.  
Focusing more intensively on a single lojong directive in this way may in fact offer an 
unexpected opportunity to articulate the deepest intentionality of the lojong teachings 
as a whole.371 
 While drive all blames into one may initially appear to some readers to foster 
precisely the sort of damaging self-aversion already discussed in previous chapters, drive 
all blames is in fact a fundamental reversal of aversion—perhaps a more direct reversal 
than autonomous self-compassion can be.372  In fact, the emphasis on ‘self-acceptance’ 
may impede the possibility of any fuller liberation, in as far as self-acceptance subtly 
370 This is not, in my view, the word that best describes how lojong teachings are used—or how we 
become capable of being formed by the teachings themselves. 
371 It is possible to imagine a series of extended lojong commentaries that begin from a single teaching, 
and then weave the other directives into that foundational teaching as the main ‘body’ of the work.  This 
may create a richer commentarial approach than much briefer explications of one teaching at a time, and 
would more creatively acknowledge the intertextual richness within lojong.  Lojong teachings may more 
thoroughly interpret one another than most commentators have so far suggested. 
372 This will be particularly true wherever self-compassion is used to combat the ‘problem’ of aversion, so 
that self-compassion itself becomes a subtle expression of dualistic intentionality.  An important question, 
clearly, is how Drive all blames into one can be anything but a similarly dualistic expression of aversion to 
aversion.  The irony embedded in Drive all blames into one (an irony at the heart of lojong’s invitational 
strategy) is that the ‘one’ does not ultimately exist, whereas the compassionate ‘driver’ does.  For 
teachers of self-compassion, the self does appear to exist in a fundamental way, and there is no access to 
compassion from beyond that limited existence. 170 
                                                        
 
confirms the perspective of autonomy itself.  Self-acceptance is in some sense a return 
to the style of achievement that successive Mahāyāna teachings, particularly the 
prajñāpāramitā and tathāgatagarbha texts, vigorously critique.  Religious forms of 
metanoia or self-evaluation, on the other hand, integrate us into a reality that is more 
real—to invoke a shentong sensibility—than the realities we create for (and as) 
ourselves.  This transcendent integration diverges from modernist emphases on the 
autonomous achievement of self-acceptance: religious self-critique is chiefly a form of 
receptivity to, and then rest within, that which transcends our more limited conditioning. 
 In Chekawa’s seven-heading systematization of lojong, the very first teaching is: 
First train in the preliminaries.  And while this simple directive encompasses the full 
range of ngöndro foundational practices,373 the central Ri-mé figure Jamgön Kongtrul 
373 The ngöndro is composed of six aspects: “the four thoughts which turn the mind from samsara; taking 
refuge; the generation of bodhicitta; the purification through Vajrasattva; offering of the mandala; and 
finally, Guru Yoga.”  See Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, Guru Yoga According to the Preliminary Practice of 
Longchen Nyingtik (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1999), p. 30.  The four thoughts which turn 
the mind from samsara are: the nearness and certainty of our own impermanence; the preciousness of 
human birth; the faults of cyclic existence, including greed, hatred, confusion, and the ubiquity of 
suffering; and the teaching of karma, or the relationship between cause and effect in practice.  Refuge 
involves “Going for refuge to the Three Jewels—Buddha, his Doctrine [Dharma] and the Spiritual 
Community [Sangha]….  The door of refuge is opened by faith” (Khetsun Sangpo Rinbochay, Tantric 
Practice in Nying-Ma, trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins, co-ed. Anne Klein [Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion 
Publications, 1982], p. 113).  Generating bodhicitta has three elements: “training in the attitudes of the 
four immeasurables, generating an altruistic aspiration to highest enlightenment and the precepts for so 
doing” (ibid, 125).  Vajrasattva purification involves a confessional practice which, in order to be effective, 
“must possess four powers.  The first is that of the object or base, which is the being to whom you 
confess—in this case Vajrasattva.  The second power is a strong sense of contrition and dissatisfaction 
with whatever misdeeds you have done in the past.  The third is an aspiration towards restraint, a strong 
intention to avoid repeating the deeds in the future.  The fourth is to apply an antidote to what you have 
misdone” (ibid., 142).  The offering of mandala is a ritual process of generosity toward infinite Buddhas 
and bodhisattvas, using both imagination as well as physical representations of the mandala for the 
making of offerings to those awakened and empowering beings (ibid., 155).  One can quickly see even 
from this brief overview that the ngöndro already express the themes of both critical self-evaluation and 
deep refuge.  Finally it should be noted that Guru Yoga itself encompasses the other ngöndro, and 
functions as both a source of empowerment and as a foundation for self-critical purification (Dilgo 
Khytense Rinpoche, p. 48).  In a sense, therefore, Drive all blames into one is a practice driven by the 171 
                                                        
 
gives particular importance to guru yoga as a primary groundwork for all further lojong 
practice.  “It is important,” writes Kongtrul, “to begin every period of meditation this 
way”—that is, by imagining the guru above one’s head, and then descending into a 
pavilion of light within one’s own heart.374 
 Our own sharp cultural turn away from attitudes of submission, surrender, and 
profound reverence likely inhibit even a basic devotion to a guru as one who embodies a 
profoundly awakened power.  But such devotion, perhaps counterintuitively, turns out 
to be the indispensable ground of any creative self-evaluation.  “Of all practices,” writes 
Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, the great twentieth-century Nyingmapa teacher, “the one 
which, through its blessings, will fulfil our aims and aspirations most rapidly is guru 
yoga.  Guru yoga literally means ‘union with the nature of the guru’ and it is both the 
quintessence and the ground of all the preliminary and main practices [of the 
bodhisattva path].”375 
 Guru, a Sanskrit term meaning, simply, ‘teacher,’ takes on a range of further 
meanings in its Tibetan context, and in the Tibetan term, lama, which most directly 
translates guru.  “The lama is indeed a teacher,” writes Geoffrey Samuel, but is “also a 
human representative of Buddhahood, and a focus of devotion for his students and 
disciples, who will visualize him in the form of a Tantric deity.”376 This visualization 
allows the student access to the actualized Buddha Nature, or nature of mind, operative 
awakened power of the Guru.  Here again, refuge, purification, and insight are, as in tathāgatagarbha 
thought, not different from one another. 
374 Kongtrul, p. 8. 
375 Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, p. 29. 
376 Samuel, 13. 172 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
in the guru—which in turn confirms the student in his or her own active potentiality of 
Buddhahood, such that the ultimate guru comes to be recognized as the nature of mind 
itself. 
 Guru yoga, then, is a repeated orientation toward a power of liberation from 
beyond the limits of one’s own karmic patterning.  This is in part why it is so necessary 
that the guru be recognized as a fully awakened Buddha; it is not a conditioned kindness 
that we require, but complete liberation (guru yoga, when framed by other ngöndro 
emphasizing the four thoughts which turn the mind away from samsara, is an 
expression of what we most need to turn toward).  Guru yoga, like refuge more broadly, 
offers us the possibility of a deep alteration of our most tangled karmic compulsions.  
Kongtrul’s insistence on the importance of guru yoga as a basic frame for lojong itself, 
given to a nineteenth-century Tibetan audience, is not pro forma.  The early-twentieth-
century Nyingma master and lojong commentator Zhechen Gyaltsab provides this 
anecdote from the medieval Kadampa era: 
At one time Tonpa [Dromtönpa, Atiśa’s foremost disciple] asked Lord 
Atiśa: “There are many practitioners of meditation in Tibet.  How is that 
none of them have gained any truly special qualities?” 
Atisa replied: “All the qualities of the Great vehicle, both great and small, 
are produced by depending on the [guru].  You Tibetans, who see [gurus] 
as just ordinary beings, do not gain these benefits.”377 
 
In a series of talks given to European audiences in 1985, Gomo Tulku noted: “I have met 
many people over the years who have told me that, in spite of their having practiced 
377 Zhechen Gyaltsab, p. 51.   173                                                         
 
Dharma for quite some time, they still had not gained any realizations; from my side, I 
think the reason is a lack of guru devotion.”378 
 The lack of guru yoga means, for these pages, a lack of sustained orientation 
precisely toward the unconditioned and compassionate awareness of Buddhahood 
itself— understood as the true essence or nature of mind, imbued with those qualities 
of pervasive openness, compassion, wisdom, and clarity discussed above.379 The failure 
of guru yoga implies the prior failure of ngöndro preliminary practices that ground guru 
yoga itself; the ngöndro are precisely the structured consideration of our own samsaric 
condition as a situation of necessary reliance on a basic empowerment from beyond 
that limited conditioning.380 The ngöndro generate a renunciation of autonomy, but this 
is a renunciation that takes place necessarily within a context of refuge in the guru as 
both the embodiment and the empowerment of the student’s own compassionate 
nature of mind.381  
 Drive all blames into one is a primary expression of that refuge.  It need not be 
laden with seriousness or aversion; to put blame on one point, namely that of false self-
378 Gomo Tulku, Becoming a Child of the Buddhas: A Simple Clarification of the Root Verses of Seven Point 
Mind Training (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 1998), p. 16. 
379 As a personal aside in the midst of a larger argument, my own perspective is that traditions which 
privilege practices of devotion seem to invite persons into a kind of normalized brightness that I do not 
often find elsewhere.   
380 Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche says: “The main point is to practice the ngöndro preliminary practice in a 
genuine way.  It is the prerequisite for having a sound foundation for the main practice.  Without the 
ngöndro, the main practice will not resist deluded thoughts, it will be carried away by circumstances, it 
will be unstable, and it will not reach its ultimate goal.  It will be like building a beautiful mansion on a 
frozen lake” (74). 
381 Joe Loizzo translates lojong not as mind-training, but as mind-clearing—a translation that gestures 
skillfully toward the basic open awareness that lies beyond the deep obscuration of self-grasping.  See Joe 
Loizzo, Sustainable Happiness: The Mind Science of Well-Being, Altruism, and Inspiration (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), especially pp. 152-57. 174 
                                                        
 
cherishing, is potentially to recognize the pain but also the humor of our ignorance.  To 
Drive all blames into one does not involve any perfectionism meant to earn a love or 
compassion that cannot be earned in the first place.382 Drive all blames into one 
expresses a desire to more clearly recognize the compassion that already exists and 
empowers us; it is not an activity of an autonomous mind prior to all divine compassion, 
addressing past transgression in order to enable or force a future connectivity to love.383 
The seeking after favor through anticipatory self-criticism is the compulsive logic of 
personality culture, wherein we reform ourselves constantly in order to become what 
we feel we are not: interesting, acceptable, lovable.384 
 A particular temptation in the recent interpretation of drive all blames into one 
has been to understand the teaching in narrowly psychological or therapeutic terms—as 
382 Any Christian understanding of penance that views it as a stringent self-preparation for future grace 
will also fall well outside of the mainstream of classical Christian thought and practice, as we will see in 
the following chapter. 
383 Mahayana practitioners have often been encouraged to confront both past and future transgressions 
as a form of refuge in the basic compassionate nature of reality.  In the sixth section of the Platform Sutra, 
Huineng describes a ritual specifically for “repentance” (chanhui).  This section of the Platform Sutra 
begins with a note on the nature of mind as an expression of tathagatāgarbha teaching: “[S]ee your own 
dharmakaya, see the Buddha within your own mind”—and goes on to suggest repentance (chan) for past 
harmful action and “remorse” (hui) for future harmful action.  This future-orientation may appear strange 
or even dangerously antinomian at first: is repentance for future misdeeds an attempt to invoke 
impunity?  Instead, the focus on future action is instead a heightened moral commitment.  “Ordinary 
people are stupid and only know they should repent for their past licentiousness—they do not know they 
should feel remorse for future errors.  Because they do not have such remorse, their previous 
licentiousness is not extinguished and future errors continue to be generated.”  See John H. McRae, The 
Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (Berkeley, California: Numata Center for Publication and Research, 
2000), pp. 46-48.  Jamgön Kongtrul writes: “Right now, take on mentally all the suffering that will ripen for 
you in the future.  When that has been cleared away, take up all the sufferings of others” (17).  Isaac the 
Syrian writes: “The meaning of the word repentance, as we have learned from the true quality of things… 
[includes] also concern about protecting the future.”  See Writings from the Philokalia on Prayer of the 
Heart, trans. E. Kadloubovsky and G.E.H. Palmer (London: Faber and Faber, 1951), p. 247-48.  
384 When the Christ makes his characteristic announcement that sins are forgiven, he does not contradict 
what he and John the Baptizer have already instructed: repent, for the community of heaven has come 
near.  Repentance itself expresses a proximity to love.  It might have been said: repent, for your sins have 
been forgiven. 175 
                                                        
 
a form of autonomous action.  Norman Fischer, a Zen teacher, sees lojong as a “more 
psychological” practice than Zen, and writes that “What [drive all blames into one] is 
saying is: whatever happens, don’t ever blame anyone or anything else, always blame 
only yourself.”385  Judy Lief concurs: “This slogan is quite radical. Instead of blaming 
others, you blame yourself.  Even if it is not your fault, you take the blame.”386  
Chögyam Trungpa, Lief’s root teacher, instructed: “All the blame always starts with 
ourselves… [I]t is we who are not letting go, not developing enough warmth and 
sympathy—which makes us problematic.  …The intention of driving all blames into one 
is that otherwise you will not enter the bodhisattva path.”387 
 To redirect externalized blame, or even to be grateful particularly to those who 
provoke our aversion or resentment, is not only to recognize that we are the true 
owners of our aversive patterning, but also to genuinely value the disclosure of our 
fundamental obscurations.  Sé Chilbu, Chekawa’s student, writes that situations or 
persons who invoke our frustration “become allies in your battle against self-grasping.  
Since they are a powerful army on your side, it is inappropriate to generate anger 
toward these agents of harm; look on them instead with joy.”388  The path of the 
bodhisattva is impossible without such revealers of our habitual negativity. 
385 Fischer, p. xviii; p. 50. 
386 Judy Lief, “The 59 Lojong Slogans: Atisha’s Mind-Training Techniques,” Tricycle Magazine: accessed 
June 13, 2013 at http://www.tricycle.com/web-exclusive/train-your-mind-drive-all-blames-
one?offer=dharma.  
387 Chogyam Trunpa, Training the Mind and Cultivating Loving-Kindness, ed. Judy Lief (Boston, MA: 
Shambhala Publications, 1993), p. 43. 
388 Sé Chilbu Chökyi Gyaltsen, “A Commentary on the Seven-Point Mind-Training,” trans. Thupten Jinpa in 
Mind Training: The Great Collection (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2006), p. 102. 176 
                                                        
 
 However, to say simply that drive all blames into one is about blaming ”the” self, 
while challenging and blunt in tone, is also imprecise in a way that risks basic 
misinterpretations.  Drive all blames into one is not a mode of autonomous self-critique, 
as some contemporary teachers have suggested.389  The one into whom all blames are 
driven is not a generalized self, but has been understood, from the earliest lojong 
annotations and commentaries, as the very particular and inveterate habit of self-
reifying ignorance.390  
 This particularity of critical focus on ‘the one’—the actual process of generating 
reified selfhood—has not been strongly emphasized in modern lojong commentaries.391  
And that lack of precision may prevent a full creative engagement with the lojong 
instruction to Drive all blames into one, obscuring the way that the very recognition of 
self-grasping is in fact driven by refuge in the power and clarity of compassion itself. 
389 Some Western lojong commentators, such as those discussed in this section, have not significantly 
emphasized refuge or guru yoga as a framing context for lojong practice, perhaps because refuge is not 
always easily accessible affectively or attitudinally for Western teachers and practitioners.  It is also true 
that some Tibetan teachers, for instance Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche, within his own lojong commentary, 
have also de-emphasized refuge as a foundational framing context for lojong, perhaps in order to render 
lojong teaching more accessible to a Western audience.  Trungpa Rinpoche’s instructions on ngöndro are, 
for instance, primarily intellectual and reflective, seemingly intended to appeal to a psychologically and 
existentially oriented Western audience—precisely at the moment where psychological assumptions 
might have been usefully challenged.  The problem with such decisions, ultimately, is that the full range of 
lojong’s meanings almost certainly depend upon practices and commitments of deep refuge in the nature 
of mind, if the awareness (lo) to be trained (jong) is to be accessed in its deepest ground. 
390 The “Annotated Root Lines” notes: “Whatever undesirable events befall, banish all the blames to the 
single source, which is not others but rather self-grasping” (Jinpa, 2006, p. 76). 
391 I do wish to mention Alan Wallace’s work as an exception.  Wallace writes: “Keep in mind,” when 
considering drive all blames into one, “that we are not speaking to ourselves.  Self-centeredness is not the 
self but rather an obscuration, or affliction, of the mind.” This is a very different way of speaking than we 
hear in other contemporary commentarial investigations of Drive all blames into one. See B. Alan Wallace, 
A Passage from Solitude: Training the Mind in a Life Embracing the World (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion 
Publications, 1992), p. 70. 177 
                                                        
 
 To Drive all blames into one involves, simultaneously, a recognition of fault, 
particularly that of externalized aversion, but also a deepening reliance on the nature of 
mind as the creative power of compassionate evaluation in the first place.  This is the 
richness of the teaching that goes missing when we fail to develop precision first about 
‘the one’ and then also about the context of refuge within which Drive all blames into 
one makes its fullest sense. 
 Lief does briefly note that “It is important to distinguish this practice from 
neurotic self-blaming or the regretful fixation on your own mistakes and how much you 
are at fault.”  However, this does not result in a clear differentiation between neurotic 
self-blame, on the one hand, and a creative recognition of fault grounded in an 
awareness endowed with compassion, on the other hand.  “Instead, as you go about 
your life, you simply notice the urge to blame others and you reverse it.”392 I am 
skeptical that many students will understand how this is supposed to work, without 
simply activating patterns of destructive aversion toward self.  Fischer psychologizes the 
instruction: 
Drive all blames into one is tricky because blaming ourselves, which 
seems to be what the slogan is recommending, is not exactly blaming 
ourselves in the ordinary sense.  We know perfectly well how to blame 
ourselves.  We’ve been doing this all of our lives, it is commonplace; we 
are constantly feeling guilty about everything, and if we are not guilty, we 
are ashamed…  Drive all blames into one means that you take the full 
appreciation and full responsibility for everything that arises in your life, 
no matter whose fault it is.  This is very bad, this is not what I wanted, 
this brings many attendant problems.  But what are you going to do with 
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it?  What can you learn from it?  How can you make use of it for the 
path?”393 
 
 Asking what we might do with our own suffering and habitual externalizing is far 
more skillful than indulging in mere reactivity.  But this is also where much 
contemporary commentary on drive all blames ends.  When Drive all blames into one is 
discussed in isolation from its context of refuge in the nature of mind, it becomes too 
easy to view the teaching only in terms of its critique of externalizing aversion, without 
understanding its much more important purpose—that of re-orienting the mind to a 
fundamental refuge in its own nature, instead of the false shelter of externalizing 
aversion.    
 This is in part why the seemingly abstruse debates mentioned above about what 
it means to examine the nature of unborn awareness, or what it means to “Place your 
mind on the basis of all, which is the actual path,” end up mattering a great deal.394  
Without examining the nature of unborn awareness as the compassionate driver of 
blame, as the true agent and path of lojong, lojong teachings themselves may in fact 
become somewhat flat or merely psychological.  The contemporary Kagyü scholar Traleg 
Kyabgon articulates this connection well: “[T]he lojong teachings condemn only our 
egoistic, deluded mind, not the totality of our being.  Blaming the ego is not the same as 
blaming the whole self.  If that were all we were, then once that mind was transcended, 
we wouldn’t be able to function.  But we are also in possession of unborn awareness, or 
393 Fischer, 51-2. 
394 See Jinpa, 2006, p. 11.  See also Traleg Kyabgon, The Practice of Lojong (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Shambhala Publications, 2007), p.56: “There have been ongoing discussions about whether the phrase 
‘rest in the basis of all’ means to rest in the basic consciousness [alaya-vijñāna] or to rest in the wisdom 
consciousness [alaya-jñāna], which is the same as absolute bodhicitta or unborn awareness.” 179 
                                                        
 
Buddha-nature, and we don’t annihilate ourselves when we turn away from self-
regarding attitudes.”395 
 Where Drive all blames into one is disconnected from the nature of mind, the 
teaching is emptied of power and clarity.  Such disconnected commentarial 
engagements tend to work from the perspective of instrumental and therapeutic 
reason: What can be useful to me? 
 The driver of blame is not, in fact, the psychological self.  The question of lojong 
is instead: How can transcendent compassion—i.e., Buddhahood—make use of our 
minds and bodies? To drive all blames into one is somehow to be driven by compassion 
itself.  It is not a self-reformation.  To see this more clearly, we should also become 
clearer in our response to another question: what is the one into which all aversion 
must be driven? 
 The most direct answer to this question lies at the heart of the medieval 
anthology of Kadampa teachings called The Book of Kadam,396 which recounts a number 
of dialogues between Atiśa and his closest Tibetan disciple, Dromtönpa.  The sixth of 
these exchanges, entitled ‘How all blame lies at a single point,’ begins, perhaps 
unexpectedly, when Dromtönpa expresses a desire to better understand the twelve 
links in the chain of interdependent origination, or the mutual proliferation of reified 
vision and suffering, pratītyasamutpāda (the basic content of nirvanic insight, for both 
Pali and Mahāyāna traditions; see above).  When Dromtönpa suggests that his own 
395 Traleg Kyabgon, 91. 
396 Thupten Jinpa, trans., The Book of Kadam: The Core Texts (Somerville, Massachusetts: Wisdom 
Publications, 2008). 180 
                                                        
 
future trainees might be helped by further explanation of the difficult concept of 
dependent co-origination, Atiśa gently and ironically reduces him again to the status of 
student: 
‘I shall explain [dependent co-origination] later when we have to lift our 
robes because of muddy water.’ 
‘In that case, what is the root of bondage?’ asked Drom. 
Atiśa: ‘It is the grasping at self.’ 
‘What is the grasping at self?’ enquired Drom. 
‘This is something that wants all positive qualities for oneself alone and 
wants others alone to take on all misfortunes.’ 
‘Then please explain this in such a manner so you can say “This is self-
grasping,”’ asked Drom. 
Atiśa replied: ‘Where would we find something of which it could be said 
that “This is the reified self-grasping?”’ 
‘In that case, please explain to me how it is that [this self-grasping] wants 
everything and transfers [all] blames onto others.’ 
Atiśa replied, ‘Upāsaka, why even ask me?  This is pervasive in sentient 
beings…’ 
‘Atiśa, there are people who possess such forms of grasping?’ 
‘Where do they exist?’ responded Atiśa. 
‘They are [within] our own mental continuum,’ replied Drom. 
‘Upāsaka, what is one’s own mental continuum?’ 
‘It is that which wants everything and grasps [at it all],’ replied Drom. 
‘It is devoid of parts, and I have never seen it myself.  There is nothing 
that abides where there is nowhere to abide.  I do not know the colors 
and shapes of something with no reality…’ 397 
 
 Several important issues are raised here.  First, when asked for the most 
fundamental diagnosis of the origin of suffering, Atiśa gestures directly toward self-
grasping ignorance (Skt.: ātmagrha; Tib.: dak dzin398), but then also unexpectedly points 
397 Thupten Jinpa, trans., The Book of Kadam: The  Core Texts (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2008), 
pp. 121-22. 
398 Self-cherishing, notes Pema Chödrön, is in fact ‘the opposite of a compassionate relation with oneself.’ 
See Pema Chödrön, No Time to Lose: A Timely Guide to the Way of the Bodhisattva (Boston, MA: 
Shambhala Publications, 2005), p. 314.  More psychologically oriented Buddhist thinkers tend to equate 
the English terms self-cherishing and self-compassion in ways that ignore prior Buddhist usage.  
Christopher Germer writes, “Mindfulness says, ‘Feel the pain’ and self-compassion says, ‘Cherish yourself 181 
                                                        
 
Dromtönpa into the ungraspable quality of his own mind.  Here again, a critical 
engagement with self-grasping is contextualized, crucially, with a complementary 
teaching about the mind’s true nature.  Any portrait of Drive all blames into one 
depends on recognizing both its explicit critique of self-grasping as well as its implicit 
affirmation of qualities of empty, unobstructed awareness.  
 When we come to focus our critical attention, not on the global and 
indeterminate ‘self,’ but instead on the fearsomely destructive belief in the autonomous 
and defendable self, the recognition of the ‘one’ must take place within a broader 
vision—or it cannot take place at all.  To drive all blames into one is an integrating act of 
divine compassion itself—this is the ‘driver’ of recognition.  To drive all blames into one 
is to recognize again the conditions of suffering from the nascent perspective of 
unconditioned emptiness.  Self-grasping does not recognize itself.  It is recognized by 
compassionate wisdom.   
 When we understand drive all blames only in the indeterminate psychological 
vernacular of self-blame, we avoid any direct encounter with our hidden but absolute 
faith in autonomous selfhood.  In the discussion between Dromtönpa and Atiśa above, 
the root of all suffering depends upon an implicit belief in something that does not even 
exist.399 The autonomous self is as much the product of assertive faith as any religiosity.  
in the midst of the pain’…” (Germer, 89).  The use of ‘self-cherishing’ as a simple synonym for self-
compassion may understate the way in which human beings habitually place their own interests before 
others.  “In short, we need to understand clearly that all the different problems and sufferings that we 
experience are caused by our own self-cherishing mind” (Gomo Tulku, 26). 
399 Chekawa: “When examined, the selfhood of persons is as nonexistent as the horn of a rabbit; 
[nevertheless] it has made us suffer since beginningless time.”  See “A Commentary on the ‘Seven-Point 
Mind Training’” in Thupten Jinpa, 2012, p. 115. 182 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
It only seems to require no rituals of commitment because this faith cannot usually 
recognize itself as faith.  In fact, though, this self is deeply and compulsively embedded 
in ritualistic repetitions of other-blame and self-concern. 
 Autonomous self-compassion may, at times, provide us with the sense of safety 
necessary for an engagement with the most basic and painful processes of self-grasping 
and self-cherishing.  But such a critical confrontation with self-grasping is not in fact the 
stated purpose of self-compassion, as presented in a burgeoning contemporary 
literature. 
 Self-compassion is explicitly presented, instead, as a counter-conditioning, a 
response to the traumas of family and culture to which we are all exposed.  Self-
compassion is offered as the necessary and conditioned antidote to the conditioning of 
self-aversion.  It is also offered as an ancient soteriological path, but we have seen that 
this is an unjustified reading of early canonical and commentarial texts on metta. 
 For modernist accounts of self-compassion, the entire world must be ever a set 
of competing conditions.  And when we focus on autonomous self-compassion at the 
expense of self-evaluation, we are likely to participate in the consumption of a personal 
relief, rather than clearly facing the obscurations of self-centered aversion and self-
centered desire that prevent us from embodying the basic compassion, and accessing 
the nature of mind, that is far more real than any particular selfhood.  Access to a 
compassion beyond that of the ‘self’ requires, however, precisely the sort of 
fundamental refuge that autonomous self-compassion avoids.  To Drive all blames into 
one is to take refuge in the nature of awakened awareness: “To ‘see the face of the 183 
 
sugatagarbha [Buddha Nature],’ the ultimate reality, and to rest in it is to take 
unsurpassable refuge.”400  It is only in a context of refuge or ultimate reliance that ‘self-
blame’ can be understood not as a commitment to self-aversion, but as a recognition 
that the ultimately self-empty process of grasping takes place within an other-emptiness 
that is itself a pervasive wisdom of emptiness and compassion.  From the perspective of 
that other-empty compassionate wisdom comes a profound recognition of the ways in 
which self-aversion functions as a strategy of false self-definition and false security. 
 I have suggested above that the initial sense of discomfort among some who 
practice self-compassion may be rooted, not so much in a fear of loss and re-
traumatization, as Paul Gilbert has argued, but rather in a quiet perception that karmic 
self-conditioning alone cannot give us full access to any unconditioned source of 
compassion.  All there is, in that therapeutic world, is an endless counter-conditioning. 
 However, from an ontological perspective that explicitly privileges the open 
unconditioned nature of mind, modernist resistance to Guru Yoga and other forms of 
refuge is just one expression of a habitual misperception not of the Guru alone, but of 
mind itself.  A greater refuge would necessarily disrupt any familiar self-identity—
including, potentially, a traumatized identity.  And even if a traumatized identity is 
painful, that suffering may be strangely comfortable and familiar.401 Without confidence 
400 Kangyur Rinpoche, Treasury of Precious Qualities: A Commentary on the Root Text of Jigme Lingpa, 
trans. Padmakara Translation Group (Boston, Massachusetts: Shambhala Publications, 2001), p.143. 
401 Joe Loizzo writes, “Since much if not most of our inner lives have been spent in the myopic mode of 
self-indulgence, identified with our traumatized childhood self, completing the shift to a synoptic self and 
mature way of life requires a decisive change in our sense of identity.” (Loizzo, p. 175.) 184 
                                                        
 
that another reality exists, we are tempted to aggressively generate the feeling of being 
real through depression and anger. 
In a personality culture, self-evaluation helps us to continually construct 
ourselves in ways that are intended to invite the recognition, curiosity, approbation, and 
acceptance of others.  These are actually the only sources of acceptance in a 
psychologized ontology.  Where no unconditioned love is acknowledged or trusted, we 
must constantly condition the sources of care that do appear to exist.  That world must 
always contain an implicit threat of isolation.  One understandable result is the rise of 
perfectionist and anxious styles of self-management.  Self-criticism and judgment are 
driven by a need to prevent disconnection, because no fundamental connection to a 
compassionate reality seems to exist. 
We are left intolerably alone.  What is more, modern practices of self-acceptance 
and self-compassion often seek only a more tolerable isolation.  Paul Gilbert writes, 
“You probably want to feel loved, wanted and that you belong—all basic human wants.  
However, now perhaps we can recognize that compassion begins at home...”402 Self-
compassion is self-sufficiency.  
 To Drive all blames into one is, ironically, to participate in the direct unraveling of 
the very assumptions of autonomy that allow for the proliferation of self-aversive forms 
of blame.  This irony in response to the illusion of autonomy is an important part of the 
total meaning of lojong. 
402 Paul Gilbert, The Compassionate Mind (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, 2009), p. 320. 185                                                         
 
 It is also true that Drive all blames into one, as far as it involves a confrontation 
with the self-concerned genesis of suffering, is actually a primary complement to the 
practice of tonglen—the exchange of self and other that reverses self-concern by 
making offerings of all one’s resources and happiness to others,403 taking on others’ 
suffering in turn.  Tonglen thereby unravels precisely the autonomous self that is also to 
be ‘blamed’ for the proliferation of suffering.404 
 Here we come to something curious.  In the Root Lines attributed to Atiśa, the 
lojong practitioner is advised to “Commence the sequence of taking from your own 
self.”405 This instruction, which initially resembles a limited self-compassion (though 
already implicitly directed toward compassion for others), disappears from the 
Annotated Root Lines, and is also absent from the seven-point systematization of 
Chekawa.  For Chekawa, tonglen is instead enjoined without any reference to which self 
should be taken as a primary object: “Train in the two—giving and taking--
alternately.”406 
 How, then, are we to explain this apparent movement away from anything 
resembling autonomous self-compassion, in these earliest recensions of lojong?  One 
403 Again, such that others are viewed and confirmed in their fundamental awakened identity, and so that 
the life of the bodhisattva becomes one of devotion. 
404 Unskillful and externalized blame of ‘others’ can also become, increasingly, a recognition of the ways in 
which they, too, are caught in patterns of fear and self-grasping, just as we are.  The ‘one’ need not be 
understood only as our self-grasping, but as self-grasping in a wider, more troubling, and more accurately 
shared sense.  Here again, such a recognition of the true scope of the problem of self-grasping will result 
in refuge, and refuge allows for further recognition of self-grasping, in a dialectical process of 
development. 
405 “Root Lines of Mahayana Mind Training,” in Jinpa 2006, p. 70.  Here, as in Buddhaghosa, self-
compassion is part of a sequence that guides the practitioner toward compassionate awareness for 
others.    
406 “Seven-Point Mind Training” in Jinpa 2006, p. 83. 186 
                                                        
 
answer may be that, for Chekawa and other early lojong commentators, their 
increasingly explicit instructions on the nature of mind or ultimate bodhicitta, guiding 
practitioners toward rest in the natural state of compassion itself, rendered an initial 
foundation of self-oriented tonglen less necessary as a primary point of entry into 
compassion.  In fact, these early commentators may have intensified ultimate bodhictta 
as a framework for tonglen in part so that the individual self would not become the core 
focus of practice.407 
 The instructions that point the practitioner into ultimate bodhicitta—examine 
the nature of unborn awareness; place your mind in the basis of all, the actual path—do 
not, importantly, contravene the self-compassion of relative bodhicitta.  Nobody is 
saying that compassion for self is somehow against the rules.  But it is clear that these 
framing instructions do not privilege autonomous self-compassion as a primary 
foundation for the training of the bodhisattva.  Lojong teachings are dedicated, instead, 
to a compassion that is given far more to an increasingly nondual recognition of 
emptiness, so that no limited self or other can be upheld as more worthy than 
another.408 Tonglen, a definitive practice of relative bodhicitta, is nonetheless grounded 
in, and moves back toward, ultimate bodhicitta as the source of the worthiness of all 
beings.   
407 To focus too consistently on one’s own self as somehow in ‘need’ of compassion, as if we will be okay 
only after receiving enough, may express a subtle lack of trust or refuge in the nature of mind, or 
Buddhahood. 
408  And if there is no subject suffering, 
Mine and other’s pain—how are they different? 
Simply, then, since pain is pain, I will dispel it. 
What grounds have you for all your strong distinctions? 
 (Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra 8.102) Shantideva, p. 124. 187 
                                                        
 
 It is certainly not the case, then, that the self’s place in a field of compassion has 
been in question in the pages above.  My concern has been, instead, to question 
whether the subtle self-reification of therapeutic self-compassion may actually obscure 
access to the much greater compassion found in the nature of mind, in the presence of 
the guru, and in a generous devotion toward all beings in their own ground as Buddha 
Nature.  Along such a path, we are integrated into an encompassing compassion, 
becoming increasingly grateful to all beings.  The importance of Drive all blames into one 
lies in its confrontation with our unwillingness to surrender ourselves to that gratitude. 
 All beings are precious.  All aversion—toward self, toward others—is a mistake. 
188 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THINK THIS NOT A DARK SAYING— 
THERAPEUTIC THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN MOURNING 
 
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
 It sometimes seems that Christian penitence can now only be the distant 
concern of the spiritual archivist.  Old languages of Christian self-evaluation fade almost 
entirely from view; they appear only occasionally as objects of cultured embarrassment. 
We have already seen that, for Nietzsche, the Christian ascetic is a figure of 
destructive judgment, converting our real human strengths into ressentiment against 
what we most truly are: instinct, desire, joy in our own cruelties.  Nietzsche inspires a 
thrilled honesty about shadows. 
In the twentieth century, the Christian theologian begins most often from a 
Nietzschean maxim: all religious self-critique is an inhumane harm.  And such habits of 
criticism must be met today with new capacities for affirmation, the courage to be: 
“Our self-acceptance is the basis of the Christian creed.”409 
Self-acceptance and repentance may be far more similar than is usually 
recognized.  But the theological centrality of repentance has been almost fully displaced 
as an explicit aspect of unfolding Christian maturity. 
Christian thinkers recognized, in the latter half of the twentieth century, that 
self-aversive shame had become a prominent focus of concern across the spectrum of 
therapeutic culture.  They sought to address themselves and their traditions to self-
409 Johannes Baptist Metz, Poverty of Spirit (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), p. 5. 189                                                         
 
aversion.  But in doing so, they understandably discarded and ignored the rich 
reflections on ‘self-blame’ that can be found in earlier Christian tradition. 
Nietzsche, it seemed, had been right about the deep negativity of the ancient 
Christian.  In order to be salvaged at all, Christian traditions would have to undergo 
therapeutic reformation in order, finally, to foster self-affirmation—to have any hope of 
competing with the therapeutics. 
  
 For Luther, a primary purpose of reformation had been precisely to purify and 
intensify repentance.  The first of the ninety-five theses is: “When our Lord and Master 
Jesus Christ said, ‘Repent’ (Matt. 4:17), he willed the entire life of believers to be one of 
repentance.”410 
The fourth thesis is this: “The penalty of sin remains as long as the hatred of self 
[odium sui], that is, true inner repentance, until our entrance into the kingdom of 
heaven.”411 That is, sin so intrinsically disorders our attitudes and conduct that even an 
abundant grace, even true inner repentance, cannot fully reorient us to ourselves in this 
life. The Kingdom of Heaven is elsewhere; here we cannot expect to avoid the necessity 
of repentance.  Odium sui is the indispensable practice of deep truth. 
In a culture of personality, however, we can only overhear this as dead language: 
Luther, gruff northern barbarian, speaking aggressive but failed oracles.  The open 
emphasis on “self-hatred” as a definitional virtue of the Christian life is exactly what 
410 Lull, p. 41. 
411 Ibid. 190 
                                                        
 
sometimes seems to empty Christian thought and practice of any humane prospect.  
These are the attitudes, it would appear, that render Nietzsche’s particular reading of 
Christian history far more than plausible.412   
 An insistence on human dignity, however, has rarely been far from Christian self-
understanding.  Take, for example, the fundamental Christological disagreements taken 
up at Nicea in 325.  In considering the apparently abstract difference between Christ’s 
likeness with God or Christ’s sameness with God, we actually confront the question of 
our own status in Christ.  Have we, or have we not, been taken into the life of shared 
love that defines the Trinity, if Christ’s place in the timeless and unconditioned love of 
the Trinity is itself questionable? 
The answers given to such questions will profoundly guide the nature of our 
devotion, and shape the nature of Christian self-perception.  (Devotion and self-
perception are strangely interwoven.)  To say, or to implicitly believe, that Jesus is 
merely ‘like’ God, is in some way to sever our own basic relationship to divinity. 
How, then, can the ultimate and intrinsic dignity of the human be reconciled 
with penitence? How could it possibly be the case that a human being is unlikely to 
increase in love—which is to say, in dignity, his true nature—apart from repentance? 
Christianity’s dual emphases on deep dignity and significant self-critique are 
inextricable from its power.  It is impossible to separate the sense of being an object of 
God’s compassionate goodness from a fundamental commitment to repentance, 
412 The fact that Luther complains about a general Christian failure to take “self-hatred” seriously enough 
is itself a challenge to Nietzsche’s own historical portrait of Christian ascetic masochism.  If Nietzsche’s 
historical vision had been correct, Luther would have been unnecessary. 191 
                                                        
 
without damaging both compassion and repentance.  This is the richer anthropological 
vision that goes missing in many current discussions of self-compassion and self-
acceptance.  It is far too easy to assume that the highest purpose of a Christian life is to 
accept oneself. 
To understand how Christian repentance came to be viewed, not as a path of 
deepened human dignity, but as a superfluous and self-denigrating mode of spirituality, 
it would be necessary to construct a modern history of repentance as it became 
distorted in at least two ways.  First, following the Reformation, repentance seems to 
have become less a form of spirituality, as Luther had clearly intended, and more a 
necessary profession of denominational belonging, as the proliferation of Christian sub-
traditions increasingly required evidence of true commitment as a guarantor of that 
belonging. 
Second, demands for repentance in both Protestant and Catholic communities, 
especially during catechetical training, was one way to satisfy ecclesial anxiety about the 
dangers of secular forms of understanding and participation, starting in the nineteenth 
century and continuing through the first half of the twentieth.  Repentance thereby 
became, in many places, a virulent and potentially destructive form of self-
justification—an extraordinary irony in the history of Christian spirituality, but one that 
influenced many of the thinkers discussed in this work, from Friedrich Nietzsche and 
James Joyce to June Price Tangney and Paul F. Knitter. 
In Christian communities, the price of belonging became severe self-critique, as a 
sign of obedience and faith—increasingly the primary Christian virtue, no longer 192 
 
subordinate to caritas.413  These distortions of repentance understandably drove many 
Christians from the churches.  The present work cannot offer anything like a full history 
of the modern distortion of repentance, but I wager that something like this narrative 
has occurred, to great theological and human loss. 
Repentance, until the rise of the therapeutic, has been precisely the category of 
insight used by Christians to confront sins of self-involvement.  Christian ‘self-blame,’ 
which is clarity regarding human imperfection within divine connection, is the opposite 
of a total self-denigration.  The inextricable connection between ‘self-blame’ and 
Christian dignity may seem to involve a monstrous and unresolvable contradiction—one 
mostly ignored by those who seek to retain Christianity’s modern moral relevance by 
emphasizing self-acceptance as a Christian virtue. 
Christianity divested of a robust vision of repentance is a Christianity without any 
vital desire for greater integration into a Trinitarian life of agape.  Penitential self-blame 
is not a destructive hatred, but an intensive form of hope, trust, and love.414 
In our attempt to glimpse more connected and creative forms self-criticism, we 
will look to a relatively distant Christian past.  In the final section of the essay, we will 
413 See Brad Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 208-209. “The most 
important social virtue among early modern Lutherans and Reformed Protestants, at every social level 
from disciplined individuals through patriarchal households to well-ordered regimes as a whole, was… not 
caritas but obedience—newly important given the sobering truth about human nature and the reality of a 
divided Christendom.” 
414 Just as, in the previous chapter, we saw that some Buddhist forms of self-evaluation focus more on the 
future than on regret—so, too, should Christian repentance be understood.  Mark the Hermit, a fifth 
century monastic theologian, writes that “the person who knows reality does not repent for things done 
or wrongs remembered; rather he confesses to God about things to come.”  Quoted in John Chryssavgis, 
“Life in Abundance: Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Repentance and Confession,” in Mark J. Boda and 
Gordon T. Smith, eds. Repentance in Christian Theology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2006), p. 213. 193 
                                                        
 
turn to several collections of teachings attributed to the desert Fathers of the fourth and 
fifth centuries, and especially to the sayings of Abba Poemen, master instructor of 
creative self-critique, in order to understand the second of the beatitudes: Blessed are 
those who mourn, for they will be comforted (Mt. 5:4). 
The sayings of the desert tradition, like the lojong directions examined in the 
previous chapter, are offered primarily in the form of short pith instructions.  The desert 
sayings are at times enigmatic and difficult.  But these teachings focus intensively on 
penitential disposition, and particularly emphasize the practice of penthos—mourning 
for our all too human turn away from God’s offer of love and ultimate salvation.   
The Desert Fathers are far more interested in the deepening cultivation of love 
than they are in any destructive self-contempt.  And like the masters of lojong, the 
Fathers cannot see self-blame apart from great gratitude.  
4.2 TRUE AND FALSE SELVES: RECENT THEOLOGIES OF SHAME 
 Contemporary pastoral theologies often assume and project an ecclesiology in 
which religious professionals, or well-informed laypeople, are in the useful business of 
healing both themselves and others with psychological expertise, religiously informed.  
Religious traditions are most relevant to the degree that they can symbolically support 
and discipline therapeutic insight—but here it is insight, and not ritual or theological 
constructions, which ultimately heals the human person.415 
415 “Lacking any external referents, any anchors in the world outside the self, such an inward search for 
sincerity is truly never-ending.  It is sincerity all the way down, which means, ironically, the never-ending 
search, all the way down, for the sincere.  Civilizations or movements with a diminished concern for ritual 
have an overwhelming concern for sincerity… [because] sincerity works as the social equivalent of the 
subjunctive [the as if imagined world].  If there is no ritual, there is no shared convention that indexes a 194 
                                                        
 
Catholic and especially Eastern Orthodox theologies have more often 
emphasized the pastoral person as an imperfect conduit of sacramental encounter.  
Liturgy and ritual, in these traditions, is far more important than any professionalized 
psychological insight, in as far as liturgy and ritual actually allow us to participate in a 
shared love. 
 It should also be said, however, that much pastoral theology is rooted in a very 
real emphasis on the encounter with suffering: “Shame is a cause of great suffering in 
human life,” writes Episcopalian priest and scholar Jill McNish.  “The idea that suffering 
has creative potential is hopeful and optimistic.  It is therapeutic for pastoral caregivers 
to set this reality before those to whom they minister…”416 However, the Christian 
choice to suffer with and on behalf of others is here quietly conflated with a far more 
individualized and psychic form of suffering. 
The Reformed theologian Lewis Smedes sees shame as “a very heavy feeling.  It 
is a feeling that we do not measure up and maybe never will measure up to the sorts of 
persons we are meant to be.  The feeling, when we are conscious of it, gives us a vague 
disgust with ourselves, which in turn feels like a hunk of lead on our hearts.”417 
possible shared world” (Adam Seligman, Robert Weller, Michael Puett, and Bennett Simon, Ritual and its 
Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity [New York: Oxford University Press, 2008], pp. 104-105).  
This never-ending search for sincere insight is reflected in a commonly endless therapeutic self-
examination. 
416 Jill L. McNish, Transforming Shame: A Pastoral Response (Binghamton, NY: Haworth Pastoral Press, 
2004), p. 3. 
417 Lewis Smedes, Shame and Grace (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 5. There are similarities 
between this view of shame as a kind of heaviness, on the one hand, and the pre-modern theological 
understanding of acedia as sin, on the other. 195 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
This self-disgust is an undeniably significant suffering, and pastoral writers like 
McNish and Smedes, among others, understand the good news of the gospel as a direct 
response to precisely that form of pain.  They have a clear vision of what is good in the 
good news: shame can be healed, either through an encounter with overwhelming 
grace, or by adopting a life that conforms to “a paradigmatic model of shame 
transformed and resurrected.”418 
This model is archetypally expressed in the life of Jesus—the one who 
successfully disengaged himself from the shaming norms of an ancient honor culture, 
and who confronted the damning power of shame through a courageous ‘descent’ and 
then an affective ‘resurrection.’  The legitimacy of pastoral theology, its disciplinary 
distinction from therapeutic psychology proper, is reinforced in part by its use of 
historical-critical scholarship into the social origins of the New Testament, as well as 
anthropological studies of myth and archetype.  Pastoral theologies rely far less, in 
general, on explorations of sacrament and ritual as important sources of transformation. 
 McNish and Smedes, as well as the challenging figure of Stephen Pattison and 
the sensitive presence of Donald Capps, all express a humane therapeutic vision.  But I 
find much contemporary pastoral-theological reflection on shame and grace to be 
strangely arid.  I will try briefly to say why. 
 
Pastoral theologians appear to address themselves primarily to institutional 
religious leaders who no longer fully trust their own teachings, apart from psychologized 
418 McNish, 204. 196                                                         
 
and anthropological interpretative strategies—but who nonetheless feel obliged to 
teach something relevant.  I will admit that this may at first seem unnecessarily harsh.  
But pastoral theology does often proceed by imposing psychological definitions on a 
vaguely religious terminology, simultaneously appealing to the prestige of tradition 
while suggesting that tradition itself is a now superseded source of relevant wisdom: “If 
we stand honestly in the godless vortex of shame [crucifixion], with as little resort as 
possible to the shame defenses, we can emerge as more authentic, more creative, more 
compassionate, more mature, and better integrated.  This is the growth that comes 
from grace.”419 
Soteriology is regularly reduced to psychological categories, with a touch of 
transcendent rhetoric.  Grace is also easily understood as the affective relief that is 
supposed to come at the end of the process of transformation, rather than the 
foundation of the entire process. 
It hardly occurs to us at first to object that grace has little to do with the 
betterment of selves.  Classically understood, grace is the shared life of the Trinity as it is 
given out in agapic love to creation itself—which may seem tiresomely formal and 
abstract to some.  The point of participating in such love is not, primarily, to feel a 
certain way, or to be ‘more’ of anything, but to give ourselves away—to expend our 
energy, care, and time on behalf of others. 
Where grace is conceived as an expression of psychological health, a normative 
pattern of self-affirmation is quietly held up as the authoritative standard of real 
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religious experience.  A common and encompassing grace gives way to private and very 
limited achievement. 
One particularly significant temptation of pastoral theology is to ‘prescribe’ a 
powerful experience, a melodramatic grace, as a conversion to self-acceptance.420  An 
abundant grace, however, is not simply or immediately accessible; we are too 
thoroughly conditioned by sin, and therefore highly practiced at overlooking the 
abundance of love that is offered. 
The figure of Jesus is quickly subsumed as an illustration of psychodynamic 
theory.  Jesus is most useful as a template for achieving health: “In the full acceptance 
of who he was, Jesus is the archetype of personality integration.” 421  Pastoral 
theologians regularly turn to Carl Jung, for whom the figure of Jesus “became a sacred 
symbol because it is the psychological prototype of the only meaningful life, that is, of a 
life that strives for the individual realization—absolute and unconditional—of its own 
law.”422  This is Jesus as the original representative of absolute and literal autonomia. 
Such archetypes are ciphers.  They are easily collapsed into modernist visions of 
personality development, and are sometimes aggressively ignorant of the most basic 
Christian vision of Christ as the one in whom God’s self-emptying and agapic kenosis 
420 See, in particular, Smedes, Chapter 13, in which a prisoner’s extraordinary deliverance from the 
suffering of solitary confinement is set forth as a paradigm of grace.  The thirst for what is extraordinary 
should be suspect, however, wherever self-aversion is concerned.     
421 Brennan Manning, A Stranger to Self-Hatred: A Glimpse of Jesus (Denville, NJ: Dimension Books, 1982), 
p. 99. 
422 Carl Jung, “The Development of Personality,” in Collected Works, Volume 17 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1954), p. 181.  Quoted in McNish, p. 16.  Jung may have wished to enable real religious 
commitment, but his own work actually inverts his religious intention.  The archetype is for our use.  
Religions ask us to consent to being used by something else.  Jung insists on autonomy (see quote in text), 
resisting a far more religious heteronomy. 198 
                                                        
 
becomes fully visible and trustworthy.423 (We will have more to say about kenosis and 
willfulness below.)  The therapeutic archetype of Jesus is infused with romantic 
individualism. 
“For me to be a saint means to be myself,” writes Thomas Merton.  “Therefore 
the problem of sanctity and salvation is in fact the problem of finding out who I am and 
of discovering my true self.”424 Richard Rohr, perhaps Merton’s most direct and self-
consciously rhetorical heir,425 writes that “Your True Self is what makes you, you.”426  
423 Philippians 2.  Paul’s kenotic reflection quotes a hymn, which is to say, a core communal celebration of 
kenosis.  Kenosis is not a Pauline rhetorical convention or invention, but fundamental theology in the 
earliest ecclesial communities. 
424 Thomas Merton, New Seeds of Contemplation (New York: New Directions Books, 2007 [1962]), p. 31.  
In the first, 1949 version of the book, Merton was already using the categories of the true and false self 
(see p. 28 of Seeds of Contemplation).  In 1960, the psychoanalytic theorist D.W. Winnicott reflected at 
length on the increasing clinical use of the categories of ‘true’ and ‘false’ selves, whose origins he located 
in the early work of Freud.  See D.W. Winnicott, "Ego distortion in terms of true and false self" (1960), in 
The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional 
Development (New York: International UP Inc., 1965), pp. 140-152.  It is unclear to me how the 
therapeutic vocabulary of ‘true’ and ‘false’ selves came to be used almost simultaneously by both Merton 
and Winnicott.  It is also important to note that Winnicott’s work often constitutes a fierce defense of the 
autonomous self—the notion of the ‘false’ self is already a direct attack on socialized and supposedly 
‘compliant’ personality.  The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has written that, “All his life Winnicott was 
obsessed with the freedom of the individual self to exist defiantly, resisting parental and cultural 
demands, to be there without saying a word if silence was its choice.” (See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Dr. 
True Self: Review of Winnicott: Life and Work by F. Robert Rodman,” The New Republic, Oct. 27, 2003.)  
Walter Susman’s “Character Culture” can only appear, from the perspective of the therapeutic, as a 
conspiracy of ‘false’ compliance. 
425 Merton, more than Rohr, usefully complicates the language of ‘true’ self: “Love is my true identity.  
Selflessness is my true self” (New Seeds, 60).  Still, the metaphor of ‘self’ is imprecise in the extreme when 
considered as ‘true,’ and easily comes to imply an individualism that earlier Christian tradition cannot 
support (please see footnote immediately following). 
426 Richard Rohr, Immortal Diamond (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013), p. 17. In more than one book, 
Rohr uses these lines from Gerald Manley Hopkins’s “As Kingfishers Catch Fire”—lines which are beautiful 
but which demand a more robustly theological reading than they are usually given: 
 
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; 
Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells. 
Crying: “What I do is me: for that I came.” 
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For Donald Capps, the most direct liberating word that Jesus offers to the shamed is, 
“Have faith in yourself.”427 
The now widespread rhetoric of ‘true’ and ‘false’ selves is both understandably 
attractive and insidiously dubious.  In some of the most theologically central sections of 
the New Testament, Paul speaks not of ‘true’ and ‘false’ selfhood, but of a necessary 
Christian passage from an old to a new self: “You used to walk in these ways [of 
negativity], in the life you once lived.  But now you must also rid yourselves of all such 
things as these: anger, rage, malice, slander, and filthy language from your lips.  Do not 
lie to each other, since you have taken off your old self with its practices and have put 
on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator.  Here 
there is no Gentile or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or 
free, but Christ is all, and is in all” (Col. 3:7-11).     
Rohr approvingly notes that Hopkins’s vision of individualized affirmation is inspired in part by the 
medieval Franciscan scholar, John Duns Scotus, for whom, as Rohr writes, “each soul has a unique 
‘thisness’ (haecceity)” (Rohr, 18).  It is very possible, however, to see the thought of Duns Scotus as 
something less wholesome.  Hans Boersma writes, “With Scotus, we might say, it became possible to deny 
the sacramentality of the relationship between earthly objects and the Logos… No longer did earthly 
objects (as sacramentum) receive the reality (res) of their being from God’s own being.  Rather, earthly 
objects possessed their own being.”  See Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a 
Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011), p. 75.  
427 Capps, 161, 163.  In The Depleted Self, Capps, like Rohr, launches a bold therapeutic defense of 
ontological individualism.  Capps appeals in particular to the most eloquent modern spokesman of 
haecceity, Ralph Waldo Emerson.  For Emerson, writes Capps, “Hope comes from knowing that we are 
free to be original, that we need follow no model or form, but may be the self that we uniquely and truly 
are. …We have been bequeathed a soul that is not of our own making, but is the very spirit of God within 
us.  If we are unaccustomed to viewing ourselves as having divinity in us, this is because we have denied 
common humanity while ascribing divinity to Jesus. …Emerson is arguing, therefore, that expressive 
individualists like himself did not declare war on the churches—the communities of memory—but rather 
found that the churches were inhospitable to those whose most urgent and pressing spiritual need was to 
regain selfhood, to discover or rediscover grounds for self-trust” (114).  Emerson was perhaps Nietzsche’s 
most central inspiration, and the Duns Scotus–Emerson–Nietzsche intellectual trajectory of romantic 
individualism is profoundly anti-institutional.  The sacrament of individuality has been delivered to us 
each; why come together to receive anything more? 200 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 Note, however, that individual identities are not at all confirmed here.  Paul’s 
words actually better resemble the Heart Sutra’s relentless apophasis of identity.  In 
fact, Paul proposes an epistemology in which we see, not ourselves, but others, from 
within a new access to love.  The metaphor of the ‘new self’ points us not toward self-
acceptance, but toward repentance, and this is very explicit: we can only come to more 
fully participate in kenotic love by giving up the cold comforts of malice and rage. 
Paul offers no therapeutic exhortations.  To suggest that he points us toward a 
‘true’ self, whose salvation is to therapeutically recognize its own particular identity as 
beloved, is to confound any reasonable reading of Paul, for whom the sense of a 
separate identity is given up in Christ—the body that is present only when shared. 
Much of the rhetoric of the ‘true’ self advances a subtle reification of selfhood, 
claiming the True as a thing, and as a thing that is completely our own.428 This is 
explicitly a strategy of reversing self-aversive shame: “Once you know [divine intimacy 
with the True Self], the problem of inferiority, unworthiness, or low self-esteem is 
resolved from the beginning and at the core.”429 If only you would just see yourself 
differently, you could see yourself differently. 
428 Rohr speaks of a divinely given “brilliance that is now uniquely ours [ital. original]” (26).  And he 
consistently but very mistakenly recruits Buddhist categories to support ‘True Self’ theory: “Master 
teachers like the Buddha see the False Self courageously; they forthrightly call it ‘emptiness’ and the True 
Self ‘enlightenment.’  Knowledge of your True Self gradually places your life in a big and ever bigger 
frame” (31-2).  There are a number of very basic problems with such rhetoric.  We will mention just two: 
first, ‘emptiness,’ in Buddhist thought, must apply to both the False and the True Selves; and second, the 
Buddha explicitly rejects the Brahmanic metaphor of atman (selfhood) as a synonym for ultimate reality 
precisely because metaphors of self so often lead to subtle but mistaken perceptions of identity. 
429 Rohr, 15. 201 
                                                        
 
The self-reification at the heart of the therapeutic insight into the True Self 
simply flips the valence of self-reification from negative to positive, rather than 
unraveling the inherently unstable habit of self-reification altogether.  Christ nowhere 
encounters persons as reified objects. 
Even Winnicott suggests that the False Self is actually a series of attempts to 
render a world of personal affect safe enough for the emergence of a True Self.  It might 
even be said that the False Self is the necessary seed of the True for most of us, and 
therefore intensely true and important itself.  By recognizing our own natural strategies 
of self-protection, we slowly develop the resources of compassion necessary to care for 
all who live within those very same strategies.  To understand these patterns in terms of 
‘true’ and ‘false,’ however, risks the reification of a duality that doesn’t actually exist.  
We should be extremely concerned to meet any self-proclaimed True Selves. 
Lewis Smedes has written that, “In a Christian experience of grace, a person even 
dares to own Christ as her true inner self.  St. Paul did: ‘It is no longer I who live,’ said 
he, ‘but Christ who lives in me’ (Gal. 2:20).  He traded the false self of religious 
conformity for the spiritual presence of the Christ within him and dared to claim that 
inner presence as his true self.”430 
But the whole point of Paul’s note is that it is not he who lives, when he lives in 
Christ; why, then, introduce the metaphor of the ‘true’ self at all?  This is a theology of 
growing self-possession, rather than faithful and kenotic divestiture. 
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Jesus undergoes intense suffering as part of a process of trust, in which he 
refuses to simply save himself in any sense, either in the desert or on the cross (the 
notion that he did save himself is embedded in the gnostic teaching of docetism, later 
adapted by Islam in the Qur’anic portrayal of crucifixion-avoidant Jesus).  Wherever we 
find ourselves truly capable of residing in the ‘godless vortex of shame’ without 
immediate recourse to self-defenses of reactive rage or avoidance, this is a gift that 
requires only our intentional and repeated receptivity.  Resurrection is received more 
than it is accomplished.431 We do not roll away our own stone. 
Jesus demonstrates a faithful turn, within awful pain, to a God that is not a 
template to be used, but a closeness to be trusted.  One reason why some thinkers have 
resisted the use of concepts like archetype and symbol432 to help enable religious lives, 
is the fact we so often seek to use these categories for pragmatic self-creation, rather 
than allowing ourselves to be better used by agapic love itself. 
The difference in vision is a profound one.  The therapeutic archetype of Christic 
autonomy and self-affirmative power is not the same thing as a life-long integration into 
kenotic love. 
Jesus resists therapeutic pragmatism, he offers no model for self-deliverance.  To 
live a life ‘modeled’ on Jesus, to ‘follow’ Jesus, is not to live in Christ.  Ancient Docetism, 
431 Wendell Berry’s fantastic poem, ‘Manifesto: The Mad Farmer Liberation Front,’ ends with the line, 
“Practice resurrection,” but this is something of a contradiction.  We can only be resurrected; what we 
can practice is trust. 
432 One might appeal to the fact that central Catholic theological figures like Karl Rahner, for instance, use 
the word ‘symbol.’  But here a symbol is a union between a sign and the thing signed—a mystery of real 
presence, a sacrament.  See C. Annice Callahan, “Karl Rahner’s Theology of Symbol: Basis for his Theology 
of the Church and the Sacraments,” in Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1982), pp. 195-205. 203 
                                                        
 
too, sought to view Christ only as an external model.  Reflecting on Docetic thought, 
Johannes Baptist Metz writes: “Satan wants the Incarnation to be an empty show, 
where God dresses up in human costume but doesn’t really commit totally to the role.  
The devil wants to make the Incarnation a piece of mythology, a divine puppet show.”433 
The therapeutic use of Jesus is so often a refusal to be disposed to the divine, 
apart from the benefits that might somehow accrue to ourselves.  In the therapeutic 
situation, “We can come to apprehend God only in so far as we understand God for us.  
The seeming modesty of this claim disguises the new and absolute importance of the 
thinking subject. …[T]he enhancement of the human person becomes the only reason 
ethically for introducing the existence of God; the only reason apologetically is that 
religion is necessary to open up the mysteries of humanity.  In all of this, the human 
person, the thinking subject, has achieved an implicit but effective centrality; in one way 
or another, the divine existence is asserted and evaluated as a corollary of the 
human.”434 
The famous Tillichian equivalence of salvation with healing, based on an 
etymological appeal to salve, is perhaps the most visible example of the increasing 
centrality of the ‘subject’ in therapeutic theology.  In one of Tillich’s most evocative 
sermons, we begin with God, but then come quickly to our true goal, the autonomous 
resolution of self-hatred: 
 
433 Metz, 11. 
434 Michael Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 95. 204 
                                                        
 
Where the New Reality appears, one feels united with God, the ground 
and meaning of one’s existence.  One has what has been called the love 
of one’s destiny,435 and what, today, we might call the courage to take 
upon ourselves our own anxiety. 436  Then one has the astonishing 
experience of feeling reunited with one’s self, not in pride and false self-
satisfaction, but in a deep self-acceptance.  One accepts one’s self as 
something which is eternally important, eternally loved, eternally 
accepted.  The disgust at one’s self, the hatred of one’s self has 
disappeared.  There is a center, a direction, a meaning for life.  All 
healing—bodily and mental—creates this reunion of oneself with 
oneself.437 
 
Such overwhelming emphases on assurance are worth questioning at their core. 
One serious problem with Reformation doctrines of assurance is that integrative self-
critique can only be done in direct competition with teachings of assurance, which 
convert the question, how can I participate more thoroughly in love, into the question, 
do I feel okay. 
Pastoral theology, like therapeutic thought more broadly, is descended from this 
emphasis on the lived experience of assurance and certainty. Assurance pursues a 
certitudo salutis—a certainty most easily located in what Max Weber called a ‘witness of 
emotion.’438 Penitential self-critique, unsurprisingly, has no place in this.  Repentance, 
instead, is one aspect of a broader commitment to humble uncertainty about our final 
435 Cf., Nietzsche’s Eternal Return. 
436 Note also the quiet implication that contemporary therapeutic thought and pre-modern theological 
commitments are self-evidently equivalent. 
437 Paul Tillich, The New Being (New York: Scriber, 1955), p. 22. 
438 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber emphasizes the historical reliance on 
emotion, in addition to material success, as a proof of salvific certitude.  Both capitalism and the 
therapeutic may find a common root in Reformation doctrines of assurance (even apart from the 
capitalist reliance on therapeutic methods to relieve its high human and affective pressures).  It is difficult 
to imagine the therapeutic apart from capitalism. 205 
                                                        
 
fate in the Kingdom. Augustine prays to God not to be “more certain about you, but to 
be more stable in you.”439 
The sayings of the desert fathers reveal a remarkable consistency of view 
regarding the necessity of rejecting mere assurance.  Sisoes, as he lay dying, said “’Look, 
the angels are coming to fetch me, and I am begging them to let me do a little penance.’  
The old man [the abba attending to Sisoes] said to him, ‘You have no need to do 
penance, Father.’  But [Sisoes] said to them, ‘Truly, I do not think I have even made a 
beginning yet’” (Sisoes, Apophthegm 14).440    
The therapeutic, on the other hand, is consistently a herald of gnostic certainty 
and prestige, reveling in his own difference from lesser persons, who adhere to mere 
tradition: “Can we deal with the transformations and resurrections of personality that 
can ultimately follow from lives lived authentically and creatively?  Or would we rather 
stick with the pious old formulas and language of guilt, sin, and repentance?”441 
The dramatic rhetoric of therapeutic transformation is hugely attractive in a 
personality culture.  An implicit but powerful promise is held out to us: you can be 
439 Paul: “If any man imagines that he knows something, he does not yet know as he ought to know.  But if 
one loves God, one is known by him” (1 Cor. 8:2).  See Robert Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), Ch. 12, “The Knowledge of Sensuous Intelligence.” 
440 Twice in the Alphabetic Collection of the sayings of the Fathers, we overhear Anthony instructing: “The 
greatest thing a man can do is to throw his faults before the Lord and to expect temptation to his last 
breath” (Anthony, Apophthegm 4; Poemen, Apophthegm 125).  Note: hereafter, known sayings of the 
Fathers are attributed directly to them as individuals; these may all be found in the same collection 
already cited in the previous chapter: The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabetical Collection, trans. 
Benedicta Ward. 
441 McNish, 196. The assumption of an opposition between repentance and creativity is a complete 
departure from tradition. 206 
                                                        
 
better, special, worthy.  You and I are not, thank heaven, those witless and tradition-
bound others.442  
The therapeutic, committed to a separation from the damaging coercions of 
convention, lapses regularly into a conspiratorial tone toward the uninitiated (cf. Ch. 2, 
on conspiratorial rhetoric as initiation in Nietzsche).  Writing about the sense of divine 
intimacy that comes from recognizing the True Self, Richard Rohr regrets that, “for some 
sad reason, it seems to be a well-kept secret… I hope you have been there, or there is 
something essential you do not know.”443  “When the True Self becomes clearer to you, 
and it will for most of you, you will have grounded your spirituality in its first and 
fundamental task, and you will have hired the best counseling service possible.”444 
The gnostic language of the insider445 is easily transfigured into a patronizing 
superiority: “So what does this book say to you?  Is it as life changing and death 
shattering as I hoped?”446 
What is one supposed to say? 
Therapeutic rhetorical strategies, dividing the world into true initiate of insight 
and the lesser other, are very difficult to oppose: any critic can be automatically 
dismissed as unintelligent or too ‘compliant.’  The loaded binary divisions between 
“creativity” and “repentance,” or “authenticity” and “sin,” allow the therapeutic to view 
his opponents more with pity than with curiosity or openness. (Rohr expresses a 
442 See also Luke 18: 9-14. 
443 Rohr, 164, 170. 
444 Rohr, 4-5. 
445 Rohr, 168. 
446 Rohr, 175.   207 
                                                        
 
consistent disdain toward regular clergy, the mere company men, who do not agree 
with his positions.) The therapeutic theologian presumes an enormous authority to 
impose expert interpretation on the lives of others, even though assuming such an 
interpretive authority for our own experiential lives is already questionable enough. 
The therapeutic creates a strong incentive to adhere to his authority, if we wish 
to have any relationship to him at all; he appeals to the same desire to comply and 
belong which he so thoroughly criticizes elsewhere as ‘false.’ 
However, the ‘old formulas of repentance,’ if they are understood well, are more 
creative in directing our natural human capacities for self-critique into the equally 
natural human desire to love more completely. 
When emotions or ‘passions’447 are healed in pre-modern Christian theological 
tradition, this healing does not happen because we affirm ourselves, or because ‘God’ 
amplifies that self-affirmation.  The greater salvation of Christian commitment is instead 
the unintended result of another project altogether—namely, the wholehearted love of 
God and of persons.448 
447 Passion was the central term in the Christian-Stoic dialogue of late antiquity.  And because the Stoic is 
the nearest ancient equivalent of the contemporary therapeutic, that dialogue may become an 
increasingly important Christian resource.  Apatheia, the stilling of all passions, was the central concept of 
Stoic soteriology, as it was, in a modified sense, for Christian contemplative theologians.  Christian 
theologians such as Maximus the Confessor understood a specifically Christian apatheia as one that 
allows for a newly clarified and undistracted love of God and other.  Love, not relief, is the direction of 
that Christian apatheia.  Apatheia in this sense suggests a clearing away of self-concerned affect, so that 
other-oriented care might more easily unfold itself. 
448 Are we not commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves, so that ‘self-love’ might be seen as the truly 
foundational Christian practice?  Sǿren Kierkegaard takes up this question at length in Works of Love, 
where he asks whether it is “possible for anyone to misunderstand this, as if it were the intention of 
Christianity to proclaim self-love as a prescriptive right?  On the contrary, it is its purpose to wrest self-
love away from us human beings.  This implies loving one’s self [in a self-centered way]; but if one must 
love his neighbor as himself, then the command, like a pick, wrenches open the lock of self-love and 208 
                                                        
 
We ultimately wish far more to participate in love than to be loved.449 
Some readers may wish, on behalf of an enormous range of human beings who 
have suffered intensely because of others, to insist that the sense of being loved by an 
ultimate reality is profoundly necessary.  This is not at stake for me.  I agree. 
My claim, instead, is that many of us are so thoroughly embedded in the 
therapeutic that we easily forget that self-acceptance is not the end, but just one 
probable consequence, of a sustained commitment to love.450 
We must lose our lives as our own, affirmed or not.  Even when Jesus beholds a 
person who is not used to being seen in their essential capacity for agapic love—for 
instance, Zacchaeus the collector of taxes—Christ does not leave that person with some 
thereby wrests it away from a man.” See Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962 [1847]), p. 34.  Compare to the discussion of dak dzin, self-grasping, and its unraveling 
through tonglen, in Chapter 3. 
449 This anthropological assumption was an implicit point of disagreement in the Reformation.  For the 
reformers, the locus of salvation was primarily individual, if faith was to be newly disciplined and vivified.  
In a more thoroughly sacramental vision of love, the locus of salvation cannot be limited to the self alone.  
(Whatever else may be said about the problem of indulgences, that practice implicitly views human 
beings as interconnected, and very much capable of mutual deliverance from harm: indulgences were 
most often sought on behalf of others.) 
450 My colleague, Professor Karen Enriquez, reminds me that central theological teachings such as self-
emptying love or repentance have often been used by and against women to justify a despairing self-
abnegation in the face of social expectations that ask women, in particular, to sacrifice themselves for the 
utilitarian desires of others.  I remain concerned, however, that when we critique such a damaging use of 
kenosis, we tend to ignore the important role of theological discernment in religious practice: if we have 
no vision of the integrity of kenosis, over against mere accession to power, we have no real vision of 
kenosis at all.  Self-emptying is not at all opposed to a frank and fundamental challenge of the powerful; 
humility and confrontation are not completely different directions of interpersonal engagement.  A 
powerful and developing love of God gives us the courage to inhabit a deeper and more challenging 
kenosis, which has little to do with either self-abnegation or violent reaction against the violent.  
Participation in a transcendent love makes us less likely to accede to the abuses of power, perhaps at first 
for our own sake, but then also for the sake of the powerful themselves. 209 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
pure and uncomplicated affirmation.  Only when Zacchaeus commits himself to actually 
caring differently within the Kingdom of love does Christ speak of his salvation.451 
The real question is not whether we can love ourselves, or even whether we can 
sense ourselves as assuredly loved in some final way.  The far more central question is 
whether we can come to live through and out of God’s love, however inefficiently and 
badly we may do so.  There are two primary Christian truths: the ultimate truth that all 
is grace, and the relative truth, the one that we are usually more accustomed or 
habituated to recognize, which is the prominence of pain, the prevalence of self-
concern, and the existence of people who may not seem to deserve our supposedly 
quite limited resources of care. 
If we live only within this relative truth, we will attempt to ‘have’ grace within it, 
in order to make that world bearable for ourselves.  From a perspective that emphasizes 
a more pervasive grace, there is no point in ‘having’ it. 
 Therapeutic Christian theologians often treat the love of God as a relief we may 
experience, rather than an act that we might receive and express.  Self-critical 
repentance is the Christian path toward a more active allowing of that love. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
451 I’m grateful to Professor John McDargh for several rich discussions of this passage.  See Luke 19. 210                                                         
 
4.3 BLESSED ARE THOSE WHO MOURN 
 
When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ said, ‘Repent,’ he willed the 
entire life of believers to be one of repentance.    
      —Martin Luther 
 
Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God (Mt. 5:8). …[But] 
because now you are unable to see, let your task consist in desiring.  The 
entire life of a good Christian is a holy desire. 
      —Augustine452 
 
 That these two statements say something very similar might have required little 
explanation in some centuries.  We are given now to understand repentance as a kind of 
calculated self-punishment.  But repentance is the clearest path of holy desire available 
to us, the greatest antidote to modernist self-contempt. 
In order to more clearly understand this, we turn our commentarial focus in 
particular to the second of the Matthean Beatitudes, Blessed are those who mourn, for 
they will be comforted (Mt. 5:4)—a teaching about both repentance and desire. 
The Beatitudes, like the terse sayings of Tibetan lojong, are closely interwoven, 
and grow increasingly intelligible when read as interpretations of one another.  
Beginning with the blessedness of the poor in spirit (Mt. 5:3), the Beatitudes develop an 
unrelenting portrait of the Christian life as one of kenotic self-emptying, and 
mourning—penthos—is a primary practice of that creative impoverishment that allows 
for receptivity.  Makárioi oi penthoúntes: blessed are the mourners.453 
452 Augustine, Homilies on the First Epistle of John, trans. Boniface Ramsey (New York: New City Press, 
2008), p. 69.  See Homily 4, Sections 5-6. 
453 Luke 6:21 has, instead, Makārioi oi klaiontes—blessed are those who lament—which has a more 
affectively intense tonality, and which may gesture more toward lamentation over violence or immediate 
loss than does the Matthean phraseology. 211 
                                                        
 
The Beatitudes are perhaps the most powerful invocations of desire in the New 
Testament, envisioning comfort, inheritance, fulfillment, mercy, God.  The Kingdom 
itself is the explicit framing context of the Beatitudes as a whole: see Mt. 5:3 and 5:10. 
The Beatitudes bring two things together: desire and self-emptying surrender.  
Augustine, reflecting on the cleaned-out (‘pure’) heart that allows for a vision of God 
(Mt. 5:8), tells those gathered to hear him that “by desiring you are made large enough, 
so that, when there comes what you should see, you may be filled. …This is how God 
stretches our desire through delay, stretches our soul through desire, and makes it large 
enough by stretching it.”454  
 We are more used to considering Augustine as the unyielding scourge of desire.  
This is to read him, primarily, through Freud (for whom desire is far more conflated with 
sexuality than it is for Augustine).  Augustine sharply condemned concupiscence in 
particular as a sexualized and disordering desire in his early debates with Pelagian 
interlocutors455—but the problem with concupiscence is not that it is desire, but that it 
is so intensely and compulsively focused on the self alone. 
Christian life is an ongoing series of decisions between kenotic and concupiscent 
forms of desire. The grace-empowered choice to love beyond the self, rather than the 
paltry freedom of deciding between material goods, is the real meaning of human 
freedom for Augustine. (The Stoic, seeking to end all desire, is oriented primarily toward 
454 Ibid. 
455 Timo Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2012), p. 
355.  Nisula argues that Augustine came later to recognize pride as the truer foundation of all sin: initium 
omnis peccati superbia. 212 
                                                        
 
relief.  Augustine is no Stoic, and neither, we will find, are the Fathers of the desert.456)  
The ferocity of the Augustinian attack on concupiscence is in many ways an impassioned 
plea for a deeper human nobility457—a nobility that can unfold only through a desire 
that is ordered toward God. 
To repent is the discipline of beginning, again and again, to turn attention back 
(metanoia) toward the love that we also repeatedly refuse.  Christian repentance is our 
consent to being perpetual beginners at love. 
To repent is to commit to our own imperfection as the only possible vehicle for 
any integration into a larger context of care. The Desert Fathers often add a concluding 
emphasis to their reflections on repentance: Truly, there is no other way than this. There 
is no other way, because repentance is the only way forward from wherever it is that we 
actually are.  We have no other place to start. 
 I focus here on mourning, or penthos, as a particularly central early monastic 
commitment within the broad categories of repentance and compunction. (Compunctio 
has to do etymologically with the sense of being punctured—in this case, primarily by 
love.) I acknowledge that penthos—“mourning for lost salvation, whether one’s own or 
456 Alexis Torrance, in an excellent recent study of early monastic understandings of repentance, notes 
that for some desert teachers, “if the ascetic feels a certain peace which leads him to think that he no 
longer needs to call on the name of Christ, he must flee this ‘peace’ through more fervent and unceasing 
prayer: ‘we should not have such peace, if we consider ourselves sinners’ [Barsanuphius of Gaza].” See 
Repentance in Late Antiquity: Eastern Asceticism and the Framing of the Christian Life c.400-650 CE 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 149.  
457 One curious aspect of Buddhist inculturation in the West is that the Second Noble Truth, which is so 
comparable to Augustine’s critique of concupiscence as ignorant and self-centered craving, should go 
unquestioned as a semi-psychological anthropological truth, while Augustine is consistently dismissed. 213 
                                                        
 
that of others”458—can easily appear to the therapeutic as an overly precious spirituality 
of self-pity.  The pre-therapeutic Christian, however, takes his or her own sin far more 
seriously as the primary obstacle to greater integration in the life of God.  Mourning is 
far more understandable in such a situation.459 
It is crucial for our entire argument, therefore, that penthos should be 
understood as something quite different than despair, pity, or aversive self-contempt.  
“The direct opposite of penthos,” writes Irenee Hausherr, “is acedia, which dries up the 
source of tears and drives one to seek out distractions… Penthos and lypi [sorrow, a 
synonym of acedia] go in diametrically opposed directions: the first towards the 
summits of union with God, the second toward the abyss of despair.”460  
The superb patristic historian Alexis Torrance, reflects that for Barsanuphius of 
Gaza, humble self-blame was not intended “to promote despair, but to soften the heart 
hardened in a state of unsalutary self-justification, which admits no repentance.” 
Torrance offers us a sense of Barsanuphius’s own pastoral skill and balance: 
Not all compunction, Barsanuphius warns one monk, is from God.  If the 
memory of one’s sins is acted upon for the correction of our past, then 
“this is genuine compunction, through which sins are forgiven.” But if in 
remembering our sins we continue to fall into the same sins or worse, 
458 Irenee Hausherr, Penthos: The Doctrine of Compunction in the Christian East, trans. Anselm Hufstader, 
OSB (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1982), p. 18. 459 For reasons no doubt related to the unyielding pace of our own economic lives, we may be 
increasingly tempted to give a growing idealized prestige to renunciation.  Such a projection expresses our 
own desire to relinquish the endless pettiness of negotiating freeways, prices, professional relationships, 
families, and the resulting chaos of our hearts.  But to know something about monasticism may be a way 
to think fashionably, rather than to live religiously.  The lay appropriation of monastic thought can 
sometimes become a subtle expression of despair. 
460 Hausherr, p. 5.  Acedia dries up the tears of penthos because the former is so powerfully self-involved, 
and holy tears are a response to something given from beyond the self. 214 
                                                        
 
then “this memory comes from the enemy, who suggests this memory to 
you only in order to condemn your soul.”461 
 
Donald Capps skillfully argues that narcissistic shame, or self-aversive despair, 
should be restored to the explicit status of sin,462 insofar as these habits of self-concern 
involve a very real self-estrangement from God.  We have also seen, in the previous 
chapter, Joe Loizzo’s view of some forms of self-aversive shame as a form of 
‘indulgence’ in habitual forms of reactivity.  These thinkers all write implicitly against the 
normal therapeutic instinct to understand self-aversion as a form of conditioning 
perpetrated against the individual from the external sources of culture or family, as if 
shame might only be understood as a victimized innocence.  “Abba Isaiah, when 
someone asked him what avarice was, replied, ‘Not to believe that God cares for you…’” 
(Isaiah, Apophthegm 9).  Such a failure of trust, such an insistence on one’s own 
particular and specialized pain, marks self-interest more than victimhood.  It is not 
worthwhile to view ourselves as innocents.463 
Christianity is a spirituality of imperfection, and penthos is presented by a 
number of desert and monastic theologians as the most central of all Christian 
practices—not a special spiritual gift for monks alone.  It would be too convenient to 
461 Torrance, pp. 137, 143.  Recall also the discussion of moral perfectionism in the Sanka Sutta (Conch 
Sutta) above, in Chapter 3. 
462 Starting from the original list of eight deadly sins, melancholy (tristitia) was eventually subsumed into 
apathy (acedia) in the Western church.  Donald Capps understands self-aversive shame as ‘melancholy,’ 
and suggests that it should be restored to the status of sin.  This is an interesting suggestion (see Capps, 
42-48).  But we might also be careful to keep acedia and melancholic patterns closely aligned.  For good 
reasons, acedia and melancholy are understood to imply the other.  If we separate acedia and melancholy 
too thoroughly, we may justify the very recent notion that despair is just an innocent victimhood, rather 
than a species of spiritual languor and disconnection. 
463 Mark 2:17: “It is not the healthy who need a doctor, but the sick. I have not come to call the righteous, 
but sinners [hamartoloi; flawed ones].” 215 
                                                        
 
assume that the penitential character of the Beatitudes is reserved for some subset of 
the Kingdom.  To understand tears as a marginal Christian spirituality is to ignore such 
central figures as Augustine, weeping in his mother’s garden, or Ignatius, whose Spiritual 
Diary is chiefly a record of the gift of tears.464  John Climacus is direct: 
You there!  We will not have to answer, at the moment of the soul’s 
departure, for not having been wonderworkers or theologians, nor for 
not having become contemplatives, but we must unavoidably render an 
account to God for not having practiced penthos without interruption.465 
 
Penthos is “not essentially mystical.”466  It is necessarily a merger of grace and human 
dedication, but it is nonetheless there for the asking, however long and difficult that 
asking may be. 
Maggie Ross, a particularly articulate student of penthos, writes implicitly of 
penthos as something accessible even in a life of incomplete but ongoing renunciation. 
“Grief work,” she writes, contrasting therapeutic and theological modes of mourning, 
“always seems to seek mitigation of pain, seek comfort in establishing relationships that 
will enable new boundaries of self to be established so that the pain is ended.  This is 
right and proper.  The way of tears, while not seeking pain for its own sake, is a 
willingness to be continually confronted not only by painful truth about one’s self, but 
464 See Ignatius of Loyola, “The Spiritual Diary” in Personal Writings, trans. Joseph A. Munitiz and Philip 
Endean, (London: Penguin, 1996), pp. 73-109. 
465 See the Ladder of Divine Ascent, 7.70.  Quoted in Hausherr, p. 176. 
466 Hausherr, 175.  “The monk, at least the eastern monk, is not a special person” (24).  “If I may add a 
thought for today’s Christians, I would recommend that they take careful note of this doctrine, and first 
thank the Lord all the more for the sacrament of penance, but then beware lest they think themselves 
dispensed from the virtue of repentance…” (177-78). 216 
                                                        
 
also seeks to know this truth on a universal level of human suffering.”467 Some 
resonances with Tibetan lojong will grow stronger now. 
 Penthos is an encounter with strong imperfection, an encounter that is only 
possible in connection with the basic goodness and mercy of God.  It is not a practice of 
certainty or final self-judgment.  Abba Poemen: “In all our afflictions let us weep in the 
presence of the goodness of God, until he shows mercy on us.”468   
Penthos returns repeatedly to the presence of extensive mercy.  “Penthos,” 
writes John Chryssavgis, consists simultaneously “in mourning for the loss of God’s 
presence,” which is simultaneously a form of longing for that presence.469  Repentance 
focuses not on sins as intrinsic qualities of persons, but instead views sin as the 
performance of self-separation from love.  The depressive sorrow of acedia is not an 
identity, but something done. 
Penthos seeks no special therapeutic insight into the roots of our painful 
performativity, or into the familial and cultural origins of those performances.  Penthos 
simply confronts acedia by turning it relentlessly toward mercy, until it has been 
purified of its destructiveness.  If repentance is the entire life of a Christian, this is in 
part because that life is an endlessly imperfect turn toward love. 
The Fathers of the desert, like the teachers of lojong, celebrate our sharpest 
moments of failure and difficulty, precisely because these moments can function, if we 
467 Maggie Ross, The Fountain and the Furnace: The Way of Tears and Fire (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 
p. 45. 
468 Poemen, Apophthegm 122. 
469 John Chryssavgis, “Life in Abundance,” p. 222. 217 
                                                        
 
let them, to re-direct our attention.  Abba Anthony said, “‘Whoever has not experienced 
temptation cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.’  He even added, ‘Without 
temptations no-one can be saved.’”470  Evagrius said, “Take away temptations and no-
one will be saved.”471 Dorotheos of Gaza reads Paul’s famous exhortation to the 
Thessalonians, urging them to offer gratitude for all things (5:18), as a teaching about 
the immense value of failure.472 
Without coming up against our own most difficult and seemingly intractable 
imperfections—without an inveterate rage or beckoning acedia, without gluttony or 
porneia—we cannot be pushed to entrust ourselves further and further towards God’s 
encompassing care.473 Penthos is one form of trust in the face of necessary demons. 
I myself inhabit a willfulness that is, on the face of it, completely necessary.  It is 
there for me when I face the normal business of life: calling a phone company to clarify 
an unexpected charge, representing myself as more competent than I actually feel so 
that I might find opportunities to become more competent, trying to be polite to 
someone I do not fully trust.  Living in the world seems to require, more than anything 
470 Anthony, Apophthegm 5. 
471 Evagrius, Apophthegm 5.  Among the anonymous apophthegmata, we also find this: “There was an old 
man who was constantly ill.  Now it happened that he was without suffering for one year, and he was 
vexed and wept, saying, ‘God has forsaken me and has not visited me.’”  See The Wisdom of the Desert 
Fathers: Systematic Sayings from the Anonymous Series, trans. Benedicta Ward (Oxford: SLG Press, 1986), 
Apophthegm 77.  In the very next saying, a Father insists that his listener should “Understand that it is not 
good for someone to despair of himself because of his temptations; rather, temptations procure crowns 
for us if we use them well” (Apophthegm 78). 
472 Dorotheos of Gaza, Discourses and Sayings, trans. Eric P. Wheeler (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian 
Publications, 1977), pp. 192-200.  The lojong analog discussed above is: Be grateful to everyone. 
473 Gregory of Nyssa writes, “For the whole array of passions—wrath and fear, cowardice and impudence, 
depression as well as pleasure, hatred, strife and merciless cruelty, envy as well as flattery, brutality 
together with brooding over injuries—they all are so many despotic masters who make the soul a slave in 
their territory as if it was a prisoner of war.”  See Gregory of Nyssa, The Lord’s Prayer and The Beatitudes, 
Ancient Christian Writers, Vol. 18, trans. Hilda Graef (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 113-14. 218 
                                                        
 
else, a practiced self-assertion—forms of wilfullness that are at least somewhat 
palatable to the assertiveness of others. 
But it is hard to wear this well over time.  The eye quite literally becomes darker.  
Engaged so thoroughly in our normal willfulness, we are likely to turn aggressively 
inward to force the changes we seek in ourselves, rather than giving ourselves over to a 
certain more humble powerlessness and transparency to love. 
Only through some disciplined recognition of our real failures to turn ourselves 
toward love can we interrupt our otherwise endless self-involvement.  Though some 
recent authors have expressed regret that Christianity does not have a moment-to-
moment form of self-awareness like that offered by Buddhist practices, they have very 
much overlooked repentance as the most direct Christian analogy to ‘mindfulness.’474 
The concept of ‘return’ is embedded within the New Testament and Pauline meanings 
of metanoia: return to the nous, to the mind, of Christ. 
 With or without distinct tears, the mourning of penthos is far more like a truthful 
sobriety than it is a pitying or regretful emotionalism.  We have already seen Maggie 
Ross distinguish between cathartic grief and penthos.  Some of the most central thinkers 
of early Christian tradition, focusing on the purification of our desires through 
repentance, seek to draw very similar distinctions.  Gregory of Nyssa, in an extended 
homily on the second Beatitude, notes that “the underlying sense [of penthos] seems to 
be that the soul should turn to the true good and not immerse itself in the deceits of 
474 Paul F. Knitter speaks of mindfulness as “an ingredient not easily found in most Christian pantries,” 
which is part of a more general hermeneutic of Christian insufficiency in Without Buddha I Could Not Be a 
Christian (London: Oneworld Publications, 2009), p. 151. 219 
                                                        
 
this present life.”475 John Chrysostom, who was, along with Gregory, a late fourth-
century contemporary of, and participant in, desert monasticism, reflected on penthos 
in one of his homilies:  
 
Wherefore, if you will be comforted, mourn: and think this not a dark 
saying. For when God does comfort, though sorrows come upon you by 
thousands like snow-flakes, you will be above them all. Since in truth, as 
the returns which God gives are always far greater than our labors; so He 
has wrought in this case, declaring them that mourn to be blessed, not 
after the value of what they do, but after His own love towards man. …He 
bids us mourn, not only for our own, but also for other men’s 
misdoings…476 
 
 Both Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostom speak of penthos with a pastoral 
sensibility.  We can sense in Chrysostom in particular the delivery of a prestigious 
monastic spirituality to the lay imagination—a situation not unlike that of the present 
moment.  Alexis Torrance notes that Chrysostom, in the Commentary on the Psalms, 
“speaks repeatedly of the laity as having the same opportunities for glory as the 
monastics, and even suggests that they ought to weep more than the monks, they 
‘being in more need of the remedy of repentance.’”477  Chrysostom also recognizes that 
his listeners might misunderstand mourning as a dark demand for an impossible 
penance, so he emphasizes God’s love, rather than any bitterness or gnashing. 
In fact, penthos involves a consistently attested joy.  This is not the same thing as 
assurance; penthos remains more completely attuned to mystery; it relinquishes 
475 Gregory of Nyssa, 114. 
476 John Chrysostom, “Homily XV on Matthew,” in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First 
Series, Vol. 10, trans. George Prevost (Edinburgh: 1851), p. 93. 
477 Torrance, p. 84. 220 
                                                        
 
certainty about the final fate of any person before God.  There is already a deepening 
comfort, however, even in allowing ourselves to long for a more active participation in 
love, beyond the gravity of our own natural self-concern.  Even though penthos is 
focused initially on a loss of God’s presence, that presence is sought again in longing; 
and, even more importantly, the joy of this longing is itself sensed as a gift of pervasive 
holiness.478 John Climacus writes, “As I ponder the true nature of compunction, I find 
myself amazed by the way in which inward joy and gladness mingle with what we call 
mourning and grief, like honey in a comb.”479 Hannah Hunt writes of “The joyinfused 
grief of penthos [that] brings the whole person… into the presence of God.”480 
 We sometimes hear the Beatitudes as prescriptive conditions: if we perform a 
certain set of perfections, then we will find joy.  We might hear the Beatitudes, instead, 
as descriptive: blessedness is not what will happen, once conditions and requirements 
have been met; blessedness is what already enables love to be poured out at all. 
We do not mourn our turning away from love, so that we may eventually 
become blessed.  We find ourselves able to mourn because we live in the midst of 
common blessing.  “Let us accept from God the repentance that heals us,” writes 
478 “The whole life of a man is but one single day for those who are working hard with longing” (Gregory 
the Theologian, Apophthegm 2); “If only a man desired it for a single day from morning till night, he would 
be able to come to the measure of God” (Alonius, Apophthegm 3).  The last saying is implicitly a critique 
of our damaged capacity for holy desire, not a claim that we can actually justify ourselves through longing. 
479 John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, trans. Colm Luibheid and Norman Russell (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1982), p. 141.  See also this saying from Abba Benjamin: “As he was dying, Abba Benjamin 
said to his sons, ‘If you observe the following, you can be saved, “Be joyful at all times, pray without 
ceasing and give thanks for all things”’” (Benjamin, Apophthegm 4). 
480 Hannah Hunt, Joy-bearing Grief (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 232. 221 
                                                        
 
Chrysostom, “For it is not we who offer it to Him, but He who bestows it upon us.”481 
Penthos is receptivity. 
The Desert Fathers sometimes disagree about the extent to which we must exert 
effort for the sake of explicit tears, but no authority suggests that mourning is 
something we achieve on our own.482  This is important.  Whenever the connection 
between penthos and receptivity is forgotten or denied,483 we become more likely to 
dismiss teachings on repentance, penthos, and ‘self-blame’ as expressions of small and 
bitter self-contemptuousness. 
Criticism apart from love is rightly refused.  The gift of discernment is necessary 
in any religious life that includes both love and loving critique; we are under no 
injunction to accept any and all criticism or blame (note the Tibetan insistence on 
carefully examining the trustworthiness of one’s teacher).484 In a situation without trust 
or love, criticism, from either self or other, often appears as an attack upon our 
personhood, rather than an attempt to help heal our distinctive departures from love. 
To receive critique from a trusted source of care, is to receive care itself.  
Repentance, repeated over time, becomes a strengthened capacity of non-resistance to 
‘481 John Chrysostom, On Repentance, 7.3.  Quoted in Chyrssavgis, “Life in Abundance,” p. 225. 
482 “The aim of repentance is not self-justification, but reentry into that consuming fire of love where all 
sin and imperfection and selfishness wither.”  Ibid, 220. 
483 See Augustine, Enchiridion §82.  “As soon as they made the acquaintance of Saint Augustine, the 
Eastern ascetics preferred above all his ability to awaken the feeling of compunction” (Hausherr, 15). 
484 A skillful theology of discernment should allow us to participate in an imperfect body of Christ, without 
rejecting that body.  This is not at all to justify harmful acts—only to put ourselves in position to challenge 
them from a position of grace.  “An old man was asked, ‘How can I find God?’  He said, ‘In fasting, in 
watching, in labours, in devotion, and above all, in discernment.  I tell you, many have injured their bodies 
without discernment and have gone away from us having achieved nothing.  Our mouths smell bad 
through fasting, we know the Scriptures by heart, we recite all the Psalms of David, but we have not that 
which God seeks: charity and humility’” (Anonymous Series, Apophthegm 90). 222 
                                                        
 
critical love.  ‘Self-blame,’ in this context of love, is primarily a judgment that we receive 
from beyond ourselves, not something imposed as a form of internal willfulness.  Abba 
Poemen said: 
 
‘All the virtues come to this house except one and without that virtue it is 
hard for a man to stand.’  Then they asked him what virtue was, and he 
said, ‘For a man to blame himself.’485 
 
The therapeutic will tend to hear the language of ‘self-blame’ as a perverse 
diversion from therapeutic self-acceptance.  We may have temporarily lost the ability to 
hear a quiet irony and precision in the core theological language of ‘self-blame.’  In this 
blame there is no global condemnation.  In fact, from the perspective of the Desert 
Fathers, any full condemnation, directed against others or against ourselves, is already a 
breathtaking exercise in the sin of presumptio.  Teachings on ‘self-blame’ have little to 
do with blame for any reified or global psychological ‘self.’  For the Fathers, self-blame is 
directed not toward the whole person, but toward the more insidious human 
tendencies of willfulness and self-centered desire. 
Destructive forms of self-aversion claim inviolable authority to make final, total, 
and willful judgments about ourselves (and others).  Gerald May speaks of willfulness as 
“the setting of oneself apart… in an attempt to master, direct, control, or otherwise 
manipulate existence.”486 That attempt at masterful autonomy, given reign, is the 
reversal of penthos.  But such willful mastery is also damned hard and exhausting work.  
No one, it turns out, is an Übermensch.  For Nietzsche, the will-to-power must be 
485 Poemen, Apophthegm 134. 
486 Gerald G. May, Will and Spirit: A Contemplative Psychology (New York: Harper Collins, 1982), p. 6. 223 
                                                        
 
inverted toward the self, before it can be successfully imposed elsewhere.  These are 
circles of viciousness. 
 Willfulness is the attempt to produce our own distinct and particular worthiness 
through work, effort, and, where necessary, force.  Willfulness is always subtly tinged by 
an inflammation of violence toward ourselves and others.  “Abba John said, ‘We have 
put the light burden on one side, that is to say, self-accusation, and we have loaded 
ourselves with a heavy one, that is to say, self-justification.’”487 
Why is self-blame the lighter burden?  Because it is precisely the repeated 
divestment of the heaviest human weight of self-concern. 
Self-blame and penthos are the practices of the cleaned-out heart: “eliminating 
self-blame,” writes Hausherr, “cuts off penthos at its root.”488  Given to a lifelong 
process of self-emptying, we are slowly rendered more capable of desiring a will of love 
that is not fully our own.  Autonomia is gradually replaced by a new willingness.489  
It is perhaps impossible to give up one habit of desire without turning to 
another.  Control and mastery, which we quietly know are unachievable even as we 
avidly pursue them, give way to a longing to participate in a kenotic mastery that we 
cannot control.  We seek to be held in love, that we might become more loving.  “There 
are a lot of counterfeit changes of heart around,” writes Maggie Ross, “but the sort that 
is permanent has been longed for, wept over, and coming for a long time.  Just wanting, 
487 John the Dwarf, Apophthegm 21. 
488 Hausherr, 90. 
489 It is no accident that the prayer at the center of Christian tradition simultaneously expresses both 
longing and repentance: Thy Kingdom come; forgive us our debts, as we forgive those of others. 224 
                                                        
 
not even willing, is a lot of it.”490 The whole of Christian life is a holy desire.  Poemen 
said, “To throw yourself before God, not to measure your progress, to leave behind all 
self-will; these are the instruments for the work of the soul.”491 
‘Self-blame’ and penthos ultimately connect us to all others.  The Beatitudes, 
including the beatitude of penthos, are imbued with a grammar of plurality: makárioi oi 
penthoúntes.  Penthos mourns for our own lost sense of God’s presence—but also for 
the losses incurred by others.492 For Chrysostom, as we have already seen, Christ “bids 
us mourn, not only for our own, but also for other men’s misdoings.”493 For St. Mark the 
Monk in the sixth century, monks are “obliged to offer repentance for their neighbor”—
not as a burdensome duty of the elite, but as ‘sponsors’ of the salvation of others.494 
Since, therefore, the merciful will be shown mercy, [it is] through 
repentance… [that] the whole world holds together, one finding mercy 
through another according to the divine will.495 
 
Where autonomous self-aversion is founded on separation, repentance actively 
repairs our capacities for connection and commonality. This penitential vision of 
490 Ross, 139. 
491 Poemen, Apophthegm 36. 
492 Hausherr, 18. 
493 John Chrysostom, “Homily XV on Matthew.”  Compassion, however, has its own dangers, as both 
Nietzsche and lojong teaching will insist.  In the desert, also, some beginning monks were urged to “avoid 
the false desire to be compassionate which [would be] simply a gratification of his own will and an illusion 
of the demons” (Torrance, 154). Although penthos may be made for all, there remains the strong caveat 
that one should never consider one’s own sin fully mourned before God. “For the Desert Fathers and 
Mothers,” writes John Chryssavgis, “there is no stage [in this life] beyond this knowledge of imperfection.  
Perfection is for God, not for us; imperfection is ours to know and embrace, not to forego or forget.”  See 
In the Heart of the Desert: The Spirituality of the Desert Fathers and Mothers (Bloomington, IN: World 
Wisdom Books, 2008), p. 50. 
494 Mark the Monk, De Paenitentia, Ch. 11.  Quoted in Torrance, 110. 
495 Ibid, p. 115.  Consider also the Talmudic teaching that the entire world may be forgiven through the 
repentance of one person (Yoma 86b). 225 
                                                        
 
interconnectedness within the love of Christ496 marks the deepened unraveling of self-
concern.  No severe or despairing self-aversion can make sense within the relentlessly 
relational epistemology of penthos. 
In tonglen and in other-oriented penthos, there is no one person saving some 
other person.  For the Christian, that purification of the world’s suffering is necessarily a 
penitential request, rather than a self-assertion: Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done.  
Repentance with and on behalf of others expresses a profoundly eschatological desire. 
We only gain full access to mercy through giving it away, not through self-
acceptance.  Repentance is not primarily a desire to be accepted, but a deeper desire to 
participate, more and more completely, in transcendent love.  Christian mourning 
unravels the despairing autonomy upon which self-aversion as a resistance to love must 
be founded. 
496 For the monastic (and for the non-therapeutic Christian more generally), it is far more important to be 
within Christ, than it is to be like an archetype.   226 
                                                        
 
CONCLUSION: AUTONOMY AND REFUGE 
 
 
 
In 1982, Jonathan Z. Smith asked, quite reasonably, why similarity should ever be 
interesting as a focus for comparative religious inquiry. 
Religious similarities, he wrote, are almost certain to arise in the process of 
research in multiple religious traditions.  It is not clear, though, how a researcher is to 
discern the sort of similarity that could be relevant or helpful: “Often, at some point 
along the way, as if unbidden, as a sort of déjà vu, the scholar remembers that he has 
seen ‘it’ or ‘something like it’ before…. This experience, this unintended consequence of 
research, must then be accorded significance and provided with an explanation.”497   
What could ever be the value of sameness?  Smith concluded his discussion with 
an insistence that “Comparison requires the postulation of difference as the grounds of 
its being interesting (rather than tautological) and [also requires] a methodical 
manipulation of difference… in the service of some useful end.”498  Religious inquiry is 
justifiably suspect wherever it fails to serve such an end, and Smith’s demand for 
greater self-awareness of purpose and method in religious scholarship is one of his 
lasting legacies. “No scholar of religion has done more than Professor Smith,” writes 
497 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Prologue: In Comparison a Magic Dwells” in Kimberly Patton and Benjamin Ray, 
eds., A Magic Still Dwells (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.26.  Originally published as 
Chapter 2 of Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
498 Ibid., p.40. 227 
                                                        
 
John Thatamanil, “to cultivate among religionists this deep habit of theoretical 
reflexivity.”499  
However, there is a large difference between the researcher who theorizes or 
‘imagines’ religion, and one who seeks to enable the religious practice of a community—
this figure usually called a theologian, Rabbi, or teacher.  Much depends on the meaning 
of Smith’s phrase, “the service of some useful end.” 
Thatamanil has sharply questioned the sorts of scholarship that Smith has so 
authoritatively advanced during the past half-century: 
 
It is worth asking… the following critical question: just why it is that 
imagining religion has remained largely a Western project? Is imagining 
religion an inevitable part of the larger project of creating the secular as 
its paired and opposite other? Asking these kinds of questions moves 
inquiry well beyond the methodological reflexivity or self-consciousness 
that Smith calls for by turning the ethnographic gaze back onto 
theoreticians of religion themselves. …In what way is the scholarly 
project of imagining religion as it takes place within the Western 
university part of the larger cultural labor of creating and extending the 
secular?500 
 
 This essay works from a set of religious questions about the nature of self-
examination, as that examination takes place—or fails to do so—within a field of 
compassion. 
Those questions were first raised in conversation with Buddhist practitioners in 
institutional settings: first at the Barre Center for Buddhist Studies, a retreat and study 
center in rural Massachusetts, and then at the Won Institute for Graduate Studies in 
499 John J. Thatamanil, “Comparing Professors Smith and Tillich: A Response to Jonathan Z. Smith’s 
‘Tillich’s Remains,’” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, December 2010, Vol. 78, No. 4, p. 1172. 
500 Ibid., p. 1179. 228 
                                                        
 
Philadelphia.  The questions themselves have to do with the therapeutic commitments 
and views of self among contemporary Buddhists in capitalist cultures.  This work, then, 
is in part about the inculturation of Buddhism in the North Atlantic world, where 
Buddhism is easily constructed as a therapeutic auxiliary. 
It has been very easy, thus far, for North American Buddhists to overlook the 
great traditions of critical thought about human ethical harm, and about our intense 
need for refuge, in pre-therapeutic Buddhist communities.  With Levinas, pre-modern 
Buddhists were concerned with the connections between ignorance and violence. 
Insofar as Buddhists in the West sometimes see themselves in opposition to the 
Abrahamic traditions they have left, the similarities of ‘self-blame’ I have written about 
here implicitly challenge any convenient assumptions of total religious difference.  For 
instance, Buddhists, because we supposedly have no doctrine of sin’s origination (an 
entirely questionable assumption), are also supposedly free of Abrahamic sources of 
negativity toward the self. 
This hides far more than it reveals.  Such interreligious dualisms help to hide the 
therapeutic secularizing context within which any religious commitment is now made. 
In a community of committed religious imagination and practice, both 
differences and similarities may allow for unexpected creative insight.  The work of the 
theologian or teacher is to discern which similarities and which differences are 
important for a given question of ethical, ritual, epistemological, contemplative, or 
institutional practice. 
229 
 
The similarity of apophatic emphases of some Buddhist and Christian medieval 
monastics, for instance, is an entirely reasonable focus for scholarship, if the Christian 
theologian is thereby driven, through an initial similarity, to recover and vivify practices 
of silence for his or her own Christian audience.  The contemporary Buddhist, enamored 
with a romanticized apophatic, may find in the same comparison a helpful reminder of 
the cataphatic and ritual emphases of prior Buddhist thought and practice. 
An emphasis on interreligious similarities of devotion, like those pursued in the 
work of Francis Clooney, may have far more value and purpose for vivifying both 
traditions’ access to such devotion, than any exploration of mere religious difference.  
Difference itself cannot be relevant so long as it simply delineates incommensurability.  
No one cares that turtles are not planets.  Difference alone is no guarantee of relevance. 
Similarities, then, particularly in a cultural situation where non-therapeutic 
religious lives are difficult to cultivate, may serve useful ends of greater refuge, faith, 
and trust.501 These are not the ‘useful ends’ that Jonathan Z. Smith was prepared to 
recognize.  Smith’s disciplinary demands leave little room for the scholar who is faithful, 
seeking understanding—and they leave perhaps no room at all for the scholar who is 
faithful, seeking deepened faith. 
Usefulness, in the social location of university religious studies, is often defined 
in terms of new knowledge that enriches or complicates theory itself.  The theologian, 
on the other hand, is not interested in the new so much as he or she is interested in 
501 In such a case, the true test of the valuable comparison may be whether the comparison itself can be 
left behind, after it has done its corrective or revitalizing work. 230 
                                                        
 
what understandings can help give his or her community greater access to love or 
compassion.  These understandings are often shared with the past.  But they are not 
mere exercises in domesticated and secular ‘cultural memory’—they have specific 
audiences and purposes. 
Theological inquiry seeks to render the human being’s greater dignity back to 
him or her, in an expanded context of love.  Thatamanil and others are right that this is a 
far different project than the construction of theories of religion. 
My questions have been about the sources of destructive self-aversion in my 
own time and place, but also about the strangely thin therapeutic rhetoric of 
autonomous ‘self-compassion.’  In a therapeutic context, practices of ‘self-blame’ have 
become increasingly invisible to us as forms of religious creativity and connection, 
precisely at the point where connection has become most needful. 
Even the most cursory reader will recognize that the work above includes both 
significant similarities and sharp differences.  The first chapter offers a typology of the 
divergent views of shame that operate in contemporary psychology and philosophy.  
That chapter focuses in particular on shame as it operates, for both psychologists and 
philosophers, within communal and social contexts.  Shame is always a problem or a 
possibility of connection.  Psychologists and philosophers, however, have usually valued 
connection very differently.  (There are exceptions: Sartre, for instance, who is far more 
individualistic and therapeutic in tenor than Emmanuel Levinas, Bernard Williams, and 
John Braithwaite.)  The social-historical understandings of capitalist emotion outlined by 
Illouz, Lasch, and Susman helped to provide a context to better understand how 231 
 
historically conditioned recent psychological and philosophical discussions of shame 
have been: we live in an era of self-performativity and intensified self-evaluation. 
The second chapter names the problem of shame as a central concern in 
Nietzsche’s mature thought.  Affirmative autonomy functions as the heart of Nietzsche’s 
proposed response to self-aversive shame.  But autonomy does not appear to offer 
genuine resources of joy and commitment; the human being is always and necessarily 
rooted in relationship, and the attempt to heal the damages of aversive shame by 
enhancing autonomy solves very little. 
These first chapters were intended to offer some broader historical, sociological, 
and intellectual context for better understanding modernist antipathy or blindness 
toward religious practices of ‘self-blame.’  Those practices are discussed in Chapters 
Three and Four, on lojong and penthos, respectively. 
Even so, these chapters on self-blame themselves contain internal 
differentiation.  In Chapter 3, I discuss modernist Buddhist self-compassion, in order to 
create a framing contrast with pre-therapeutic Buddhist practices that take the human 
capacity for karmic harm far more seriously.  I do something similar in Chapter Four, 
discussing the modernist Christian rhetoric of self-acceptance, in order to contrast that 
rhetoric with the penthos of the Desert Fathers, which is a path of greater love than self-
acceptance can be. 
To imagine ‘self-blame’ as an autonomous practice of ascetic self-perfection is to 
badly misunderstand such practice.  Buddhist and Christian practices of ‘self-blame’ and 
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penthos work, instead, from relationship, and also toward renewed relationship to 
transcendent sources of compassion. 
In a therapeutic cultural context, it is almost impossible to perceive religious 
possibilities beyond those available to the autonomous self.502  It is autonomy which I 
most thoroughly question and critique. 
 
It is customary in this kind of writing to situate oneself, naming the particular 
and limited horizons that one’s questions and answers must necessarily inhabit.  Such 
statements sometimes have an air of defensive self-exculpation, meant to forestall 
critique.  In the humanities, authority is sometimes renounced altogether, simply 
because no authority can be final. 
But the authority of any theological work depends upon the way in which a 
community of practice is able to hear and respond to that work.  I myself have the 
limited but real authority of a co-questioner and participant within communities of 
Buddhist practice.  Any work of mine will be justified, or not, by the richness of the 
conversations it enables me to pursue.  This has to do not only with others’ learning 
from me, but with my ongoing learning from them. 
I come, of course, from a very particular social, geographical, gendered, racial, 
emotional, and economic position.  It would be difficult to imagine a more fortunate life, 
than to be born into the white middle-class in late twentieth-century America.  I was 
502 The autonomous self may also be understood as a neoliberal self.  I have chosen autonomy, however, 
as a primary descriptive language because it refers more broadly to habits of self-separation that are 
recognizable to pre-therapeutic and pre-capitalist religious thinkers in both Buddhism and Christianity. 233 
                                                        
 
raised in the particularly individualistic cultural context of the inland Pacific Northwest. 
My hometown, which lies along the Columbia River in the desert of Southeastern 
Washington State, exists in large part due to the Manhattan Project.  Four of my 
childhood friends have doctoral degrees in Physics. 
In that scientistic atmosphere, my family in particular was intensively therapeutic 
and individualistic in its intellectual and moral assumptions.  Throughout my early life, I 
had little exposure to any invested religious lives.  I was in fine position to become a 
prophet of the therapeutic. 
But I have also been a person particularly made for connection.  I live within a 
certain kind of interpersonal watchfulness and care, and none of that is particularly my 
own doing. It has meant, however, that therapeutic autonomy increasingly makes little 
sense to me as a reasonable human telos that I myself might inhabit.   
It no doubt requires a therapeutic to critique the therapeutic.  It became clear to 
me, as a young adult, that I was given over, far more than necessary or wise, to habits of 
severe and painful self-critique, and that these habits had only further negative effects 
for me and others. 
I also found myself seeking out places of refuge, perhaps in part refuge from this 
critical and untrusting aspect of mind: I travelled extensively as a young person, going 
into Syrian mosques and Ukrainian Orthodox churches, German cathedrals and Tibetan 
monasteries.  I intuited in these places the possibility of a greater safety than I could find 
anywhere in my own history.  But I had in my early life no disciplines through which I 
could consistently gain access to that safety. 234 
 
 I began studying religion as one in need himself of deepening trust.  Lojong is the 
place or practice where I most belong precisely because it is so definitively a path of 
connection to compassion directly within the situation of daily difficulty.  Lojong 
disciplines a life that continues to move, fitfully at best, in the direction of greater 
connection and compassion.  However, I have had to slowly renounce any 
therapeutically adjusted normalcy in order to understand the purposes of lojong at all.  
The pages above are part of that renunciation. 
 So situated, I propose now to offer several conclusions, and several avenues of 
further inquiry, in response to ‘self-blame’ as a practice of transcendent integration in 
Tibetan lojong and Christian penthos. 
 
The work above repeatedly emphasized the ways in which ‘self-blame’ will have 
to take place within a field of compassion, if it is to enable any increasing connection to 
compassion itself. 
The therapeutic can only perceive self-blame as a practice of autonomy, and 
therefore quite understandably perceives self-blame only as a masochism.  However, 
the ‘driver’ of blame is not, for the lojong practitioner, autonomous and conditioned 
reason at all; similarly, self-reproach, for the Desert Fathers, is received as a gift of 
integrating grace—it only takes place within that goodness.  Self-blame is re-connection. 
This process may be understood, of course, in entirely psychologized terms.  
Psychologists increasingly see religious commitment in the terms of attachment theory.  
Extending the theoretical work of developmental psychologist John Bowlby, scholars of 235 
 
attachment suggest that it accomplishes ‘two important functions’: “(a) providing a safe 
haven in times of threat or stress and (b) serving as a secure base from which to explore 
the environment and develop new mental and physical skills.”503 
Buddhist teachers of refuge are unlikely to disagree with this general portrait, 
although ‘exploring the environment and developing new mental and physical skills,’ in 
the context of the path of the bodhisattva, is not at all reducible to any normalized 
development.  The theorists of attachment tend to work in a reductionist key, 
highlighting “the propensity among human beings to develop attachment-like 
relationships to unobservable, imaginary others.”504  It is of course deeply unclear why 
imagined relationships should be ‘like’ attachment.  Our encounter with others is always 
mediated by imagination; imagined connection is the only connection. 
The real question is whether the connected imagination is developed with skill 
and focused intention.  We might recall Jamgön Kongtrul’s insistence on visionary guru 
yoga as a frame for lojong as a whole: “It is important to begin every period of 
meditation this way.”505 We have also seen Gomo Tulku suggesting that those of his 
students who felt they had not progressed in compassion and wisdom were often too 
little invested in guru yoga. 
Is guru yoga, then, simply a technology of normalized attachment? The 
psychologist of attachment reduces religious commitment to a typology of conditioning: 
503 Pehr Granqvist, Mario Mikulincer, and Phillip R. Shaver, “Religion as Attachment: Normative Processes 
and Individual Differences,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14(1) (2010), p. 50. 
504 Pehr Granqvist, “Religion as Attachment: The Godin Award Lecture,” Archive for the Study of Religion 
32 (2010), p. 20. 
505 Kongtrul, p. 8. 236 
                                                        
 
those who are insecurely attached, due to early experience with caregivers, are likely to 
use religious commitment episodically as a form of ‘distress-regulation’; avoidant 
attachment styles predict agnosticism or atheism; and secure attachment styles suggest 
a probability that the religious person will view God or ultimate reality as a source of 
security.506  
 The notion that different persons will commit themselves differently to 
ontologies and practices of ultimate compassion will hardly be surprising to any 
Buddhist teacher or Christian theologian.  This is one reason for the fundamental 
Buddhist emphasis on renunciation: in traditional Buddhist communities, renunciation 
aligns individual styles of attachment along a path of common commitment.  
Regularized ritual and contemplative practice in the presence of an awakened teacher, 
particularly in the Mahāyāna and the Vajrayana, allows each practitioner to develop 
creative and sustainable styles of attachment. 
 Note, though, that this alignment of styles of attachment takes place in 
relationship to sources of awakening that will drive all of us well beyond any normalizing 
goal of health.  Connection to the teacher is connection to the manifestation of 
Buddhahood itself.  This involves a reformation of our attention and our trust in ways 
that other forms of ‘attachment’ cannot provide. 
We otherwise pursue a version of Pascal’s wager: religious commitments may or 
may not place us in relationship to ultimate reality—but we pursue religious 
commitment primarily because it produces the likelihood of relief and well-being. 
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Here there is no refuge in anything beyond the possibility of our own benefit.  
Devotion takes on the minimal meaning of therapeutic adjustment, with no vision of 
true access to any more boundless form of compassion.  This is the despair of not 
knowing that one is in despair.  It is ‘Buddhism’ as a fantasy of renunciation. 
It turns out that practices of devotion like guru yoga do involve maturation and 
integration, but only because they do not see the individual person’s well-being as their 
final purpose.  The process of devotion itself is the beginning of participation in precisely 
the same compassion that one seeks. 
This is the therapeutic paradox: one’s own suffering is far more likely to be 
reduced when personal relief from suffering is not one’s highest purpose.  Psychologists 
of self-compassion, including many Buddhist therapeutics, often conflate outcomes of 
personal relief with the rhetoric of a more total awakening—thereby reducing the 
likelihood of either. 
Autonomous self-compassion may allow for a reduction of aversion toward our 
own experience.  But the ‘self-blame’ of lojong seeks the integration of the person into a 
greater compassion, and a far more extensive fearlessness than we can merely muster. 
To drive all blames into one is to allow compassion itself to use our daily 
moments of negativity to further our own more fluent participation in compassion.  And 
to be so driven is to be turned, again and again, toward such participation.  This involves 
no aversion to what is blamed, but rather a recognition that moments of blame are 
themselves important and necessary opportunities.  To be grateful to everyone is to 
recognize the revelatory potential in all frustration.  It is impossible to practice such 238 
 
gratitude apart from extraordinary trust in one’s own place in a broader field of 
compassion. 
 Eleonore Stump has written, from a Catholic philosophical perspective, that the 
sort of unified and strenuous love that we most fundamentally desire “requires internal 
integration on the part of the person.”507  Nietzsche will agree.  But this ‘internal’ 
integration is always also an integration into and dependence upon the life of God.  
“[W]hat human beings are culpable for is not the weakness of their wills when it comes 
to willing the good, but rather something very different—namely, the failure to seek 
help.”508 Christian surrender, like Buddhist commitments to refuge, is the necessary 
foundation for any empowered capacities of love. 
This essay has been a critique of autonomy as the basic refusal to even view help 
as a possibility.  And so I wish to suggest that contemporary Buddhists may have 
something to learn from Christian considerations of evil.  Buddhists usually emphasize 
skillful and unskillful modes of activity, rather than reifying persons themselves into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’—reifications that introduce subtle but serious possibilities of revenge 
or violence.  Some discussions like this can become a kind of Buddhist self-
congratulation, or an expression of superiority. 
In St. Thomas’s understanding, however, evil is not so much a reification, but 
rather the ongoing process of turning away from love—even though this is a love that 
infuses all lives, including those lives that turn away from love itself.  “[Evil’s] being,” 
507 Ibid., 137. 
508 Ibid., 159. 239 
                                                        
 
writes Michael Himes, “is self-contradictory”509; it refuses the reality of its own 
lovedness.  Eleonore Stump has spoke of the ‘willed loneliness’ of shame in quite similar 
terms of self-division. “Evil,” writes Himes, “is the refusal to be what in fact we are, the 
denial of our being good, the denial of our being loved, the refusal to love ourselves or 
others.”510  
Evil, then, is a quality of activity, and an expression of denial, much more than it 
is a status intrinsic or essential to any person.  And so far as self-aversion is an active 
refusal to participate in compassion, aversive shame might be viewed chiefly as an 
expression of evil in Christian understanding.511 
In this sense, the notion that “Our self-acceptance is the basis of the Christian 
creed”512 is ultimately true—but only if considered as an acceptance of a broader love, 
and therefore as a rejection of mere autonomy, rather than a confirmation of it. 
It turns out that the triumph of the therapeutic involves the triumph of a very 
truncated view of human dignity, one that denies our capacity for significant harm.  
Where the human being is merely incapacitated by pathology, the highest 
transformation he or she might achieve is the health of normalcy.  But as Charles Taylor 
notes, “evil has the dignity of an option for an apparent good; sickness has not.”513 
We can see how fateful the issue is for a human life.  To worry endlessly 
about the meaning of an unease whose whole basis is really organic 
[neurophysiological alone] is to have wasted time and effort, and to have 
incurred unnecessary suffering.  But to have tried to get rid of an unease 
509 Himes, 70. 
510 Ibid, 72. 
511 A point of agreement, if the psychologists can hear it, between themselves and the Christian. 
512 Metz, 5. 
513 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 619. 240 
                                                        
 
that one really needed to understand is crippling; the more so in that 
within the culture of the therapeutic, the various languages, ethical and 
spiritual, in which this understanding can be couched become less and 
less familiar, less and less available to each new generation.514 
 
 This reminder of the dignity implied in the option to evil necessarily challenges 
the therapeutic levelling of desire, which encourages us to consider only one sort of 
human flourishing.  But when persons are less and less able to perceive or articulate 
their most fundamental desire to participate in love itself, a deep anxiety intensifies.515  
The therapeutic proposes a diminution of the most basic and ineradicable human 
desire, but the resulting irruption of anxiety is a primary tragedy of therapeutic 
modernity. 
 Buddhists in particular would do well to carefully revisit our resources for 
accessing such desire, so that we are not so easily tempted toward the sterility of a high-
end samsara.  Shantideva writes: 
In this and all my other lifetimes, 
Wandering in the round without beginning, 
Blindly I have brought forth wickedness...516 
 
 This is not to be confused with any total self-aversion.  Still less is it an attempt 
to earn some external forgiveness.  It is instead a recognition of the real—the way in 
which the pre-conscious habit of self-grasping has been an unending source of pain, and 
therefore the correct object of any blame.  Without an honest horror in response to our 
514 Ibid, 622. 
515 See Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
516 Shantideva, 2.28. 241 
                                                        
 
own ancient and violent ignorance, without a Levinasian shame, we must fail to respond 
to the aspiration for compassionate awakening that is already within us. 
This is the aspiration which alone can actually perceive the true scope of 
suffering in the first place.  It is the human aspiration that the therapeutic forecloses. 
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